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Abstract
The Anxiety Disorders Association of Ontario (ADAO) is a grassroots, 'community' based
group that seeks to readdress the lack of figurative and literal spaces available for those with
anxiety conditions such as panic and agoraphobia. In order to do so, the ADAO must
negotiate a balance between networking with other organizations, and maintaining its own
direction, thereby creating a space that is 'one's own'. Using qualitative methods this thesis
examines how the ADAO constructs itself in the context of this tension.
The thesis builds on geographical, feminist and political literatures about the interrelationship
between health, identity, space and place by focusing on experiences of anxiety conditions
that are embodied by members of the ADAO. The thesis illustrates the complex
interconnections between discourses of community, identity, and wider socio-economic,
political and medical environments. More specifically the thesis investigates the discursive
production ofmental health care spaces and services for anxiety conditions within Ottawa,
Ontario, Canada.
Chapter one introduces the questions that the thesis addresses and the theoretical perspectives
that inform it. Chapter two reviews current work in the social sciences and geography on
anxiety conditions and agoraphobia in particular; feminist political theory on issues of care
and autonomy; and geographical research on health care, mental health, disability and
impairment. Chapter three explains how the research was informed by feminist geographical
methodologies, and how the data were collected, used, analyzed and written within the
research process. Chapter four provides an account of the history of the ADAO and the
context within which it operates.
The next four chapters analyse documentary and interview data to show how the ADAO
advocates the development of'health citizenship' as opposed to a model of the normative
'healthy citizen' upon which much clinical organization and health care practice is based.
The healthy citizen-subject is an abstract ideal created and maintained by processes of
governmentality, expert knowledges and a self-care ethic that shapes wider beliefs about who
is an effective, productive member of society. Health citizenship by contrast highlights the
needs and lived experiences of individuals, including those with anxiety conditions. It
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incorporates people's experiences into a model of citizenship and subjectivity rather than
using experiences like anxiety as something to strive against. Consequently, rather than
negating one's own experience of ill health in the pursuit of an ideal of an 'able', sickness-
free, body and subjectivity, the experience of ill health becomes a constituent part of
citizenship. Thus, the thesis argues that, through the development of health citizenship, the
ADAO offers an inclusive model of subjectivity and community consistent with geographies
of active citizenship and radical democracy. In this way the ADAO forges a space for itself
within a landscape ofmental health service provision. Chapter nine concludes the thesis by
summarising its core argument and emphasizing the importance of the knowledges of those
with anxiety conditions including 'community' groups such as the ADAO, which so often
remain excluded from wider debates about health-care provision; highlighting the thesis'
contribution to the production of geographical, political, and feminist knowledge and theory
with a focus on the contributions the thesis has made to the subject of geography; and
suggestions for future research directions and questions.
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Chapter One - Introduction
1.1 Thesis themes and issues
In Anxiety in a Risk Society Iain Wilkinson (2001) describes how anxiety has become a
central trope within contemporary cultural and social theory. The twentieth century has
been an 'age of anxiety', a time of high anxiety resulting in increasing vulnerability and
instability. It is not surprising then that anxiety disorders, which emerged as a clinical
category within the later nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century, are seen by
some as a quintessential marker ofmodernity (Freud, 1979 in Wilkinson, 2001). For
cultural theorists such as Kroker and Cook (1985) and Bauman (1993), anxiety and panic
characterize the postmodern state ofmind and the postmodern condition (Bauman, 1993).
For social theorists such as Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991), anxiety underpins the
concept of the risk society. In a world that is characterized as increasingly risky, anxiety is
inevitable (Beck, 1992).
According to numerous studies anxiety disorders are the most prevalent form ofmental
condition within western societies. It is estimated that one out of every six persons will
have an anxiety disorder at some point in their life, and that these statistics may be higher
for women than men. Anxiety conditions include panic disorder, agoraphobia with and
without panic, post-traumatic stress disorder, phobias including specific and social
phobias, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder (APA, 2000;
NIMH, 2003). Throughout the thesis I typically use the term 'condition', rather than the
conventional term 'disorder' to complicate clinical language practices, as well as a
respectful gesture to the subjects ofmy research who highlight the stigmatizing effects of
the term 'disorder'. However, the term disorder is used, where appropriate, as a way of
making specific reference to clinical discourses.
In spite of the discussion of the importance and prevalence of anxiety, there is very little
development ofwhat anxiety means and how it is experienced. This thesis aims to address
that gap. While there is considerable and growing interest in the subject of anxiety, panic
and agoraphobia within clinical literatures, there are few writings on these subjects within
the social sciences and humanities that address the lived realities of these conditions, and
even fewer writings on organizations that deal with these issues. Writings on anxiety,
panic and agoraphobia have been primarily concerned with individual experiences and
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stories. This is because these narratives have historically been silenced or remained
unheard and unspoken. This thesis aims not only to investigate the experiences of
individuals but, to explore a different kind of storyteller, one who has also been largely
unheard and silenced - the anxiety organization.
The wider aims/purposes of the thesis are: First, to highlight the importance of
organizations that address anxiety conditions because these groups often remain
unacknowledged or subjugated within the health service sector. Thus, the thesis illustrates
the relevance that anxiety organizations, and the experiences of its membership, have for
further study. Second, to provide geographical insights of relevance to the experience of
individuals with anxiety conditions and groups that deal with anxiety conditions. And
third, to contribute to, and expand on, geographical, feminist and political theory by
illustrating the connections between geography, embodied experiences of anxiety, mental
health service provision and the negotiation of identity, community and citizenship. This
thesis seeks to advance several different areas of geographical inquiry including work on
mental health and health geography, geographies of fear, geography and the body, the
public/private divide, the geography of community and citizenship.
The research uses an intensive case study of a particular voluntary organization -
the anxiety disorders association ofOntario (ADAO). The thesis revolves around the
experiences of the ADAO and its membership from 1999 - 2002. The ADAO is a non¬
profit/ voluntary/grassroots/charitable/sufferer-led/'community based' organization
located in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada with a mandate to provide information, increase
awareness and offer educational services to those with anxiety conditions and the wider
public. Organizations like the ADAO were developed in response to the lack of public
spaces and forums available for those with anxiety conditions. The ADAO aims to
readdress this imbalance and inequality for those with anxiety conditions. It seeks to
actively create a place, literally and figuratively, that works with, and is based on, the
lived realities of those with anxiety conditions. In order to do so an effective anxiety and
panic organization needs to negotiate the balance between networking with others and the
development of its own direction. This process is always ongoing as: "a fully inclusive
(political) community and its final unity can never be realized since their will permanently
be a 'constitutive outside', an exterior to the community that makes its existence possible"
(Mouffe, 1993:235). The ADAO wants to carve its own space within the wider context of
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health service provision and other communities, while simultaneously creating and
sustaining productive networks and communicative relationships within that wider
context that will encourage the organizations growth. The thesis explores this ongoing
process for the ADAO and identifies the organization's difficulties and successes in
negotiating its place within, and as, a community.
The ADAO exists within a series of interconnected tensions that affect both individuals
and the development of the organization itself, both ofwhom are trying to find a place for
themselves within their wider contexts. These tensions reflect wider societal issues about
the place of'mental health' and the prioritization of knowledge within a health care
system. They also open up some important questions about the relationship between
service provision, subjectivity and community, thus exploring these tensions has wider
relevance for theory, potential service provision and organizational development. The
tensions center around the pathologization of anxiety conditions and anxiety service
provision, as well as the creation of alternate knowledges about anxiety conditions that
focus on the daily lived realities of anxiety conditions and services that directly address
those experiences, which may contradict or complicate clinical practices and knowledges
of anxiety disorders. Both individuals and groups must weigh the costs and benefits of
being labeled with a mental disorder. What are the costs of the stigmatization ofmental
illness on the subjectivities, identities and geographies of individuals and groups that deal
with anxiety conditions? In a health care system that is dominated by clinical structures,
power and knowledge can groups and individuals afford not to enter into this system and
risk being positioned outside, without access to needed services, funding or recognition.
The thesis also argues for an understanding of anxiety conditions, and the grassroots
organizations that address these issues, as significant in comprehending processes of
subjectivity. In particular the thesis argues that anxiety organizations may offer alternative
models of subjectivity that affect our sense of community and help us position ourselves
within wider geographical, socio-cultural and clinical contexts. Thus the thesis uses the
case study of the ADAO in order to illustrate different forms of subjectivity negotiated
and produced within its programs and discourses, specifically what I describe as the
healthy citizen and health citizenship.
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The experience of anxiety, similar to other mental health conditions, is often a marker of
the anti-citizen; that to which we should not aspire to become. The experiences of those
with anxiety disorders rather than being incorporated into a collective notion of
subjectivity and citizenship becomes a marker of lack, the antithesis of the contemporary
citizen, something that is worked against as opposed to worked with. To have anxiety is
normal and routine, to succumb to anxiety is a sign ofweakness, an inability to cope with
societal demands; thus anxiety disorders signal a character flaw, connected to the essential
self and nature of that person (Wilkinson, 2001). Anxiety is something that people can
and should be able 'to get over' and 'move on from'. Anxiety conditions are classified as
neuroses, which means a relatively mild mental illness involving symptoms of stress
without loss of contact with reality (APA, 2000). In this way sufferers are seen to have
some control over their actions and are thought of as responsible agents who are liable for
maintaining control of themselves and coping with their surroundings. However, many
sufferers describe feeling overwhelmed and losing control of themselves and their
environments during an anxiety or panic attack. Thus, the sufferer takes on the double
burden of feeling as if they are losing control, yet as responsible agents they are liable for
themselves and their actions. In this way anxiety disorders, such as panic, become
markers of vulnerability and instability, associated with the history of labeling mental
illness and madness. This creates a cycle of self doubt and self blame, in which feelings of
shame, deviance, abnormality lead to a process of physically and metaphorically isolating
and 'othering' the self.
The stigmatization of anxiety has resulted in misperceptions about the severity and
experience of anxiety that have further led to the invisibility, trivialization and
marginalization ofanxiety conditions as being just 'anxious' or 'panicky'. The
misperceptions and trivialization of anxiety conditions are issues that the ADAO must
address in order to gain credibility for its cause, to increase awareness and educate the
public. Therefore the ADAO must address the issue of subjectivity and become active in
its (re) construction. However the process by which the ADAO negotiates subjectivity is
both complex and contradictory. On the one hand the ADAO actively fosters the needs
and lived experiences of individuals with anxiety conditions and incorporates those
experiences into a model of citizenship and subjectivity rather than using those
experiences as something to strive against. In this thesis this is described as health
citizenship. Within a model of health citizenship the experience of ill health becomes a
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constituent part of citizenship as opposed to its antithesis. On the other hand, the pursuit
of an ideal 'able', sickness free body and subjectivity is central to both the clinical care
system and the ADAO which often bifurcates the experience of ill health in favor of an
end product, what is described in the thesis as the healthy citizen.
The thesis argues that the question of organization development is necessarily connected
to the issue of subjectivity. I argue that an organization that is able to balance alternative
discourses in the wider context of clinical structures without losing sight of its own
desires and goals is an organization that strives towards developing health citizenship as
opposed to reifying the ideal of the 'healthy' citizen. In other words rather than negating
ones' own experience of ill health in pursuit of the ideal of a 'sickness free' body and
subjectivity, the experience of ill health becomes a constituent part of citizenship. Health
citizenship is similar in many respects to cultural citizenship, which values and includes a
diverse range of cultural identities and cultural practices into a model of the citizen.
Similar to Anne Phillips (1995) "politics of presence", in which she discusses cultural
citizenship, health citizenship is attentive not simply to the messages but to the
messengers themselves. But unlike cultural citizenship, which is more concerned with
identity politics, health citizenship is concerned with body politics. Thus, embodied
subject positions, the spaces of the body, and the relationship of the body to wider
geographies then must be taken into consideration within the development ofwhat
constitutes citizenship and what kinds of considerations need to be made in thinking about
citizen-subjects.
Susan Sontag (1978) goes one step further than Phillips by provocatively suggesting that
illness and ill health itself is a more onerous form of citizenship. Though it is a statement
that she throws out, with little additional discussion, I believe she is implying that the
notion of an able body upon which normative theories of citizenship are based should be
abandoned in favor of a body that experiences ill health. For her it is more realistic that at
some point we will all experience, in some form or another, illness; and less likely that
most of us will be able to attain the ideal of the abstract 'able' body based on
universalized principles that privilege a particular type of (male) body to begin with. I
believe Sontag is implying suffering, whether it is physical, emotional, mental, economic
or otherwise, needs to be a constitutive part of the concept of citizenship as opposed to its
antithesis. Thus, illness as a more onerous form of citizenship also requires that we take
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more seriously experiential aspects of health and health service provision. Here the
subject of health citizenship is not the possibility of some abstracted ideal to be attained
separate from personal reality, but something that addresses the everyday realities of ill
health. The thesis does not imply that health citizenship should not involve the desire and
the aspiration to 'get better' and 'be well', but that in the pursuit of health, the process of
getting better (which may also involve getting worse) is often ignored in favor of the end
destination, meaning that the experience of ill health is often compounded with a lack of
service provision, care and rights accorded to those individuals when they are 'unhealthy'.
Additionally, in the case of chronic illness, which is common for many of those with
anxiety conditions, there are some people who will never 'get better', and what options
are those persons left with for enhancing their sense of personhood and subjectivity?
Health citizenship can involve looking for alternative radical democratic spaces of
citizenship; become a process of community development and organization; or become a
process in which radical change may not occur, but where citizens gain a sense of their
relationship and needs in relation to social institutions and an appreciation that those
institutions are not natural but subject to construction. Within the thesis these
understandings of citizenship are linked and enhance an understanding of the other. In
these discursive conceptions of citizenship one comes to realize one's place relative to the
ideal of citizen, as well as, one's lack of place in relation to the ideal. The thesis is
concerned to discover how looking at the geographies of citizenship means looking for
different expressions of citizenship beyond the public-private divide, especially when
considering anxiety conditions such as agoraphobia. Health citizenship is a process where
people are positioned in complex ways that may help to resist or subvert existing
meanings and spaces of the political, extending meanings of the political beyond that of
the 'state'.
The tension between models of the healthy citizen and health citizenship are reflective of
the tension the ADAO has in balancing its desire to create a space for itself and to
network with other anxiety service providers. By focusing on issues of health citizenship
and the healthy citizen the thesis is concerned to discover how organizations such as the
ADAO come to affect the construction of identity, subjectivity and community in ways
that suggest the importance of the first hand experiences and narratives of those with
anxiety conditions, panic and agoraphobia in particular. The issue of health citizenship is
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linked within this thesis to a number of central questions about the capacity of an
organization to develop new frameworks of knowledge, subjectivity and identity. Does
the ADAO create spaces it can call its own offering new alternatives? Is this important or
useful for the ADAO to do so in the first place? In creating these alternative venues does
the ADAO also contribute to the development of productive ways of thinking about
anxiety conditions? Does the ADAO seek to replicate and develop its membership as
healthy citizens, who can be slotted back into their contexts so as to be productive and
effective workers and citizens? Or is the ADAO concerned to include the lived realities of
anxiety conditions into the model of subjectivity and engage in a process of health
citizenship?
1.2 Chapter Structure
The first four chapters, including this one, set up the substantive analysis for chapters five
through eight. Chapter two is a literature review ofnon-clinical and geographical writings
on anxiety conditions, in particular panic and agoraphobia, the two anxiety conditions that
will be primarily focused on within this thesis. Chapter three is concerned with the
research methodologies employed during the thesis process and within a broader
discussion of feminist geographical methodology. The fourth chapter provides
background material and an organizational history of the ADAO that helps to
contextualize the normative, geographical and social theory to follow. Chapters five
through eight elaborate on different but connected issues that develop the central
questions of the thesis.
The main substantive section of the thesis, chapters five to eight, reflects the ongoing
tensions and questions within the ADAO about the negotiation of its identity, subjectivity
and community. In this section 'body' (chapter 5), 'mind' (chapter 6), 'heart' (chapter 7)
and 'breath' (chapter 8) chapters structure the main arguments and substantive analysis of
the thesis. The metaphoric titles 'body' and 'mind' are used to remind the reader of the
legacy ofCartesian dualisms in structuring our subjectivities, identities and communities,
while 'heart' and 'breath' are different kinds ofmetaphors that highlight connectedness
rather than categorization. The chapter titles reflect several tensions that the ADAO has to
deal with: first, the abstract categorization and understanding of bodies and subjects in
comparison to the messy daily-lived realities of anxiety; and second mediating the desire
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to be a part of the wider clinical care system that may not reflect the visions and desires of
the organization itself.
Chapter five, 'body', explores an aspect of the healthy citizen that is central to its
maintenance- the construction of a body that is made intelligible through visual
monitoring and the 'gaze'. This contributes to the production of a body, and self,
understood through continual self surveillance and regulation. In this respect visibility
becomes a component of the spatial reproduction of'madness' and 'disorder'. These
issues are explored through an analysis of how being (in)visible is a central problem and
topic for the ADAO, and how this has contributed to the organization's difficulties and
the difficulties ofmany of its membership, both literally and metaphorically.
Chapter six, 'mind', involves another central issue pertinent to the creation of the healthy
citizen- the function of expert knowledge, professional discourses and the reliance on that
expertise. The metaphor of'mind' in relation to this issue addresses dilemmas generated
by the of the meanings, stigma and "object" of 'mental' illness or disorder within anxiety
service provision (Foucault, 1967). Chapter 'mind' focuses on two issues. First, the
effects that the stigma ofmental disorder, developed in conjunction with the various
meanings ascribed to madness, has had on the ADAO and on persons with anxiety
conditions. Second, how the ADAO is structured in relation to expert knowledge and how
it has adopted expertise into organizational structure, language practices and mandate,
thus, at times, privileging professional discourses over 'lay' discourses.
Chapter seven, 'heart', reflects more critically on whether the ADAO simply replicates
the dominant normative and social discourses of the healthy citizen, or is actively engaged
in the construction of a different kind of subjectivity. The chapter argues that what
differentiates the ADAO's programs and mandate is its focus on fostering relational
autonomy, the understanding that the creation of the subject is not independent from other
people and the context in which the individual is positioned. The focus on the relational
nature of identity and subjectivity, or between self and other, helps create a different kind
of space which is more responsive to the first hand needs of individuals with anxiety
conditions and those around them. A focus on relational autonomy also offers suggestions
as to how groups can create different kinds of democratic places that act as alternatives to
the dominant spaces of current anxiety service provision and care.
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Chapter eight, 'breath', poses the question: can the ADAO be thought of as active in the
production of forms of citizenship and democratic spaces that enhance what I have
described as health citizenship? The chapter explores in detail how health citizenship is
connected and negotiated by the ADAO. The chapter draws on the work of a variety of
political and geographical theorists to draw out meanings of health citizenship. Through
exploring this issue, the chapter shows how new spaces of health citizenship are useful for
organizations (such as the ADAO) and the subjectivities, identities and geographies of
those with anxiety conditions.
This substantive section - chapters five through eight are divided into two broad but
interconnected sections. Chapters 'body' and 'mind' revolve around how the ADAO has
predominantly incorporated but sometimes resisted dominant clinical discourses into its
programs, structure and mandate, i.e. creation of a specific body subject to particular
forms of (self) governance and (self) surveillance connected to the role of experts and
expertise. These chapters connect those clinical discourses to the binary of body/mind,
hence the chapter titles, and explore the struggles, challenges or opportunities the ADAO
has been presented with as a result of that binary, and how these binaries have been
worked into the ADAO's programs, structure and mandate. In this way the chapters
highlight that dualistic thinking about body and mind, in spite of academic and theoretical
criticism, remain powerful markers in people's everyday lives concerning matters of
health and political thought.
Chapters 'heart' and 'breath' analyze in more detail how the ADAO has created a space
for itself, its own sense of place, identity and community within the broader local and
national context. These chapters focus on how the ADAO has created a literal and
metaphoric space for itself that is centered on an understanding of the painful lived
realities of anxiety conditions that need to be incorporated in the construction of a more
enabling subjectivity, identity and mobility, as opposed to striving towards a particular
ideal. Thus, these chapters highlight the possibilities of subverting and transforming the
bodies and expert knowledges that sustain certain clinical discourses and practices.
The chapter structure is about a movement from discourses within 'the clinic', the
dominant set of bio/logical practices and knowledges created within and emanating from
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the professions ofbiomedicine and 'psy' disciplines that are based on the ideal of the
healthy citizen (Foucault, 1980b); to discourses that are structured in relation, in
opposition or as a resistance to those discourses as forms of health citizenship. However,
the thesis chapters illustrate that the movement away from the clinic and its
accompanying normative subjectivity- the healthy citizen- is not a direct or clear-cut path.
The chapter structure also reflects some of the defining and innovative characteristics of
the ADAO as an organization and the practices of resistance it has incorporated into its
organization and communities. Ultimately the thesis poses the question ofwhether the
ADAO constitutes a new kind of space or alternative within the wider landscapes of
anxiety service provision? And whether this is desirable or achievable for the ADAO in
the first place?
The tension between these two sections involves analyzing how the ADAO's discourses
and spaces negotiate, adopt or resist discourses, beliefs and spaces within wider clinical
care system in which it is situated. These issues are not only relevant to the maintenance
and growth of the ADAO they are also connected to the kind of society and political
community the ADAO desires which is intimately connected to the way that citizenship is
defined and understood (Mouffe, 1992:225 in Young, 2000). What underpins the thesis
chapters is a movement from thinking about the healthy citizen, who develops a sense of
self and selfworth through specific beliefs about the body, the importance of the expertise
and authority of the 'clinic', towards the development of health citizenship where the
embodied geographies of citizenship and forms of expertise that draw upon the voices of
sufferers themselves are central. Ultimately does the ADAO create a space in which the
diverse experiences of individuals affected by panic are responded to, and seen as
important in the context of the political?
The thesis concludes with chapter nine which draws together themes within the thesis
chapters around the issue of health citizenship in order to reflect on the tension between
the ADAO's desire to network with other institutions and groups while simultaneously
maintaining its own visions. This conclusion restates the diverse theoretical themes that
have bridged the thesis chapters together and highlights insights made about the role of
the ADAO in the context of enhancing identity, community and subjectivity. The thesis'
findings are not only of potential significance for sufferers of anxiety conditions and
sufferer led anxiety groups, but they offer a significant contribution to feminist,
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geographical and political understandings about the relational nature between self and
subject, self and other, and self and space. The conclusion highlights ways in which the
thesis has contributed to the production of geographical, political, and feminist knowledge
and theory. The conclusion primarily focuses on some of the contributions the research
has made for the production ofgeographical knowledge.
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Chapter Two - Literature review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews various bodies of literature of relevance to anxiety service provision.
These literatures help structure themes and issues central to the thesis as a whole. Some
themes are present throughout the research process, i.e. subjectivity, disability and
embodiment while others emerge as a result of the research process itself, i.e. health
citizenship. The wide range of literatures used within this chapter reflects the wider
interdisciplinary framework of the thesis as a whole. Bringing together work from
feminism, sociology, cultural studies, architecture, geography and political theory should
help the reader position himself/herself relative to the interdisciplinary approach of the
thesis. The chapter bridges this range of literatures relevant to anxiety service provision
within a geographical framework, which helps to highlight the thesis's place within
geography. Additionally because feminist scholarship has informed the thesis as a whole,
this chapter also draws attention to the place of the thesis relative to feminist theory.
Because this thesis revolves around the case study of the ADAO, this chapter expands on
material that helps the reader understand more about issues pertinent to anxiety service
provision. Thus, the chapter begins with a discussion about anxiety conditions
themselves. Section 2.2, explores meanings and understandings of anxiety with particular
reference to agoraphobia. Focusing on agoraphobia is illustrative ofmy particular
research interests, representative of the majority of interviewees' experiences with
anxiety conditions, and characteristic of the original focus of the ADAO. Conventional
and dominant discussions about anxiety conditions are based on clinical discourses and
etiology that serve to reify clinical knowledges (Antony and Swinson, 1996; APA, 2000;
McNally, 1994; NIMH, 2003; Walker et al., 1991). However, the literature reviewed
within this chapter focuses on discourses on agoraphobia within the social sciences and
humanities. This is appropriate because this thesis is located within, and informed by,
those discourses. Additionally, this chapter brings together a wide range of non-clinical
literatures on anxiety and agoraphobia in particular, which is unique in the clinical and
non-clinical literature on the subject. The material in this section is particularly useful in
reference to chapter five, where more detail about the experience of panic and
agoraphobia is analyzed.
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The review continues in section 2.3 with a discussion about anxiety health service
provision with specific reference to the geographical literatures on mental health. The
section examines the geographical literature on mental health with a particular emphasis
on the role of care within those geographical discourses. A focus on geographical
writings, not only highlights the place of the thesis in the context of geography, but also
the importance of space and place in relation to mental health, which is a central theme
found throughout the thesis. The geographical literature contains important insights about
the individual experiences ofmental health alongside insights about health service
provision. The review of geographical literatures brings a focus to the spatial aspects of
service provision and mental health, which is also largely absent within the wider
literature on anxiety conditions.
The next and final review section, section 2.4, elaborates on other themes central to the
thesis: the production of health citizenship; and the connection between anxiety service
provision and concepts of subjectivity. Section 2.4 uses feminist political theory to
develop the geographical insights on mental health within section 2.3 with issues that
concern health citizenship. In this way the section addresses questions about political and
collective responses to anxiety conditions in the form of anxiety service provision.
Specifically the section focuses on concepts of care and autonomy, as these are issues
central to citizenship, mental health, and feminist and geographical scholarship more
broadly. Care and autonomy are intimately connected to the rhetoric and practice of
health, and thus need to be unpacked and analyzed. They act as wider frameworks that
affect the process of providing and determining what is and is not appropriate health
service provision, thus, they are significant for processes of subjectivity. Care and
autonomy are also themes in themselves found within the substantive arguments of the
thesis. Autonomy is a central issue in chapter seven, however, the review of autonomy in
this chapter is much more broad in scope and helps to frame the discussion of relational
autonomy in chapter seven. Additionally, section 2.4 provides more room for discussion
of care than is done in chapters five through eight. This should help the reader situate and
complicate the material on care in the following chapters.
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2.2 Meanings of anxiety: beyond clinical accounts
2.2.1 Constructions of anxiety
The ADAO deals with what the DSM identifies as anxiety disorders. This includes a wide
range of conditions such as: panic; panic with agoraphobia; persistent obsessions and
compulsion; generalized anxiety; post traumatic stress; social phobia; and specific phobia
(ADAO, 2002). While the DSM refers to these conditions, as 'disorders' the ADAO does
not, as the labeling of anything as diseased or disordered is stigmatizing (see also Kirk
and Kutchins, The selling ofthe DSM- the rhetoric ofscience in psychiatry (1992). They
prefer the use of the term condition, a term I use frequently to replace disorder, except
when I am emphasizing or discussing aspects of the 'clinic' or when I am trying to
emphasize the voice of the 'clinic' within the thesis material.
Currently anxiety disorders include the general categories of panic disorder (with or
without agoraphobia), agoraphobia without panic disorder, social phobia, simple phobia,
obsessive compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and post traumatic stress
disorder (APA, 2000). Within the history of the DSM the categorization of anxiety has
shifted and expanded over time. This shift in diagnostic categories of anxiety, though well
documented and discussed within clinical literatures, has not by and large been of interest
to those in the social sciences. However, there is an expansive literature on anxiety within
the social sciences that reflects a growing preoccupation with understanding the inner self
and the self s ability to cope with mental and emotional distresses ofmodern life
(Wilkinson, 2001). Wilkinson cites a long list of influential thinkers who have discussed
the notion of anxiety within their work: Marx (1845), Freud (1929), Horney (1937),
Fromm (1942), Auden (1948), Weber (1949), Simmel (1950), Durkehiem (1964), May
(1977), Giddens (1991), Douglas (1992), Beck (1992), Bauman (1993), and Lupton
(1999) (for references see Wilkinson, 2001). Within the social sciences 'anxiety' is
understood and discussed as an example of: a physically debilitating problem; a problem
of'personality' and self definition; an existential condition; a symbolic trope and form of
culture: an affect of our knowledge and society; a cultural narrative of late modernity; and
a marker of how something is seriously wrong with the conditions of our social world.
There is no consensus as to what the definition of anxiety is, or what feelings constitute
anxiety, and as such the term is used nebulously and interchangeably within the literature
(Rachman, 1998). Even within the DSM and amongst practitioners, clinicians apply their
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own rules about the meaning of anxiety thus the reading of anxiety, as a clinical
diagnosis, is often considered variable and unreliable (Andrews and Peters, 1999).
Traditionally anxiety conditions, notably panic, have been viewed as a problem of self-
definition in both clinical and non-clinical literatures. In clinical literatures anxiety and
anxiety conditions are:
"The result of a faulty process of reasoning which leads an individual to
overestimate the reality of a prospective danger and underestimate their capacity
to keep themselves from harm's way. Having identified the cognitive errors that
cause them to misapprehend reality of their circumstances, the aim is to introduce
them to alternative frameworks of understanding use to construct new relational
meaning towards the problems that place them in distress" (Wilkinson, 2001:71).
In clinical discourses anxiety, and similarly panic, are products of the interrelationship
between affective experiences, personal histories, emotional characteristics, bodily
reactions and behavioral responses (Wilkinson, 2001:15). Thus, anxiety and panic are
conceived of as individualistic problems reflected in the way clinical research has
primarily focused on individual therapy (Rachman, 1998). Cultural components of
anxiety or panic are ofmarginal concern as clinicians are more concerned to help their
patients come to a new way of seeing their experience of the world and themselves so that
their problems do not appear as great as to prevent them from living a 'normal' life
(Smail, 1998; Wilkinson, 2001:16). Thus clinical experts teach sufferers styles of thinking
and behavior that will enable them to exercise more control over their symptoms of
distress (Hallam, 1994 in Wilkinson, 2001:70). In this way the explanation, measurement
and treatment of anxiety 'disorders' often has little to do with the relationship between
anxiety, culture, and meaning and is more closely connected to psycho-physiological
distress.
Within the social sciences the problem of anxiety is contextualised within the struggle for
self-definition and search for meaning. Thus rather than seeing anxiety as a burden it can
become an opportunity for higher meaning (Wilkinson, 2001:65). Wilkinson describes
how for Kierkegaard (1980) anxiety is a source of spiritual education while for May
(1977) it is a source of creativity and invention. The problem of anxiety lies in the fact
that it appears to be directed towards nothing (Kierkegaard, 1980:43 in Wilkinson,
2001:20), that the focus of fear in anxiety is elusive (Rachman, 1998) or as Rollo May
(1977), following Freud, remarks, anxiety has an objectless nature: "as the security base
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from which the individual has been able to experience himself [sic] in relation to objects,
the distinction between subject and object also breaks down" (May, 1977:208). Anxiety is
viewed as a barrier to self realization, where the individual feels as if s/he is being denied
the fulfillment of her/his ambitions and the development of her/his individual
potentialities (Wilkinson, 2001:31). Similarly if anxiety is seen to be central to the
development of the self, then it is assumed that those who are best able to cope with their
anxieties are more able to possess a sense of coherence that promotes self confidence and
the belief that one is in control over one's life, and those who are less able to control their
anxiety are more prone to insecurity and abnormality (Wilkinson, 2001:68). Anxiety
becomes poised against ideal types of normative and social character. It is complicated by
the myth of individualism in which individual strength ofwill is central to overcoming all
problems (Smail, 1999 in Wilkinson, 2001:80).
According to Wilkinson, the social sciences did not devote explicit attention to the
problem of anxiety until the 1930's. Sociologists who were interested in the association
between social and cultural processes and high states of anxiety as a normal occurrence of
everyday life (Glaser, 2003). More recently however anxiety has become a central
metaphor for the discussion of the risk society (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991) and risk
consciousness (Lupton, 1999a; 1999b), where knowledge and fear of risk is the major
cause ofanxiety. For Wilkinson anxiety should be seen not only as an individual
phenomenon but also as a reaction to social processes and cultural experiences that act as
a threat to our personal security and our identities (Wilkinson, 2001:9). Being vulnerable
to anxiety is not conceived of as a consequence of individuals having something wrong
with them, but as a result of social antagonisms, cultural myths and the imagined
geographies of threatening uncertainty (Glaser, 2003:30). Anxiety is determined by social
opportunities, and cultural resources that help create purpose and meaning in our lives
(Wilkinson, 2001:88). For example, Wilkinson also notes that viewing anxiety as distress
is contingent on people defining and describing their experiences as distressful. Thus,
while oppressive socialization may place individuals in risky, disadvantaged situations,
individuals may become resigned to their 'place' in life, thus may not feel distressed or
anxious. Wilkinson attributes the decline in community and 'tradition' and the increase in
the need for individualization as central to the development of an environment in which
we are vulnerable to anxiety. Ultimately anxiety for Wilkinson highlights how
consciousness is also a problem of culture, as expressions of behavior are given meaning
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through symbolic forms of culture as well as the experiential content of values and beliefs
which give meaning to their existence (Wilkinson, 2001:47).
2.2.2 Focusing on agoraphobia.
The majority of individuals that come to the ADAO for assistance or advice have panic
and agoraphobia. In fact, the ADAO was originally the Agoraphobia and Peer Volunteer
Association (APVA). The APVA/ADAO was formed as a need to address the problems
faced by individuals with panic and agoraphobia and it has expanded since then. Panic
and agoraphobia are also experiences that most of those interviewed had experienced or
focused on as central to ADAO service provision. Thus, further understanding
agoraphobia and the wider literatures that surround it are central for the thesis. In this
section I use the term agoraphobia as shorthand to refer to the experience of panic and
agoraphobia. Most people within the ADAO, who identify as agoraphobic, connect their
mobility impairment to the experience of panic, which will be further discussed in chapter
five. I also use the term agoraphobia because much of the literature on agoraphobia does
not address the relationship between panic and agoraphobic avoidance behaviours, thus
the term is consistent with its use in those texts. I begin this section with an overview of
writings on agoraphobia. I then draw on the writings on agoraphobia of Reuter, Callard
and Davidson. Each of these authors employ very different approaches to the subject
matter, however their writings expand on issues and themes discussed within the thesis.
As geographers, Callard's and Davidson's work are important in the context of this thesis,
while Reuter is a sociologist whose Foucauldian approach provides different but
interconnected insights on agoraphobia that are further developed within chapter six of
the thesis.
2.2.3 The metaphor of agoraphobia
Most writings on agoraphobia identify a similar historical trajectory of agoraphobia
beginning with the creation of a diagnostic category. Carl Otto Westphal's article die
agoraphobie (1872) is often regarded as the starting point for the history of agoraphobia
and modern literature on phobias. Westphal described agoraphobia as platzschwindel,
defined as dizziness upon entering particular places. It is from this point onwards that
discourses and literatures on agoraphobia have developed a life of their own. This
literature has continued to grow in the humanities and social sciences. However the
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understanding and meanings of agoraphobia are often varied within these literatures. The
vast majority ofwritings in the social sciences and humanities on agoraphobia use
agoraphobia as a platform, 'structure of signification', or metaphor from which to discuss
and examine a wide range of social, cultural, philosophical, gendered and geographical
issues. These writings tend to rely on the connection between agora and agoraphobia, thus
they invoke a definition of agoraphobia as rooted in the spaces of the ancient Greek
agora- whether they be open spaces, public spaces, meeting spaces or market places. This
literature also tends to rely on existing literature on agoraphobia, much of which is based
on a limited number of older clinical studies (For example Brehony, 1983; Chambless and
Goldstein, 1992; Chambless and Malson, 1986; Deutsch, 1929; Symonds, 1973). What is
problematic about the literature is that often the authors of these writings do not seem
aware that the definitions they employ of agoraphobia do not always connect with the
experience of sufferers who identify themselves as agoraphobic and their experiences of
panic. There is a smaller literature on agoraphobia that is concerned to bring to the fore
the daily lived experiences and definitions of agoraphobia of sufferers themselves (For
example Bankey, 2002; Bordo, Klein and Silverman, 1998; Davidson, 2003; Capps and
Ochs, 1995; Garbowsky, 1989; Gardener, 1995). This literature complicates a definition
of agoraphobia as rooted in the agora, as agoraphobia becomes a more complex
interaction between body and environment, that may or may not have anything to do with
open, public or market places. It is a literature motivated both by the inaccuracies in
clinical and non clinical literatures of agoraphobia and a desire to show how the first hand
experiences of those who consider themselves to be agoraphobic provide important
insights for other study.
It is important to understand agoraphobia as part of a spectrum or continuum of
experiences that connect our anxieties and fears to the external worlds in which we live.
Taken together these literatures are dialogic; they speak to each other in ways that help
potentially inform the other. Emphasizing and exploring the connectedness of various
agoraphobic discourses helps to show the different critical possibilities between them, and
the varied gaps which need to be addressed. Differing understandings of agoraphobia help
further define the spectrum or continuum of 'Agoraphobia' as part of the human
condition, as something experienced by many different people at different times, as part
of a broader western tradition/condition, and as specific accounts of the actual lived and
embodied experiences of those with panic and agoraphobia. Understanding agoraphobia
in its different forms opens up venues for analysis and discussion where agoraphobia is
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not just pathology, but also a complex combination of social, spatial and gendered
practices. As da Costa Meyer explains "we must historicize and contextualisze
agoraphobia, not just pathologize it"(da Costa Meyer, 1996:149).
Paul Carter's text RepressedSpaces: The Poetics ofAgoraphobia (2002) is concerned to
explore the connection between the agora and agoraphobia. Carter draws upon a number
of agoraphobia metaphors found within the wider literature. For example, metaphors of
agoraphobia include: an example of the patholization of culture and an example of the
operation of the clinic (Reuter, 2002); a metaphor for alienation within the city (Callard,
2003b; da Costa Meyer, 1996; Vidler, 1993); a metaphor for the fragmentation of social
life under late capitalism (Carter, 2002); a metaphor for the logic ofmodem urbanism and
its mythology of progress as movement (Callard, 2003b; Deutsche, 1996; Vidler, 1993); a
metaphor for our malaise with urban modernism 'divorced from moral value, bland and
soulless'(Carter, 2002); a metaphor for the fear of engaging oneself in the political life of
the public sphere and its communities (Deutsche, 1996); and the metaphor of agoraphobia
as a reaction to the social, economic and gendered construction ofwomen under
patriarchy (da Costa Meyer, 1996). Carter uses these metaphors to help elaborate on his
own project that utilizes agoraphobia as an example of how external 'space' has been
repressed or ignored within psychoanalytic thought, specifically Freud's own work on the
self, which has come to influence meanings and perceptions of agoraphobia. Thus for
Carter agoraphobia becomes a metaphor for the failure of psychoanalytic thought to come
to terms with its own environmental neurosis, a metaphor for the failings ofmodern urban
life, as well as, a metaphor for the repressed space of human relations (Carter, 2002: 158).
In the literature that is concerned to explore the daily-lived conditions of agoraphobics,
for example Joyce Davidson's text Phobic Geographies: The Phenomenology and
Spatiality ofIdentity (2003) metaphors of agoraphobia are also employed. Agoraphobia
becomes a metaphor within these literatures for: twentieth century constructions of
femininity (Bordo, 1988; 1993); gendered geographies, which have arisen and developed
as a result of cultural sex role stereotypes or the feminization ofwomen (da Costa Meyer,
1996; Gardener, 1994); a spatial expression of the restricted economic geographies that
women are consigned to within a patriarchal structure (Brown, 1987); a metaphor for
resistance and a way in which women can subvert western consumerist societies
(Gardener, 1995); a virtual parody of twentieth- century constructions of femininity,
based on a literal interpretation of domesticity as immobility, helplessness and
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infantilisation (da Costa Meyer, 1996); a metaphor for the conflicting relationship
between western society, sexuality and intimacy (deSwaan, 1981); a metaphor for woman
as symbolic capital enmeshed in the regulation ofwomen according to restrictive,
immobilizing social and sexual norms (Brown, 1987; deSwaan, 1981); a metaphor for the
historical spatialization of patriarchy and the creation of separate spheres as well as issues
of public harassment, assault and public safety (Bankey, 2002; Callard, 2003b; Gardener,
1995); and as a metaphor for the consequences of the socialization of spatial fears on our
bodies, identities and subjectivities (Bankey, 2001, Bordo, 1993; Bordo, Klein and
Silverman, 1998; Gardener, 1995).
2.2.3 Agoraphobia and the discursive
Shelley Reuter's work on agoraphobia (2002) helps build on arguments on processes of
governmentality, expertise and a self care ethic discussed within chapter six of the thesis.
Reuter's sociological and historical work on agoraphobia explores the modern literature
on agoraphobia from the nineteenth century onward. Her argument in this work is to
analyze the disease category of agoraphobia in terms of the socio-cultural process of
embodiment that unfolds in and though (disease) categories (Reuter, 2002:751).
Reuter highlights, following Foucault, how the diseased body has been transformed into a
discursive site as both object and subject of study. The body is both the object ofmedical
knowledge, the clinic, as the living embodied fleshy bodies that are our modes of living
(Mol and Law, 1999 in Reuter, 2002:752). Agoraphobic practices are for Reuter
examples of "the operation of the clinic and the principle of its entire discourse" whereby,
through practices of objectification, patients are transformed into subjects ofmedicine
(Foucault, 1973:xviii in Reuter, 2002:754). This process is one based in binary relations,
healthy-sick, sane-insane, normal-pathological, a process in which persons then turn
themselves into subjects, because they recognize themselves as subjects (Foucault,
1982:208 in Reuter, 2002:1978). For Reuter agoraphobic bodies have been positioned as
docile subject-objects of the "psychiatric order" yet, for her, this fails to account for the
diverse agoraphobic bodies that emerge in defiance of diagnostic norms intended to
constrain them (Reuter, 2002:754). According to Reuter resistance is conceptualized as
variability ofmeaning rewritten as doctors' notes. She argues that a singular discourse on
agoraphobia generated by physicians who wrote case reports, invoked by disease theories
and case histories, helps to enact the agoraphobic body through discourse (Reuter,
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2002:755). These discourses were both gendered and moralized. Before WW1 most
patients diagnosed with agoraphobia were male. After WW1 women were more
predominantly diagnosed. By examining, measuring, testing and listening to their patients
talk about their experiences doctors also enact agoraphobia. They do so through writing
the disease in the form of articles. In this way "medical literature mediates the relations
that it organizes [and] the bodies that are configured through it" (Berg and Bowker
1997:514 in Reuter, 2002:761).
Agoraphobia is performed. The materiality of agoraphobic bodies is constituted in and
through disease categories that are normative and regulative. This has implications for
agoraphobic bodies because according to Reuter they are unintelligible outside these
meaning structures (Reuter, 2002:764) In other words:
"[T]he body is not merely where a disease happens but it is also the material
discursive instantiation of a deeply social contestation: the theories of disease and
the ideas about culture and the social that are invoked in writings about
agoraphobia amount to the deployment of discursive structures of abjection that
regulate the material intelligibility of this disease" (Reuter, 2002:765).
Shelley Reuter's work has much to offer in terms of thinking about the way in which
agoraphobia is both performative and socio-medically constructed. But her work is also
problematic because the textual worlds from which she studies and works are not the only
ones that come to provide meaning in the context of agoraphobia. Her discussion of the
"body as an intra-action between the material and the discursive - that bodies are
something we do, we enact" is then extended into the statement that "practices related to
agoraphobic bodies are only rendered intelligible and relevant through the expression of
this disease category in language", by which she means written language (Reuter, 2002:
752). The work of various geographers suggests that the while the written histories of
agoraphobia help to shape its expression, meanings and beliefs about agoraphobia are
also shaped by the history of spatial forms and visual imagery, as well as by particular life
experiences which may never be relayed to a clinical professional (Bankey, 2002; 2004;
Davidson, 2000a). Additionally by stating that agoraphobic bodies are only rendered
intelligible through language limits the scope and place in which meaning is created to the
spaces of the clinician's office.
In this way, Felicity Callard's work on agoraphobia, which is also textually and
historically based, offers an analysis of the literature on agoraphobia that Reuter does not.
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Callards' work on agoraphobia (2003a; 2003b) is a historical account and literature
review of agoraphobia with a particular focus on the relationship between mental health
and the built environment:
"As I hope to demonstrate, visions of the built environment, public space and the
individual have important ramifications for understandings of intervention and
cure. In the process, therefore, those visions carry implications for the practice of
mental health promotion"(Callard, 2003b).
Similar to da Costa Meyer (1997), she analyses discourses on urban design and its
relation to the etiology of agoraphobia. Agoraphobia, according to Callard was, from the
moment of its emergence as a named disorder, fundamentally connected to debates about
the metropolis and our vision of the city (Callard, 2003b; Vidler, 1993). Just as the city
has changed within the past century so have meanings of agoraphobia. For Callard
agoraphobia may be understood as a product of the individual self (the physical body, the
unconscious), the social world (socio-cultural and gendered norms), and within "space",
as a condition of our built environments, where the self, social and spatial are
interconnected (Callard, 2003b). While Callard's work seems to be genuinely concerned
with understanding agoraphobia, its basis within a literature that has historically rewritten
and excluded the voices and experiences of those who are agoraphobic highlights that
there are still gaps that need to be addressed.
2.2.4 "Life-worlds" of agoraphobia
Davidson's work represents a departure from that tradition ofwriting 'about agoraphobia'
within the social sciences towards a lived and first hand account and analysis of the
meanings and experience of agoraphobia (see also Bankey, 2001; Bordo, Klein and
Silverman, 1998; Capps and Ochs, 1992).
Within geography, Joyce Davidson's work involves the most comprehensive and detailed
discussion of agoraphobia. In fact it is one of the most thorough examinations of the
daily-lived realities of agoraphobia within the social sciences. Davidson's work shares
many similarities with work in this thesis, in terms of an interest in exploring aspects of
agoraphobia that have previously been silenced or unheard, as well as, a concern with the
experiential realities of daily life for agoraphobic individuals. Her work seeks to
readdress the lack of attention given to agoraphobia outside ofmedical, psychiatric and
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psychological contexts. Yet, the material that Davidson uses to further an understanding
of agoraphobia is different from the material that 1 have used (Bankey, 1999; 2001; 2002;
2004). Her work covers a variety of subject matters and is fundamentally concerned to
discover how feminist geography, feminist philosophy and phenomenology helps to
further an understanding of the experiential dimension of agoraphobia - its "life worlds"
(Davidson, 2000b:31). She is also concerned to articulate the fundamentally "spatialized
nature ofagoraphobia" (original emphasis, Davidson, 2001a:214). In her work she is
critical of the existing clinical and non clinical literature on agoraphobia arguing that the
experience of agoraphobia is often not talked about in terms of its spatial and embodied
disruptions, and as such should be conceived of as a "boundary crisis" involving panic
(Davidson, 2002; 2003). She argues that the definition of agoraphobia as a fear of open
spaces is a misconception based on a general lack of information about agoraphobia, and
that it is peopled or public spaces that are more often feared (Davidson, 2001a; 2001c;
2002). Davidson highlights how the traditional meaning of agoraphobia as fear of the
marketplace, is both an interesting and relevant explanation of the experience of
agoraphobic women, as a fear of spaces of consumption, in particular the shopping mall,
is prevalent amongst those she researched.
In her book Phobic Geographies (2003) Davidson compiles her articles on agoraphobia
published elsewhere. In the book we see how the corpus of her work focuses on the high
incidence ofwomen diagnosed with agoraphobia. She not only focuses of the effects of
pathologizing agoraphobia, being 'all in the mind', but the effects of feminizing fear and
its ramifications for agoraphobic women (Davidson, 2003:131). Her theoretical inquiries
into agoraphobia are not separate or removed from the everyday life of agoraphobics, as
questions of identity, subjectivity and being are always embodied and placed (Davidson,
2003:143). She emphasizes how the sensations of panic come to affect the mapping of
agoraphobic spaces within and outside of the body, and how these spaces are co-
constitutive. Her work centers on a questioning of the boundaries ofagoraphobia
(Davidson, 2003:144). She is particularly interested to add a phenomenological
dimension to an understanding of panic as a form of existential angst, as a threat to our
sense of self and the dissolution of the self that brings to the fore questions of identity
(Davidson, 2003:141). Her focus on sufferers themselves results in a concrete exploration
of the spaces and experiences of those who identify as agoraphobic. These spaces include
therapeutic spaces such as self help groups, and the particular and individualistic
agoraphobic geographies or life worlds of agoraphobics, typified for example by the
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experience and geographies of shopping. She highlights how many of the spaces avoided
by those who are agoraphobic are connected to gender roles and the spatialization of
patriarchy. However she also highlights that fundamentally agoraphobic avoidance
behaviors are a product of a fear of having a panic attack, and a fear of being seen in a
state of panic, thus agoraphobes tend to fear 'peopled' or social space rather than open
spaces (Davidson, 2003:121). Davidson is primarily interested in the importance of
listening to, rather than writing about the embodied and daily spatial experiences of those
who are agoraphobic (Davidson, 2003:144). Ultimately her work is directed not just at
those who identity as agoraphobic, but for feminist therapists and theorists more broadly
(Davidson, 2003:144).
Davidson sees clinical discourses on agoraphobia, and the therapies derived from those
discourses, as based within a Cartesian mind/body dualism that is masculinist. Some of
her work focuses on the subject of coping; particularly through the use of self help
groups. When she talks about the subject of self-help and "selfhelp", she refers primarily
to texts and processes that are expert and clinically directed, in particular cognitive
behavioral therapies (2002:30). Thus self help is not seen as separate from clinical
practice but constitutive of it, a position that many clinicians (and some social scientists
see Rimke, 2000; Scott, 1999; Wiles and Rosenberg, 2001) would argue against. For
Davidson:
"The term self help can either be read in the (common) sense of "help your self',
or in the alternative more complex sense of "help for the self'. The difference here
lies in what is straightforwardly self-service, and what is a kind of therapy for the
treatment of selves. Both senses clearly harbor implicit definitions, but the latter
begs specific questions regarding the nature of assumptions underlying this
definition. Given that there are contested notions ofwhat a self is or can be, whose
idea of self is being invoked here? To exactly what kind of self is help being
offered" (Davidson, 2002:16).
What she then argues is that it is a masculinist Cartesian version of the self, divided into
mind (res cognitas) and body (res extensa), where mind is privileged over body that
informs the self-help resources she analyzes. Thus the agoraphobic self is pitted against
and dependent on a normal (masculine) identity (Davidson, 2002:16). Yet, agoraphobic
individuals may never feel that the contained boundaries of self and space are isolated
from one another. She further goes on to explain how this Cartesian self is bound within a
moral self, where "deviations from normal behavior for which no somatic explanation is
provided inevitably carry a social penalty, since psychological problems are considered
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less 'real' and more blameworthy than physical defects" (Yardley, 1997:115 in Davidson,
2002:25). Because of this Davidson argues in it is in the interest of agoraphobic
individuals to present their 'disorder' as physiological, within the realm of rational
(masculine) biological medical discourse and to describe fear as a feminine attribute
(Davidson, 2002:25). However, she also argues that in fact the manner in which sufferers
represent and describe their experiences pose a challenge to Cartesian rational discourses.
As a result Cartesian conceptualizations of subjectivity are not adequate in articulating
and explaining agoraphobia, and that the artificial division between somatic and psychic
functions results in important aspects of agoraphobic experience untreated and
unexplained (Yardley, 1997:114 in Davidson, 2002:30). Within her research she has
found that while there are a variety of differences in why people become agoraphobic,
and who is agoraphobic, subjects of her research seem to have significant overlaps in the
spatial and temporal phenomenology of their experiences of agoraphobia (Davidson,
2001a).
Agoraphobia, for Davidson, is seen to result in a gendered geography of exclusion that is
spatially mediated and constructed. As is discussed in chapter five of the thesis, the
inability to locate the source of fear that triggers panic attacks and results in agoraphobic
avoidance behaviors results in the breakdown of the boundaries between self and space,
person and place (Davidson, 2000b; 2001c). The experience of agoraphobia threatens a
dissolution of the self, where the boundaries between what is inside and outside of the
body become confused and distorted (see also Bordo, Klein and Silverman, 1998). This
results in a loss of trust in the stability of our bodies, a loss assumed to be visible to
others.
2.2.5 Addressing gaps
As developed within section 2.2, the variety ofwork on agoraphobia all has something to
offer one another. This section brings together material on agoraphobia and anxiety
conditions that have not been brought together or written about elsewhere in the literature.
The discussion ofagoraphobia as metaphoric is unique and innovative. The section has
shown that agoraphobia, along with other anxiety conditions, could be understood as a
part of the human condition. This 'agoraphobic condition' should be viewed as a
spectrum of experiences that range from sufferers' first hand experiences of panic to a
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broader experience ofwestern culture. This helps to create an understanding of
agoraphobia that is multifaceted and complex. The work on anxiety conditions and
agoraphobia within this thesis builds on these authors' contributions and addresses a
variety of gaps within existing literatures. First, there is little discussion about the role of
organizations that address anxiety conditions within both clinical and non-clinical
literatures. Second, there is also little discussion about issues of citizenship and
community with reference to the experience either of sufferers themselves or the groups
that assist those individuals. Third, analysis of the dilemmas around collective organizing
and anxiety conditions is absent in the literature. And fourth, this thesis brings together
literatures from feminist, geographical, architectural, sociological and cultural studies for
the first time in the context of the study of agoraphobia or anxiety conditions.
2.3 Understanding anxiety health service provision
2.3.1 Introduction
The next two sections of the chapter, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, address a lack ofwritings within
both clinical and non-clinical literatures on the work done by non-clinical anxiety service
providers. This is done in order to further understand one of the central themes of the
thesis - the tensions experienced by the ADAO in trying to negotiate a place for itself
within the wider 'health care' system and the importance of health citizenship for that
reconciliation. The literature review focuses on two aspects of this question/tension:
1) The importance of geographical perspectives on mental health that further an analysis
of how landscapes of care, that affect the form and content of anxiety service provision,
are (re)created and (re)produced.
2) The ways in which contested meanings of 'care' and 'autonomy' affect the
development of a 'health care' system. This further informs the reasons behind tensions
within and amongst anxiety service providers, as well as the ways in which 'health care'
is directly tied to models of the healthy citizen and health citizenship.
Section 2.3.2 turns to 'post-medical mental health geographies' to help us think about
how to approach anxiety service provision (Parr, 1998b). Post-medical mental health
geographies refers to a "second wave" ofmental health geographical work, since the 80's,
that is rooted in social theory, utilizes mostly qualitative methods, and has focused on the
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social construction of difference (Wolch and Philo, 2000:138). Post-medical geographies
bring together a range of interdisciplinary work on mental health that is in keeping with
the interdisciplinary framework of this thesis as a whole. This section also highlights the
centrality of geographical work for addressing questions about anxiety service provision
that are developed within the substantive chapters of the thesis.
Section 2.3.3 turns to work within feminist political theory to think about the how
contested meanings of care and autonomy help create discursive meanings of 'health
care', that inform the appropriateness of anxiety service provision. This section
specifically elaborates on meanings of care and autonomy that are employed by the
ADAO conducive to the development of health citizenship. The ADAO's positioning of
care and autonomy helps create a space that is different from other anxiety service
providers within Ottawa and across Canada, thus the way in which the ADAO refigures
care and autonomy within its programs, structure and mandate offers a direction to the
question the tension of how to create a space of its own connected to the wider context of
anxiety service provision. The material in this section provides a contrast to discussions
and meanings of'autonomy' and 'care' that are based in the relationship between self and
subject, that is governing and caring for the self through specific imperatives of health,
described in this thesis as central to the healthy citizen (Lupton, 1995). For example,
meanings of 'autonomy' centered on self-surveillance of the body, and creation ofbodily
and intersubjective boundaries found in chapter five, and meanings of'care' centered
around modes of governmentality and 'self-care' that structure the argument of chapter
six. Simultaneously, the material in this section provides a foundation for discussions
around autonomy in chapter seven, and discussions on community and health citizenship
in chapter eight that are based upon discursive meanings of 'care' and 'autonomy'.
'Health care' in this way is more concerned about the relationship between self and other
and the interpersonal, which is tied to the creation of boundaries between self-subject,
internal-external, and self-space
Taken together these two sections, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, problematize taken for granted
assumptions about care and autonomy present in models of health citizenship and the
healthy citizen. It is these assumptions that contribute to an understanding that the
ADAO's tensions around networking are directly connected to differing perspectives on
care and autonomy, a theme that is elaborated on throughout the substantive chapters of
the thesis.
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2.3.2 Geographies of anxiety service provision
2.3.2.1 Post-medical mental health geographies
Because the discussions around health citizenship in this thesis highlight the
fundamentally embodied and spatial nature of subjectivity, it is important to draw on
literatures that explore the connections between embodiment, health, identity and
subjectivity. Geographers have become increasingly interested in the lived realities and
theoretical debates surrounding ill and impaired bodies, and how these geographies draw
attention to how complex power relations are spatialised (Butler and Parr, 1999). Post-
medical mental health geography focuses on the relationship between mental 'illness' and
relations of space and place, in which the experience of anxiety conditions such as panic
and agoraphobia should be included. Post-medical mental health geographers, like health
geographers more broadly, draw upon a wide range of interdisciplinary writings and
studies in order to explore the interconnections between mental health and wider socio-
cultural, gendered, economic, political, somatic and medical environments. Much of the
attempt in geographical disciplines to connect social, clinical, and political issues to one
another has been to destabilize a limiting mind-body dualism in human geography that
reinforces the disciplinary boundaries ofwhat can and cannot be studied within a
geographical context (Butler and Parr, 1999). However unlike many health geographers
post-medical mental health geographers also highlight the intersection between ablesim,
illness and topographies of fear that are essential to understanding the experiences of
those with anxiety conditions (see Parr, 1999b; 2000). Ableism refers to "ideas, practices,
institutions and institutions that presume ablebodiedness, and by so doing, construct
persons with disabilities are marginalized, oppressed and largely invisible others"
(Chouinard, 1997:380). By exploring how the diverse geographies of illness/ impairment/
disability are related to the geography ofwomen's and men's fears, mental health
geographers draw attention to different embodied experiences and the complex
interconnections between mobility, identity, subjectivity and wider clinical environments
(Butler and Parr, 1999; Tuan, 1979).
Various health geographers have identified how medical geography has historically fallen
into two camps: positivistic/behaviouralist, and more recently post-positivistic (post-
medical) work which includes a number of different perspectives from social theory
(Wolch and Philo: 2000). Positivistic/behaviouralist work is more concerned with models
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of health and disability that have focused on clinical science and place emphasis on
medical facts, structures, diagnosis, etiology, outcomes and treatments. Post-positivistic
geographers are more concerned with social models of health and disability that shift
away the focus from physiology to a more critical investigation of the contexts in which
ableist identities, subjectivities and lived experiences are produced (Dear et al., 1997;
Dorn and Laws, 1994; Dorn 1998; Grant and Chouinard, 1995; Moss and Dyck 1997;
1999a; 1999b). These geographers are concerned with the re-theorization of place-based
understandings of health in medical geography as complex, material, sociological,
experiential and philosophical phenomenon and how this is crucial to rethinking through
how the local is involved in the making of and experience of different mind and body
states (Butler and Parr, 1999:11). Social models of health and disability critically
examine the social categorization of illness, disorder and disability as well as the
complexity of lived reality of those within systems of health practices (Butler and
Bowlby, 1997; Cormode, 1997; Hall, 2000; Imrie; 1996). Health is not simply seen as a
matter of physiology but a condition involving human rights that politicize spatial-making
practices and spaces themselves (Chouinard and Cormode, 1997; Doel and Segrott,
2003).
The geography ofmental health is often situated within post-positivistic (post-medical)
models of health and involves a much closer association between social and clinical
practices (Parr, 1998a; 2002b; Parr and Philo, 1995; Philo, 1995; 1997). These
discussions not only question the dualisms ofmind/ body but of the production of
otherness vis a vis normal/abnormal, sane/insane dualisms, and how these dualisms have
problematically normalized various medical practices, processes of abjection and the
manufacture of the 'ableist gaze' (Dear et al., 1997; Nast and Pile, 1998; Sibley, 1995).
This literature also explores the how mental illness is far less desirable and acceptable
than physical illness (Milligan, 1999). In these ways disability/illness/disorder becomes a
socially constructed boundary marker that fuels and informs exclusionary actions from
the everyday spaces of public and private spheres (Butler and Parr, 1999).
Mental health issues have been explored in a variety ofways within mental health
geography that range from the embodied, personal and individual to the collective and
historical (Wilson, 2003). These discourses include discussions of the experience of
sufferers and their families themselves (Butler and Bowlby; 1997; Parr, 1997; 1999b); the
experience of practitioners and the practice of providing mental health (Bondi, 2001;
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2003; Brown, 2003); the history ofmental health with a particular focus on the
development of places ofmental health (Gleeson, 1999;Gleeson and Kearns, 2000;
Milligan, 1999; Parr, 2000; Takahashi, 2000); notably institutions and asylums (Philo,
1995); the legacy and history ofmental health relative to the creation ofmeanings of
madness and the mental (Creswell, 1996; Parr, 1999a; 2000; Philo; 1995; 1997) and the
ways in which mental health issues are linked to other wider histories surrounding clinical
practices of power/knowledge (Parr, 1998b; Philo, 2000; Pile, 1996; Takahashi, 2000).
2.3.2.2 Landscapes of care
Within the geographical literature on mental health discussions around care are important
in understanding the relationship between appropriate service provision and the issue of
health citizenship. Of particular interest is the tension between adopting hegemonic
notions of care that are based in forms of governmentality, i.e. clinical 'care', and the
devaluing of forms of care that privilege non expert experiences and knowledges.
Different visions of care lead to differing forms of collective organizing and
organizational development around mental health issues. Different visions of care also
lead to different understandings of the relationship between bodies, knowledges and
subjectivities. These issues are problematized by mental health geographers who contrast
institutional care provided by the 'clinic', which is identified as dehumanizing, and
community care provided by grassroots groups (as well as some private and social
service providers) which is identified as more supportive and caring (Dear and Taylor,
1982; Park and Radford, 1997; Philo, 1997). For many geographers this is too
simplistic a division, thus, many geographers argue for a more specific and nuanced
understanding of the value and expression of care expressed in particular settings
(Milligan, 1999; Mohan, 1998; Parr, 1999a; 2000; Park and Radford, 1999). For
example, Gleeson and Kearns (2001), using feminist political theory, identify how the
geographies, practices and philosophies behind institutional care is more concerned with
'justice', that is, formal abstract rights distributed to patients in an equitable manner,
while many voluntary, grassroots groups are more concerned with care as an
intersubjective, situated process (Bowden, 1997; Smith, 1998 in Gleeson and Keams,
2001). Other geographers highlight that there are significant gaps in thinking about the
range of different spaces of care and how these places affect different practices and
expressions of care (Bondi, 2003; Chouinard, 1997; 1999). There are also gaps in the
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geographic literature on the differences within caring practices within self-help
discourses, whose place is increasingly important within discussions of landscapes of
care (Davidson, 2002).
In order to analyze the specific meanings and production of care within a particular
location or geography of care we must explore the ways in which definitions and
practice of care shift within the landscape, as well as within a particular service
provider over their history. The shifting meanings of care are developed within the
work of geographers on the subject of landscapes of care. Landscapes of care, a phrase
used by Gleeson and Kearns (2001) refers to the connections between the geographies of
service provision, expert knowledge/power and meanings of care. Gleeson and Kearns
use the phrase in the context of the de-institutionalization of asylums highlighting how
this process is connected to perceptions of institutions as 'uncaring' (see also Philo,
1997). However, drawing on research within this thesis in chapter six on anxiety
service provision, the phrase also refers to how service providers and the spaces they
occupy are divided in part based on their relationship to care and caring practices. The
quality of care, and who provides care are central issues in the geography of service
provision for mental health issues such as anxiety. Different forms and delivery of care
in clinical and non clinical settings help construct public and individual perceptions of
the spaces in which that care is given and differing beliefs about who is and who is not
included or considered within those places. Care helps differentiate beliefs about types
of knowledges present in particular places or persons.
2.3.3 Citizenship and mental health
2.3.3.1 The 'subject' of health
As is shown in much of the post-medical geographical work the phrase 'health care' is a
problematic, disputed and loaded term. Unpacking the meaning of health care is
important in the context of this thesis where different understandings of care, and health
care in particular, are used to differentiate between processes of health citizenship and the
healthy citizen. The use of the term care within health geography draws upon writings of
care within other disciplines, notably feminist political theory. These writings help to
further explain how meanings of care are spatialised and translated into particular
practices, places and persons. This section draws upon those feminist political writings in
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order to expand on the geographical insights about disability, mental health, mental health
care, and health citizenship in section 2.3.2. While there is some discussion about care
within mental health geography and human geography more broadly, there is little direct
discussion about autonomy within mental health geography. However, both care and
autonomy are issues central to understanding the position of the ADAO within a wider
health care context, as well as the differences between the healthy citizen and health
citizenship. 'Care' and 'autonomy' are issues central to the way in which anxiety service
provision is approached and delivered. These issues help inform material throughout the
thesis, thus it is important to discuss these concepts, and their relationship to one another
in more detail than is done in individual substantive chapters.
2.3.3.2 Unpacking health 'care'
The discursive meanings of the term 'health care' are different for people differently
positioned within a health care system. 'Health care' is conventionally defined as the
preservation ofmental and physical health by preventing or treating illness through
services offered by the health profession (APA, 2000; NIMH, 2003). In this way 'health
care' is a 'professional' system or structure based upon delivery of services by clinical
providers or specialist providers that address the treatment of disease and illness and
located in specific clinical settings or by the presence of a health professional. Care
involves a relationship between subject/self in which normative clinical knowledges and
disciplinary power are internalized, embodied or resisted by individuals. Within a public
health system care is an intersubjective process that relies on the person adhering and
following guidelines and imperatives of health directed by medical and clinical experts
(Lupton, 1995). 'Care' in this sense is an expression of governmentality necessarily for
the development of the clinic. Governmental ity is a political technology in which
practices and techniques align political objectives with the self-governing capabilities of
those individuals (Foucault, 1976; Rose, 1992). Within a process of governmentality
expert knowledges are translated into practices and hierarchies that are institutionalized
and spatialized in concrete forms of power and knowledge (Foucault, 1967; Philo,
2000). It is this form of 'care' and health care that informs the production of a healthy
citizen who is obliged to take up and conform to the imperatives and authority of expert
clinical systems (Petersen and Lupton, 1998:610). These meanings of care are further
unpacked and discussed within chapter six of the thesis.
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However many 'clients' of the health care system view 'health care' in different terms.
Expectations of care by those who use the systems often combines a view of health care
as a system of clinical power, expertise and treatment located in specific contexts with an
understanding of care governed in and by relations between individuals and between
individuals and groups (Couser, 1997; Nelson, 1997). The communicative distance
between these meanings has contributed to the disparity in the delivery of services,
dissatisfaction with the quality of the health services, and a decreased sense of
empowerment by both patients and health professionals (Frank, 1995). The gap in these
expectations of care has also resulted in very important health and social movements,
such as the women's health movement, disability awareness and patient advocacy-
movements that have resulted in significant changes in the provision of 'health
care'(Nelson, 1997). Understanding care in terms of the relationship between self and
other has been well developed and critically analyzed within feminist theory. Section
2.2.3.3 draws on that literature in order to more fully recognize the model ofhealth
citizenship employed throughout the thesis and to contrast discussions of care found in
chapter six.
2.3.3.3 Health citizenship and care - the politics of care
Feminist political discourses of care are implicitly and explicitly discussed throughout the
substantive chapters of the thesis and have informed the research process as a whole.
Care has often been positioned outside of the political realm as prepolitical and apolitical;
either because it is "below", a matter of the private and familial sphere, or "above", a
matter of the spiritual and charitable (Tronto, 1996:140). The denigration of care as a
political or moral concept is a central concern for feminist and geographical scholarship
as the specific contexts of care are often mistaken as the content of care (Tronto,
1996:148). Feminist work on care, could be divided amongst those who focus on the
specific and embodied experiences ofwomen, and those who are more critical of the
association of care with the celebration of conventional norms of femininity where care in
its wider forms is neglected (Mackay, 2001:136). Care becomes associated with activities
such as mothering or nursing, or as place based, as something that happens within the
private sphere or within specified privatized locations (Noddings, 1984; Ruddick, 1989).
Likewise, in the case of health care, care becomes associated with activities involving
clinicians or health professionals, or as placed based as something which happens within
clinical settings, or through the presence of a clinician or health professional. For some
34
this is too parochial and limited a definition of care and health care, as it fails to
adequately address the many ways in which care is exercised, understood, practiced,
shaped by social institutions, culturally variable and historically specific (Mackay, 2001).
Care should not just be understood as a psychological quality, but also an activity,
ontology, a process, a practice, a political goal and resource. Care involves a complex
process that reflects structures of power, the separation of public and private life, notions
of autonomy and trust, and our conceptions of self and other. By including care as part of
a political vocabulary, spaces, and subjects (such as those who are agoraphobic)
previously marginalized and 'othered' from the public realm of politics are considered;
pointing to the importance of those silenced voices and 'forgotten' places, increasing the
possibility of a broader base of political participation inclusive of the experiences of those
with anxiety conditions and the ADAO.
The celebration of care has historically been a central theme within feminist scholarship
and a form of criticism of dominant and normative versions of subjectivity, political and
moral thought. One influential point in the discourse on care within feminist geography
is Carol Gilligan's work on the ethic of care in her text In a Different Voice (1982). An
ethic of care is often poised as a challenge to existing justice and equality paradigms
characterized by an ethic ofjustice (Mackay, 2001:126). An ethic ofjustice, associated
according to Gilligan with male moral reasoning, is concerned with abstract universal
moral rules and principles that are substantively concerned with justice, duty and rights
linked to a highly individualized conception of the self. In contrast, an ethic of care,
linked to female moral voices, is a form ofmoral reasoning that highlights the importance
of responsibility in the context of interpersonal relationships, and the importance of a
moral voice that derive judgments from the contextual details of situations grasped as
unique and specific rather than abstract and rule bound (Gilligan, 1982; 1997; Friedman,
1997). Autonomous choice within this framework, unlike within an ethic ofjustice, is not
based on separation from other people, does not invoke the value of objectivity and does
not equate fairness with noninterference. In the context of thinking about the healthy
citizen and health citizenship an ethic of care is useful. In contrast to versions of selfhood,
such as the healthy citizen, found in normative patriarchal contexts that highlight
detachment and atomistic individualism described as an ethic ofjustice; an ethic of care,
implies a celebration of connectedness and intersubjectivity, which is important for
models of health citizenship.
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Gilligan's discussion of an ethic of care has been both widely celebrated and contested by
feminist theorists, particularly because the care versus justice debate often falls back on
(and relies) on a dualistic system of hetero-patriarchal, racial oppression and stereotype.
Claudia Card's work on care in Gender andMoral Luck (1996) goes beyond the care
versus justice debate arguing for different terms and ways of framing relations of care.
Card's work is useful for thinking about issues developed within the substantive chapters
to come, notably in chapters six around the distinctions between expert and non-expert
and in chapter seven in thinking about relational autonomy. For Card, Gilligan's 'justice
and care' hypothesis is about how the responsibilities of different kinds of relationships
yield different ethical preoccupations, methods, priorities and even concepts where the
considerations of care have been traditionally a priori subordinated to those ofjustice
(Baier 1986; Held, 1997 cited as examples in Card, 1997:648). Care as a gendered issue is
still central for Card because a larger share of the responsibilities of certain personal and
informal relationships are given to women, while a larger share of the responsibilities of
formal and impersonal relationships defined by social institutions to men (Card,
1997:648). Card suggests that Gilligan's description of an ethic of care should be more
appropriately termed an ethic of responsibility, understanding responsibility as a capacity
for responsiveness in contrast to an ethic of rights based in formal abstract relationships
that do not require the same degree of responsiveness (Card, 1996). By an ethic of
responsibility what is meant is the ethics of informal and personal relationships, and by an
ethics of rights what is meant is the ethics of formal or impersonal relationships.
"I examine the sense of responsibility attaching to informal, often personal
relationships, contrasting it with that of formal and impersonal ones, and attaching
to it independently of a contrast between justice and care. I argue that formal and
impersonal relationships as paradigms of obligation and responsibility have
produced arbitrarily biased and probably superficial theory. It is not that justice is
superficial. The idea is rather that the ethical significance of basic informal and
personal relationships is at least as much of the first order as that of basic social
institutions. I argue throughout that a focus on formality is not the only bias in
modern ethical theory, but that fairness has also been systematically ignored in
personal and informal relationships especially where women are involved" (Card,
1997:649).
Similar to Card, Bowden describes how "the formal associations of citizenship are
frequently used to distinguish those aspects of relations between persons in which
intimacy is constitutively limited or in which the partiality of personally engaged
attentiveness signals unique bias and favoritism" (Bowden, 1997:141). Within the context
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of normative citizenship, relations between citizens conventionally rely on norms of
conduct that emphasize the impersonal and the impartial. Values of attachment,
responsivity and flexibility, typical of caring and impersonal relationships are frequently
suppressed by requirements for order, decidedness and consistency within a concept of
normative citizenship as well as within normative notions of care associated with a
clinical system of anxiety service provision. In this way citizenship, linked to practices of
health care, allegedly signals the replacement of care with justice and commitment with
duty (Bowden, 1997:142). For Bowden however a model of citizenship is not limited to
this. In "recognizing personal practices of caring in the social organization of the public
sphere and in the material content of citizenship, public ideals and the notion of the
'public' can be transformed by caring values" (Bowden, 1997:147). For example,
volunteer 'care work' carried out by women raising funds for political candidates,
conventionally seen as adjunct to official relations- can also function independently in
order to foster community solidarity (Adelson in 1994 in Bowden, 1997:150). Bowden
argues not only for the importance of a model of health citizenship, but for the importance
of programs within the ADAO which may not have as public a face such as the volunteer
companion program in fostering a sense of identity, community and subjectivity.
Card's and Bowden's discussion of care reflects a tension in the meaning of health care,
as described earlier, between the formal obligations of health care institutions, providers
and professionals to provide services and maintain access, and the need for informal
interpersonal relationships even within those formal structures. Care and justice as
informal and formal is fundamentally connected to systems of power and authority that
shape its meaning. In this way Bowden argues that current conceptions of citizenship,
produced by a public/private division and a care/justice divide cannot be removed by a
simple revaluation of the perspectives and values acquired in personal practices of care
(Bowden, 1997:152-3). "State apparatuses of general surveillance", as described by
Habermas and Foucault (see chapter six in the thesis), are where professional expertise
and bureaucratic process frequently operate to the detriment of personal needs and caring
attachments in state clinical and social services, highlight the deep antagonisms between
the caring possibilities of personal life and the capacities of the state (Bowden, 1997:161).
In other words what Card and Bowden discuss may help further our understanding behind
the tension between the ADAO's adoption of dominant clinical discourses and forms of
knowledge and the privileging of its own discourses and the more personal knowledges of
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its membership. In a system in which formal associations and institutions overshadow the
significance of informal and personal associations, it makes sense that the ADAO
believes it would gain more recognition from other services providers and the public at
large by being seen to be a part of that formal system of institutional service provision. As
Bowden reiterates it is difficult for individuals and groups to express forms of care in a
system of state apparatuses of general surveillance. However both Card and Bowden also
argue that informal associations and personal relationships are just as important as formal
ones, thus it is necessary for the ADAO to recognize what its formal and informal
associations have to offer the organization.
A good example of the informal relationships Card and Bowden highlights are relations
of friendship. Friendship helps us to rethink meanings of care and justice, and the
interplay between these concepts. Friendship according to both Marilyn Friedman (1987)
and Peta Bowden (1997) highlights some of the problems inherent within feminist work
and the valorization of care. Friedman focuses on friendship as a form of caring practice
that does not immediately draw on gendered stereotypes in which both an ethic of care
and justice are present (Friedman, 1987; Friedman, 1997:652). Friendship is an issue that
is discussed within the context of the research methodology in chapter three, and in the
context of the volunteer companion program in chapter eight. For Friedman care and
justice, responsibility and rights, are conceptually compatible and complement one
another (Friedman, 1997:650). Justice is necessary to moral thinking about interpersonal
relationships and care is necessary to moral thinking about social policy (Meyers,
1997:664). Like Friedman, Bowden focuses on how friendship is viewed as a particular
form of care, in which care is connected to actively chosen sharing and reciprocity
(Bowden, 1997:61). In this way friendship as a form of care is central to the realization of
personal potential, identity and the maintenance of community values (Bowden,
1997:62). This is reinforced by Friedman who suggests further that the context of trust
and shared perspectives that friendship provides allows us to participate vicariously and
explore new standpoints from which we can explore the significance ofmoral values and
standards in the public and private sphere (Friedman, 1987).
Feminist theory has exposed how divisions between concepts and qualities of care and
justice are largely arbitrary, yet feminists are also concerned to expose the ways in which
dominant political, economic and social discourses obscure the central importance of
care, and in so doing relegate the experiences and work ofwomen and the private sphere
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to a lesser importance then activities within the public sphere. Joan Tronto's work in
Moral Boundaries: A political argumentfor an ethic ofcare (1993) on care helps further
politicize the importance of care and informal/personal relationships in an attempt to
politicize much of the work that women do in the private sphere. Further then that,
Tronto's core argument is that we must stop associating nurturance, compassion and
caring as women's morality, and introduce care as a central political ideal and political
practice because it describes what is necessary for citizens to live together in a pluralist
society (Mackay, 2001:142). Thus rather than valorize women's morality in an ethic of
care, Tronto is concerned to advance the notion of a care ethic.
According to Tronto a care ethic as a political concept involves responsiveness because:
"Responsiveness suggests a different way to understand the needs of others rather
than to put ourselves in their position. In instead it suggests that we consider the
other's position as the other expresses it. Thus one is engaged from the standpoint
of the other, but not simply by presuming that the other is exactly like the self.
This requires attentiveness" (Tronto, 1993: 136).
In other words a care ethic is grounded within a politics of difference and the importance
of interdependence central to the fostering of relational autonomy discussed in section
2.3.3 and in chapter seven of the thesis. Acceptance of difference, that is difference
between individuals and perhaps within one's own sense of self, becomes a positive fact
rather than a threat to social stability that would promote self-respect as well as respect
for others as crucial social values (Mackay, 2001:153). Interdependence is highlighted
within practices of care in a way that implies that we are never fully autonomous, self
supporting and disconnected from others. Yet, according to Tronto many political
theorists have condemned care as a form of dependence and rather than seeing
dependence as a natural part of the human experience, dependence is both character and
autonomy destroying (Tronto, 1993:163). In this way dependence is feared and care
giving is both devalued and denigrated (MacKay, 2001:145). The result is that those who
receive care are often transformed into the 'other' and identified by whatever marks them
as needing care; their economic plight, there seeming physical disability and so forth
(Tronto, 1993:145). 'Otherness' arises out of our expectation to be autonomous and
independent. Thus many people 'other' care givers or care receivers in order to
consolidate their own sense of autonomy (Tronto, 1993:124). Care conjures an
association with the private, the emotional and the needy; thus care can become a sign of
weakness, which results in the devaluation of care as work and the location of care within
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trivial, emotional and private states (Tronto, 1993:112). By dismantling the myth of
independence, the myth of universalism, that underpins notions of the healthy citizen, is
also unmasked. When people are viewed as interdependent their needs become a matter
of social, cultural and political concern. (Mackay, 2001:147).
Ultimately the care ethic that Tronto describes must be situated within the context of deep
antagonisms that exist within a health care system and the public sphere more broadly.
Sevnhuijsen goes one step further than Tronto and Bowden in exploring the relationship
between a care ethic and the complexity of the interplay between gender, power, care and
ethics, while simultaneously stressing the importance of gender in a care ethic, because
we cannot divorce gender or real women's experiences from the development of care
thinking (Mackay, 2001:153). For Sevnhuijsen a care ethic needs to be situated within
concrete socio political settings and situations (Sevnhuijsen, 1998). Like Tronto,
Sevnhuijsen argues that the equation of autonomy and justice within independence within
traditional liberal frameworks has led to the privileging of values of self sufficiency and a
denigration of care, dependency or interdependency (MacKay, 2001:150). She also
identifies how a care ethic and its characteristic practices of attentiveness, responsibility,
competence and responsiveness provide the framework for reaching judgments which are
attentive to difference and contribute to a radical pluralism (Sevnhuijsen, 1998:14-5 in
Mackay, 2001:151). Care rather than a form of identity politics is a form of action and
social agency that assists citizens in making political judgments about social provision
(MacKay, 2001:150). In effect Sevnhuijsen argues for the importance of health
citizenship in which the creation:
"[Of] a space in which carers as citizens can 'bring their expertise and moral
considerations into public debates without being associated with a fixed caring
identity or with associated claims to moral truth or moral goodness' (Sevnhuijsen,
1998:15). Thus the ethics of care gives rise to a form of deliberative citizenship in
which embodied citizens seek to judge with care and use attentive reasoning rather
than universalist reasoning as their starting point. [Sevnhuijsen] argues that this
results in a two fold outcome: first that the ideas of citizenship are better able to
accommodate diversity and pluralism; and, second that care is 'deromanticized'
which better enables us to 'consider its values as political virtues'" (Sevnhuijsen,
1998: 15 in MacKay, 2001: 151).
Thinking about the usefulness of care as a social and political resource brings to light
various issues and concerns developed throughout the thesis culminating in chapter eight
around health citizenship and community. The specific contexts of care within anxiety
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health practices, as discussed in the context of chapter eight, may suggest that practically
care can be an inequitable process, as it involves relations of power, pain and
vulnerability that may be abused by either care giver, care receiver or both. Thus the
inequalities of caring can be problematic for a politics of care and the development of
health citizenship (Tronto, 1996:149). "Because care forces us to think concretely about
people's real needs, and about evaluating how these needs will be met, it introduces
questions about what we value into everyday life"(MacKay, 2001:147). A care ethic
"frames political issues in such a way that makes their impact and concern with human
lives, direct and immediate. Within a care framework, political issues can make sense and
connect to each other. Under these conditions political involvement increases
dramatically" (Tronto 1993:177 in Mackay, 2001:148).
"[C]are values are skills that are needed in the public sphere of citizenship. The
public worth attached to care thinking and care thinkers as citizens' acts as a
powerful form of recognition and validation and can build or reinforce group
solidarity. Taken together the ethics of care presents a powerful vision of a
different sort of politics" (MacKay, 2001:130).
In this way is care thinking a key tool in improving democratic participation, creating
meaningful consultation and forming new forms of deliberative or active citizenship
conducive to health citizenship (MacKay, 2001:153)?
2.3.3.4 Health citizenship and autonomy
The issue of autonomy is central to the thesis, and is explored in detail within chapter
seven. This review enhances a discussion of autonomy within that chapter by drawing
together connections between care and autonomy, and by expanding on and broadening
discourses on autonomy within chapter seven. Care is central to feminist political
theorizing on autonomy, because if connectedness and interdependence is understood to
form the basis by which persons develop and relate to one another, basic suppositions
about autonomy must also come into question. Unlike care, feminist discussions around
autonomy are not as well developed within mental health geography in spite of its
obvious relevance to questions of personhood, self-governance and relations of power.
Traditionally autonomy has been the defining 'lack' for persons with mental disorders, or
those who are labeled deviant, mad or ill. Lack of ability to be autonomous has led to the
systemic discrimination of those with mental illness, and the development of beliefs about
mental disorder and meanings of the 'mental'. This is connected to the way in which
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autonomy has been defined individualistically in relation to governing the 'mind', as the
capacity for rational self-legislation or self-governance that is considered to be the
defining features of persons (Rawls, 1971). Framing autonomy as a form of independence
from others, and independence ofmind has been problematic for many individuals
including the mentally ill, and thus it has been important for feminists and mental health
advocates to reclaim and re-conceptualize the concept of individual autonomy and to
articulate conceptions of choice and political rights that are more adequate from a
feminist perspective such as relational autonomy (Hawkins, 1993; Sherwin, 1998).
The term relational autonomy arises from feminist criticism of traditional ideals and
notions of autonomy as masculinist, detached, individualistic and rationalistic. Instead
autonomy should be seen as a relational and intersubjective process that explodes the
myth that personhood can be developed independent of other individuals and life
experiences (Koehn, 1999). Many feminist critiques focus attention on the need for a
more fine grained and richer account of the autonomous agent as historically embedded
while psychically differentiated (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000:21). Feminist critiques are
also concerned to analyze the specific ways in which oppressive socialization and
relationships can impede autonomous agency at the level of: individual formation of
desire, beliefs and attitudes; the role that norms and institutions play in shaping the beliefs
of agents; as well as, an agents ability to act on autonomous desires and choices impeded
by the agent's own restrictions and social norms (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000:19-22).
In relation to discussions of care some feminists argue that traditional ideas of autonomy
give normative primacy to independent self-sufficiency and separation from others at the
expense of recognition of the value of relations of dependency and interconnection. Since
such relations have historically been central to women's lives and symbolically associated
with femininity, it is argued that traditional conceptions of autonomy not only devalue
women's experience and those values arising from it, such as love, loyalty, friendship,
and care, but are also defined in opposition to femininity (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000:8-
9). Traditional conceptions of autonomy are thus masculinist conceptions. An example of
a care critique can be found in Virginia Held's account of the self (Held, 1993; 1997). Her
account is based on the work ofNancy Chodorow (1978) and other feminist
psychoanalytic thought that focuses on the relationship between mother and child:
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"The self... is seen as having both a need for recognition and a need to understand
the other, and these needs are seen as compatible. They are created in the context
of a mother child interaction and are satisfied in a mutually empathetic
relationship... both give and take in a way that not only contributes to the
satisfaction of their needs as individuals but also affirms the larger relational unit'
they compose. Maintaining this larger relational unit then becomes a goal, and
maturity is not seen in terms of individual autonomy but in terms of competence
in creating and sustaining relationships of empathy and mutual intersubjectivity"
(Held, 1993:600).
This analysis of the self and autonomy is based on the work of feminists such as Nancy
Chodorow (1978), Jennifer Nedlesky (1991) and Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) who all
recommend that autonomy be re-conceptualized so that it is not defined in opposition to
femininity or to relations of dependence, care and connection. Evelyn Fox Keller (1985),
similar to Meyers, sees autonomy as a kind of competence. She describes two types of
autonomy, static and dynamic, that respectively characterize the distinction between
traditional masculinist accounts and feminist accounts of autonomy. While dynamic
autonomy competence promotes an enhanced sense of selfwhere relatedness to, and
dependence on, others is celebrated and welcomed, static autonomy competence is
pursued in the interests ofmastery and domination and arises from seeing others as a
threat to the self, from insecurity about the self, and from fears of dependency and loss of
self control (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000:10).
Autonomy in the context ofmental health and health care is often understood as the
person's ability to make authoritative decisions about their own health care. This is a
perspective that is central to what Lupton and Petersen (1998) describe as the core of
public and private health discourses. Within the health care system autonomy is a
universal goal, though it is often a goal that is subverted by the structure of a clinician-
patient hierarchy (Hawkins, 1993; Nelson, 1997). Autonomy within health care
discourses is often synonymous with the respect for patient rights (Sherwin, 1998; Dyck
et ah, 2001b). Without a principle of respect for patient autonomy, patients may be
subject to abuse or exploitation by clinical professionals. Illness and the health care
system tends by its very nature to be paternalistic, thus, it is a system in which subjects
become reliant and submissive to professional expertise and care. In this way patients are
vulnerable to manipulation and have a reduced ability to exercise and believe in the value
of their own types of knowledges (Kleinman, 1988; Frank, 1995). Many patients are
easily frightened into overriding their own preferences and following expert advice, or
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feel compelled to comply with the demands of clinicians in order to obtain access to other
services or medications (Sherwin, 1998).
But even in health care systems that accept the importance of autonomy as a central goal,
the effectiveness of practices that actually respect and foster patient autonomy or
informed choice and consent is another matter (Sherwin, 1998:24). Some of this problem
lies in the meaning ofautonomy within health care. Public health, and health care more
broadly emphasizes the importance of autonomy in the form of personal responsibility
and liability for one's own health care (Lupton and Petersen, 1998). The focus on
autonomy in health care generally "focuses on individualistic measures and often neglects
that autonomy is a socially situated or relational process, imbued in the political
dimensions ofmultiple relationships that structure an individuals' selfhood" (Sherwin,
1998:19). For Sherwin this view of autonomy is rooted in issues of:
"[PJrivledge and oppression within western cultures, where people raised in an
atmosphere ofprivilege come rather easily to think of themselves as independent
and self governing, it feels natural for them to think of themselves as autonomous.
Having been taught that they only need to apply themselves to achieve their needs
or desires, most think of their successes as self created and deserved, oblivious to
the barriers that oppression and disadvantage create, where the failures of others
become evidence of those people's unwillingness to exercise autonomy
responsibly"(Sherwin, 1998:25).
For Petersen and Lupton the focus on autonomy as individualistic is also problematic as
those 'autonomous' decisions made about health care are often relational in the sense that
they are directed by expert opinion and clinical professionals, which is often
unacknowledged by both clinician and patient. The illusion of choice is one part of the
mechanism for controlling behavior in modern western society (Foucault, 1980b).
Autonomy is not only reduced by clinicians themselves, but by the services and treatment
options available to people circumscribed by the policies of government and private
health care services, where the financial interests of the institution or private service being
billed may take priority over the patients preferences or needs (Sherwin, 1998:23). Yet
the rhetoric of choice within health care services prevails in spite of obviously
circumscribed options that may have little primary interest in the well being of patients.
In this way autonomy within the context of health care needs to be conceived of as a
relational process. We need to be able to look at both individual decision-making and
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the complex set of relations and policies that promote or constrain an individual's ability
to make particular choices (Sherwin, 1998:32). By viewing autonomy as relational the
process of making decisions about one's health and health care becomes an act of self-
reflection in which self-discovery and self-definition are more plausible.
2.5 Conclusion
The objective of the literature review has been to present material that builds on themes
central to the thesis and therefore informs the substantive thesis chapters to come. The
literature review specifically focuses on geographical and feminist discourses that pertain
to the collective organizing of the ADAO. It is hoped that the thesis will make an original
contribution to wider debates in human geography and feminist political theory as well as
connect those discourses to one another in innovative and productive ways. The
substantive chapters of this thesis elaborate on the themes developed within this chapter
in order to present an informed engagement with experiences of anxiety conditions.
However, before delving into the substantive chapters of the thesis two other chapters,
one dealing with the methodological aspects of this project (chapter three) and the other
providing background information about the ADAO (chapter four), will be discussed.
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Chapter Three - Methodology
3.1 Introduction
Following chapter two's review of literatures pertinent to the thesis, this chapter turns to
methodological issues. This chapter describes the feminist methodological frameworks
used within the research process. I discuss various methodological considerations,
including how data were collected, how these data were analyzed and the process of
writing up. Within the research process a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods
were used. Feminist scholars encourage a plurality ofmethods, where the choice of
methods is deemed to be comfortable, appropriate or effective (Tuana, 1993). The
framework used for this chapter is based on Beverly Skeggs (1995) discussion of
methodology within the production of feminist theory. Skeggs poses several questions for
methodological consideration (1995:5). First, why was the area of study chosen? Second,
which frameworks of established knowledge were used, referred to, challenged, ignored
and why? Third, which methods were chosen for the study and why? Fourth, what
frameworks of interpretation and analysis were chosen and why? Fifth, what were the
processes ofwriting-up influence in constructing a final product? I conclude this chapter
by reflecting on the methodological process employed in this thesis project and asking
what kinds of conclusions one can draw from that process about feminist geographical
methodologies.
3.2 Question 1- Motivations behind the research
Feminist research is concerned with exploring those voices who may have been silenced
or unheard. This was part ofmy impetus for working with the anxiety disorders
association ofOntario (ADAO). I felt that my research, its theoretical framework and
direction, should be informed directly by the experiences of those who have anxiety
conditions (notably panic and agoraphobia) and by the experiences of organizations that
deal with anxiety conditions. My motivation for this research is threefold: first, linked to a
desire to change the way in which anxiety conditions are understood and thought of;
second, to challenge dominant bio-medicai approaches to anxiety conditions such as panic
and agoraphobia; and third, to introduce the ADAO to a wider academic audience.
Researching grassroots communities, such as the ADAO, involves a critique and analysis
of the power relations involved in clinical and non-clinical practices and knowledges. By
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focusing on the ADAO, and its varied experiences in the context of health services within
Ottawa, I was provided with a starting point for asking new and critical questions about
knowledge practices and power relations that are constitutive of the identities and
communities that have shaped the ADAO.
My motivation for both my masters and doctoral research was not based on personal
experience or identity politics. I have never had a panic or anxiety attack or an
agoraphobic episode. My primary motivation was to address a gap in the social sciences
and humanities literature because the experiences of those with anxiety conditions have
much to contribute to the study of geography in particular. The assumption that a
researcher must share the identity politics of those they work with or study can be
problematic. Often identity politics revolves around narrow categorizations of a subject or
community. For example, many ofmy interviewees have, at one time or another, been
debilitated by the effects of anxiety, panic and agoraphobia, which have marginalized
them in various ways. But to say that the defining characteristic of that person revolves
around their panic or agoraphobia may be inaccurate, even for individuals who have had
panic, or been agoraphobic for a prolonged period of time.
3.3 Question 2- Methodological frameworks - key themes of feminist geography and
methodology
3.3.1 Feminist methodologies
I chose to work with feminist methodologies, and the methodological concerns indicated
by feminist geographers, because feminist geography is concerned with tracing and
exploring the silences and fissures within the discipline of geography. A concern of
feminist geographers is that critical methodologies and theoretical perspectives be
deployed to include those typically excluded from studies, especially women (Nast,
1994:55). This was one of the reasons I wanted to work with the anxiety disorders
association ofOntario whose work has been ignored or unheard. By exploring those gaps
and fissures created by, and within the research, feminist geographers explore the
possibilities of those 'in-between spaces' for social and political change and therefore
create new knowledges and spaces for feminism (Desbiens, 1999). In particular, feminist
geographers explore gender biases within methodology, theory and the profession itself.
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They also challenge more orthodox and conventional geographic work. This challenge
involves:
"[Rjethinking categories, definitions and concepts used to formulate theories
within a geographical discipline. Second, it involves examining the methods (and
the theories underlining them) used for exploring defined problems. Third it
involves considering the process of selecting problems deemed to be significant
for geographical enquiry, in particular through using gender (with all its multiple
meanings and intersections with other aspects of social identity) as a key analytical
category in studies of space/place, environment and landscape" (Madge et al.,
1997:86).
Increasingly feminist geographical methods have involved breaking or recreating
boundaries, and creating dynamic, discursive and relational spaces that continually
produce new understandings and new surprises (Laurie et al., 1999). The researcher
herself is seen as reconstructed through the research process, within a fragmented space of
fragile and fluid networks of connections and gaps (Rose, 1997). The research process is
not one in which the researcher is firmly located; it is a process in which "absences,
fallibility, and moments that require translation are brought into visibility" (Pratt,
2000:642).
Issues ofmethodology are central to feminist geographical projects and have increased
our attentiveness to issues of reflexivity, representation and responsibility within research
projects. Though methodology cannot provide the grounds for unifying feminists, as
feminists cannot claim a single distinctive set ofmethods in social research, most
feminists and feminist geographers agree that the world and theory are not separate from
one another and that our theory and methodology are shaped by our embeddedness within
the world. By recognizing that theory is embedded in 'everyday' contexts, feminist
geographers have brought to the fore the importance of'geography' or space and place
through issues of the 'field' (Jones III, Nast and Roberts, 1997:xxvii).
3.3.2 The 'field'
Within feminist geography discourses on the 'field' are central to a discussion of
methodology, the politics of fieldwork and representation of subjects. Historically the
'field' has been treated as a physical place, a place to go 'out' and do research. In this
sense geographers are seen to engage in fieldwork by entering a physically designated
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'field' (Nast, 1994:56). This is a reflection of geography's historical reliance on
empirically grounded research and an 'objective' stance where researcher and researched
roles and positions are clearly defined (England, 1994). The designation of the 'field' as a
occupying a specific geographic place and researcher location has been heavily criticized
by feminist geographers (The Professional Geographer, 1994; Women and Geography
study group, 1997; Laurie et al., 1999). Instead for these geographers the field is not
conceptualized and actualized in terms of a place or a people, rather it is located and
defined in terms of specific political objectives that cut across both time and space (Nast,
1994: 57). As Heidi Nast notes:
"The field is a social terrain in which we, as researchers, can strengthen " through
direct experience, the academic foundation of knowledge ( Kobayashi, 1994:79)
thereby forging bonds between the academy (itself a 'field') and the world at
large" (Nast, 1994:57).
The 'field' involves relationships formed with people and the decision making processes
involved in developing research agendas and adopting specific research techniques
(Laurie et al., 1999:46). Feminist geographers argue further that the field is a site of
betweeness that highlights how we always work with others who are separate and
different from ourselves. In other words: "betweeness is the: recognition that we cannot
fully understand other's subjectivities and speak with authority for them (Staeheli and
Lawson in Laurie et al., 1999:51).
Realizing that our methodologies shape and are shaped by the political context and scale
of a 'field' means that particular qualitative methods cannot be idealized in an of
themselves and that we should not expect that our own motives or the motives of the
researched are transparent (Nast, 1994:60). The field should be problematised as it is
constructed through power relations that define both the people and places that we study
(Staeheli and Lawson, 1994:97). The 'field' is both a discursive and spatial practice that is
constituted through power relations that do not end with the completion of interviews, it is
(re)produced and (re)negotiated within the context of interpretation, analysis and writing
up of the research-
Doing 'fieldwork' involves thinking about and working through a variety of issues
discussed within feminist methodology. They include issues such as: power relations,
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authority and empowerment within the research; knowledge production and sharing;
positionality and representation; friendship and trust; and reflexivity and responsibility
within the research. These issues help to identify how researchers and their subjects are
situated with respect to the knowledge that is produced, which involves an exploration of
the social experience ofboth the researcher and the researched (Ahmed et al., 2000; Amit,
2000). All of these themes are integral to one another and the distinction of these ideas
into separate discussions is artificial.
3.3.3 Authority, Power, and Empowerment
Geographical knowledge is always partial, socially situated and are produced within a
political context (Kobayashi, 1994; Rose, 1997). Thus, both researchers and researched
are positioned simultaneously in a number of fields of 'power', including gender, age,
class, ethnicity, race, sexuality and so on, that are articulated as "positions" in a
multidimensional geography of power relations (Rose, 1997:308). The researcher
inevitably participates in the (re)production of power relations in the 'field'. However,
the researcher will never be able to fully account for the power relations inherent within
research or that all aspects of the research can be known (Rose, 1993). Within feminist
research a predominant concern is the balancing ofpower differentials, and relationships
within the 'field'. The assumption here is that because the researcher has the last word, it
is the researcher who has the 'power' and negotiates that power. As researchers we
should both attempt to work against the subordination of the researched, as well as
providing safeguards for our own possible subordination and exploitation within the
field (Ansell, 2001:103). The researcher needs to be aware that s/he is situated within a
context where s/he may be powerless at times ( Barker and Smith, 2001; Horton, 2001).
There are practical concerns around the politics of doing research under conditions where
one's legitimacy is not only visibly in question but subject to constant revision
(Kobayashi, 1994:75). Resistance to the research came in a variety of forms, from denying
or simply not responding to a request to be interviewed, refusing to answer various
questions and limiting the detail and content of the narrative account. If research subjects
do not consent to be interviewed, do not show up for a scheduled interview, or do not
acknowledge the researcher's presence there is little the researcher can do to balance
power relations with those individuals. This became particularly evident when I
approached various clinicians for an interview, who felt that as a geographer I had no
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authority or legitimacy in doing research on a clinical subject. Thus, the researched hold a
great deal ofpower through withholding or providing access to their knowledge and
information. Yet, there are times when we must try to work with those more powerful
than ourselves, and who may have agendas that are oppressive (Nast, 1994:59). Every
'field' is a site of negotiation and struggle for power and that the politics of doing
fieldwork will inevitably come up against the politics of the 'field' (Kobayashi, 1994:79).
Much of the resistance to the research is also concerned with the notion of expert
knowledges and who possesses expertise. My experience in trying to interview various
persons illustrated how the power relation of 'expert' knowledge is not always conferred
to the researcher. I was both upset and disappointed by the lack of interest on the part of
some people I tried to contact, because I genuinely wanted to include their voices within
the research. I asked a number of clinicians and academics who were willing to be
interviewed why this could be the case, in the hope that they would provide me with ideas
of how to attract interest in the research. I was given a number of reasons as to why I was
being 'shut out', from: "they just might be very busy"; to "if they could bill you for your
time maybe they would do it then"; to "well, you are just a Ph.D. student in geography to
them you're nobody". While these responses provide me with some insight into the
reasons for difficulty with some interviews, I can only speculate as to why I did not get
responses to my request for interview.
Yet, as a researcher I am never entirely 'powerless' because if I cannot acquire certain
kinds of information or get enough people to interview, I can always change the way in
which I do my research and approach my subject. As the researcher I have control over
what voices are heard and how the subject matter is presented. This is why consideration
ofwhether or not the research is empowering, or places the participants of the research in
a detrimental position is important. While I have not explicitly set out to empower the
researched, increasing the number of people and kinds of audiences for the ADAO is a
form of empowerment/consciousness raising exercise that I have explicitly aimed for in
the research. Some feminist theorists insist that a feminist project is concerned with the
redistribution of power amongst women and men through empowerment of its subjects
(See Reinharz, 1992; Wolf, 1996). Unfortunately many researchers fail to ask the research
subjects themselves if they are benefiting from the process (Patai, 1991 in Wolf
1996).Who the research is empowering is a pivotal research consideration and question.
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Are we concerned with the empowerment ofour research subjects, or do "our good
intentions mask that the only individuals we are empowering are ourselves" (Moss,
1995)? Is the research about "giving voice" to others as a means of empowerment, or is it
about allowing others to speak and be heard in their own voices?
3.3.4 Whose knowledges? knowledge production and knowledge sharing
The issue of sharing knowledge within the 'field', or giving back to the participants, is an
important issue within feminist geography. A central issue for feminism has been the
development ofmethods for working with women that are fully consultative and open
(Smith, 1993). Feminism implies an obligation to take moral responsibility for our
politics, a general ethic of accountability towards the subjects of research and
responsibility for the way that knowledge is produced (Holland et al, 1998:16). The
researched should not be treated as mines of information to be exploited by the researcher
as a neutral collection of'facts' (England, 1994:82). But how that sharing process is
initiated and what is given back needs to be considered, because not all products of the
research may be useful for those researched (Morris-Roberts, 2001:148). For example
feeding back research findings to the participants, without consideration as to the form
of the feedback, may mean little to the researched (Mathews et al., 1998:103). Within
my own research I chose to share information and often act as a go between or messenger
for various participants and different people within the city.
For example, I was asked by the executive director to contact another person to find out if
he would be interested in potentially helping the ADAO in some way and I did so. In
another example, while interviewing information was relayed to me by a clinician that
would have been very useful for the ADAO to have known. Because ADAO members
provided me with a wealth ofknowledge for my research, to what extent was I obliged to
reciprocate that generosity? Did the ADAO want me to share my knowledges that I had
gained within the 'field' with them? I wanted to share what I had learnt with the ADAO,
but I did not want to impose my desire on the researched. I phoned the executive director,
and mentioned to her that I felt that the research relationship was very one sided and that I
wanted to share some of the knowledge I had gathered with the ADAO. She was happy to
hear this and informed me that there was a recent discussion ofmy research during a
board meeting. In this instance the researched were happy to be engaged in the process of
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knowledge sharing. However, knowledge production and the sharing of knowledges were
not always possible within my research. Some interviewees wanted me to inform them of
gossip collected through the research, which I felt was inappropriate. Alternately, not all
interviewees were interested in the research outside of the context of their own interviews.
I presented some ofmy analyses to my interview subjects throughout the course of the
research in order to get their opinions about my interpretations. The process yielded a lot
of critical feedback, but many interviewees were not concerned with what was done with
the research material. In this way feedback is often an imposition upon the research
participants who may have little time or interest in the research itself.
There are times when the distance that a researcher may have from the research subjects
may help to inform the researched of things that may be to close for them to see. My
position as researcher allowed me to hear and explore knowledges and perspectives that
the members of the ADAO may have not had access to, or been afraid to contact, thus, the
sharing and reciprocity of knowledges across researcher, researched boundaries was
central to the research. In so doing 1 was involved a process of representation of both
others, and myself that is a part of the larger process by which identities are inscribed
(Dyck, 1998; 1999). Within the research it is important to view the researched as
collaborators and to share knowledges back and forth with them. In this way I was
attempting to give back to my participants through forwarding information, listening to
and facilitating their experiences within the research.
3.3.5 Positionality, trust and friendship
Feminist methods position the participant as someone who informs the researcher about
the processes and relations under study, in contrast to a situation where the researcher is
viewed as an expert on a separate plane from the subjects of the study (Herman and
Mattingly, 2001; Oberhauser, 1997:167). Methodologies that promote mutual respect
between researcher and researched in non authoritative ways are deemed preferable in that
they allow for others to be heard and potentially empowered (Nast, 1994:58) As feminist
scholars we should recognize the intersubjectiveness of the relations between a researcher
and her/his subjects, and that as a consequence the knowledge that is acquired is
subjective and interpersonal (Dyck, 1997:186). By situating 'fieldwork' in the multiple
contexts in which we operate, feminist geographers have highlighted how the role of
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researcher is constituted in a space of 'betweeness' in which roles are constantly changing
(Robson, 2001). Not only did I behave differently in different situations (sometimes quite
unconsciously- though I could later hear and read this difference in my interview
transcripts), but also the people I interviewed interpreted me in different ways.
The differential positioning of research and researched is intimately tied to the respective
relationship of each to a particular place and personal location as experienced through
specific socio-spatial settings (Dyck, 1997). I often moved back and forth in my own
researcher positioning from supplicant to an informant/knower. Many feminists favor the
role of supplicant, where the researcher explicitly acknowledges her reliance on the
research subject to provide insight because the knowledge of the person being researched
is greater than that of the researcher (Oberhauser, 1997). The appeal of supplication is in
its potential for dealing with asymmetrical and potentially exploitative power relations by
shifting a lot of power over to the researched, even though this may mean that the
researcher becomes very dependent on the researched for knowledge (England, 1994:82).
Both researcher and researched come to the research with their own purposes and
expectations, some ofwhich were expressed to me and some that remained hidden
(Herman and Mattingly, 2001; Ley and Mountz, 2001). I was not always forthright about
how much information I knew, in order that the interviewee could tell me in his or her
own words about a situation or person.
Another issue central to positionality for researchers studying anxiety conditions is not to
assume the role of therapist (Burman, 1998; Ussher, 1989). Invariably, certain research
subjects are looking for someone to assist them, to tell them what to do and to talk to
(Sandeloski, 2002). Many are hoping the researcher will act in a judgmental and
prescriptive role as therapist. However, I am not comfortable being positioned as someone
who can solve their problems because while I have studied anxiety 'disorders'
extensively, I do not have the skills to counsel those I interview. Therefore, it was
important to clearly inform the researched, that the interview sessions may be illuminating
for them and they may learn things during the course of the interview about themselves,
'out I cannot address or solve their immediate problems, indeed, I stressed to interviewees
that I am not necessarily the expert in the relationship and that the research findings are
contingent on the expert knowledges of the researched.
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Often discussions of positionality revolve around the issue ofwho is inside and outside of
the field and the development of friendship in the research context (Ribbens and Edwards,
1998). My position as an insider /outsider consistently shifted within the communities that
I engaged with over time. I was an insider in the sense that I had a long-term contact with
the ADAO and have followed its progress since 1997, which placed me in a privileged
position from which to speak from and to the ADAO. The role of friendship was a part of
how 1 negotiated that insider/outsider position. Earlier feminist works suggest that
developing friendships between the researched and the researcher is desirable and
necessary for productive feminist research (Oakley, 1981; Finch, 1984). These works
were a critique of interviewing methods that favored detachment and rigid divisions
between the identities of researched and researcher. More recent feminist scholarship
suggests that friendship within the research process is not always possible, and does not
always result in a balanced power relation between individuals (Cotterill, 1992). The
development of friendship within the 'field' is further complicated because:
"[T]he friendship that may develop between a feminist researcher and her subject
could end up being more manipulative than traditional positivist methods...
Friends end up knowing more about each other than conventional researchers and
their subjects; this closeness can expose research subjects to far greater danger and
exploitation" (Stacey, 1991:114 in Wolf, 1996: 20).
If a researcher seeks friendship, friendship needs to be specifically defined as a mutually
respectful and reciprocal relationship during the research process. Striving for empathy
and intimacy should not be confused with friendship (Reinharz, 1992).
3.3.6 Reflexivity
Reflexivity, or the relationship of a researcher to their research, is also a key issue within
feminist geography. Reflexivity needs to be used throughout the processes of locating,
reaching out to, and working within a particular 'field' (Nast, 1994:59). Reflexivity is
often misunderstood as narcissistic and navel gazing, that the researcher has let the "veil
ofneutrality slip" (Oakley, 1992). Rather, reflexivity is "self-critical sympathetic
introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher" (England,
1994:82). For example, I often used a journal in order to reflect on perceptions and
interpretations of the research (also see Hovorka, 1997). It is necessary for a researcher to
have a personal space in which to reflect and perhaps to conceal aspects and gaps within
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the fieldwork that they are not happy with or proud of. This can be beneficial and
problematic for both researcher and researched. However personal journals are also a way
in which the researcher can critically reflect on the process of research in ways that are
translated into further obvious fieldwork (Hertz, 1997). Reflexivity is critical to the
conduct of fieldwork it induces self-discovery that can lead to new insights about research
questions, and result in more openness to challenging one's theoretical position (England,
1994:82).
Reflexivity provides an opportunity for the researcher to consider whether the research
has obscured and displaced the research subject in favor of the researcher, giving voice to
the already speaking author (Lai, 1996). This is a concern because it may perhaps further
silence subjects that have typically remained unheard. On the other hand, it may also
mean that the practices of the research subjects, who may be in a politically
disadvantageous situation, are not exposed as easily to those who may use this knowledge
to oppress them (Madge et af, 1997:108). For example, 1 am concerned that the research
may expose certain individuals to unfair scrutiny. I am also conscious that I need to
consider what effect my analysis will have on the changing dynamics of anxiety service
provision in Ottawa and beyond. The act of choosing and working with marginalized
groups involves a critical and reflexive questioning of what the researcher and research
hopes to accomplish, why a particular area was chosen, and for whom we are working
(Nast, 1994:58). This also involves reflecting on how power is negotiated between
researched and researcher and how these positions have transformed themselves in order
to maintain honesty between the researcher and the researched (Du Bois, 1983:95). There
needs to be a recognition that some historical and material realities are beyond our
personal and social reach, for example my ability to affect change and convince
institutional clinicians of various issues. Just because we want our research to effect social
change does not mean that we will be able to. Such expectations ignore our personal
limits within our specific socio-cultural locations (Nast, 1994:59).
3.4 Question Three- Methods
3.4.1 Selecting a case study- the organization
According to Del Casino et al. (2000:523) researcher recognition that the selection of
objects/subjects of analysis, such as an organization, is a key moment in the
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methodological process. Those objects/subjects of analysis affect the appropriateness of
the research questions we ask. Organizations are valid and theoretically complex objects
of analysis for geographers. Geographies are produced through organizational activity as
individuals who network within and outside oforganizations "stamp their ideological and
material impression regions and landscapes, they help individual-level spatial behaviors,
they influence geographic perceptions, values and meanings, they direct and redirect the
unfolding socio-spatial relations", in other words organizations both internalize, negotiate
and create social space (Del Casino et al., 2000:524). In this way studying organizations
provides a means ofunderstanding wider social and spatial processes, patterns and
discourses. The study of organizations, whether as a single case study or as comparatively
studied alongside other organizations, helps the researcher frame their inquiries in order to
begin to understand the complexity of socio-spatial settings (see Conradson, 2003).
Given my working knowledge of and relationship with members of the ADAO I based my
research primarily on a single case study. Using a single case study was, as I discuss later
in the chapter, not initially ofmy own choosing. Yet, practically using a single case study
allowed me to direct and focus the research material and analysis more precisely on
discourses and issues of special concern expressed within the organization. By focusing
on the ADAO, and providing some comparative analysis and context, a set of questions
and discourses emerged internal to the organization helped refine interview questions for
interviewees both internal and external to the organization. Additionally, because ofmy
prior association with the organization interviews were easier to facilitate and
interviewees were more open and candid in their discussions. The choice to focus on the
ADAO made many interviewee's feel 'safer' within the context of interviews because
they felt that I was genuinely interested in the organization and its well-being (see
Conradson's discussion of empathetic warmth, 2003:512). However using a single case
study also has significant implications and drawbacks for the theoretical claims that can
be made within the thesis. First, a single case study has methodological implications for
issues of trust and researcher positionality as discussed in section two of this chapter.
Second, the ability to understand the wider context ofmental health issues is framed by
the experience and perspectives of interviewees within the group that may be limited and
partial or at times speculative and uniformed. In this way the thesis may not provide as
nuanced or complete an understanding of the wider context of health service provision.
For example, as the ADAO is dominated by a particular individual and group of
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individuals selected by those individuals viewpoints expressed are partial and biased, and
that other power and discourse dynamics will occur within the research process (Hovorka,
1997). However, as many researchers point out, all research is limited and partial in some
way, and the search for a 'complete picture' is problematic. It is thus important for any
researcher to acknowledge the limits of their research questions, analysis and work (Bondi
et al., 2002). This does not mean that researchers who work with single case studies or
comparative studies cannot be thorough and methodical in their analysis and writing up or
that their work is somehow less valid. Recognizing, however, that further work and
research that the work is a stepping-stone to other analysis is important.
Often feminists who research specific organizations and single case studies employ an
ethnographic approach to their research. Ethnography refers to research that involves
participating and observing in particular socio-spatial settings in order to understand
people's lives from the 'inside' within the context of their everyday lives and experiences
(Parr, 2001:182). Here the researcher is often closely involved with a particular group or
neighborhood where attention is paid to the social structures, behaviors and meanings of
these for that group (Hay, 2000: 187). Ethnographic approaches explicitly discuss how
researchers may affect the research context as they become a part of the social world that
they study, as well as the importance of reflexivity on the social processes, personal
characteristics and values of the researcher which inform the collection of data and its
analysis (Punch, 2001:166).
While the research I conducted bears many similarities to the concerns raised through
ethnographic research an ethnographic study of the ADAO would have been difficult and
not necessarily useful. There are two primary reasons why ethnography was not deemed
appropriate for the study. First, most of the places in which ADAO activity occurs are
within the private residences ofmembers, or spaces that are far too small to accommodate
more than one person. The ADAO headquarters were for many years located in the
executive director's apartment, performing ethnographic study within a small two
bedroom apartment turned office would be uncomfortable (for both myself and those in
the office), intrusive, and a violation (perhaps) at times of the executive director's privacy.
The office located in the Bronson center is roughly four feet wide by eight feet deep,
complaints were made by office staffabout their own ability to work within the space,
having an additional person in the office would be very uncomfortable physically and
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mentally. Secondly, the ADAO did not operate in consistent patterns, the days of the week
that staffworked in the office varied significantly and were often not well planned. In this
way it would be practically difficult to arrange for constant periods of observation. Third,
while I attended various meetings and events held by the ADAO, it was difficult within
support groups and the fourteen week anxiety management program to have every
member agree for me to sit in or observe the group. At times I would attend a group
session and be asked to leave because someone in the group was having a bad day, or
because they felt vulnerable by my presence as a researcher. As Parr notes research
strategies such as ethnography may serve to reinforce the vulnerability of the people who
live in those spaces, as the presence of the researcher may also serve to help objectify the
researched (Parr, 2001:192). In this way researchers seeking to help empower those they
research by focusing and intruding on their lived experiences can reproduce the processes
they seek to critique (Parr, 2001:191).
Yet similar to many ethnographic studies, I was cognizant ofmy positionality within the
context of research settings and made records ofmy observations throughout the research
with a focus on how people reacted to my questions or myself. I was reflexive on the
nature of the relationship between myself and research participants, as well as how that
relationship transformed over time. Often ethnographic researchers are initially positioned
outside of the communities they study, while my position and my relationship to the
ADAO placed me in a position where I was not quite an insider or outsider. This both
facilitated certain relationships and flow of information at the same time as it hindered
other relationships and information exchange, which was important to record, discuss and
analyze within the context of the research (Punch, 167: 2001). Ultimately, it is important
for the researcher (performing ethnography or not) to understand that negotiating access in
different contexts hold different implications for the formation of research relationships
and creating geographical knowledges (Parr, 2001:192).
3.4.1 The interview process - collecting 'data'.
I have worked with the ADAO since 1997. In this period I often collaborated with the
current executive director Cheryl Driskell. Throughout this period I demonstrated my
commitment to the organization and its mandate through my work on panic and
agoraphobia and my genuine desire to explore issues that are influenced by, and pertain
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to, individuals with anxiety conditions. As a result it was not difficult for me to collect
information and gather people for interviews who are associated with the ADAO. When I
came back to Ottawa to initiate the research interview process in October 2000 I contacted
Cheryl, informed her ofmy research on community based organizations that deal with
agoraphobia and panic, and my desire to more specifically look at the ADAO's structure
and programs. I then asked her if I could interview her, and if I could have a list of other
names of people to interview. She was happy to be interviewed and provided me with the
names of other ADAO members. Thus Cheryl was a key person in providing me with my
initial network of interviews, which came to influence the research directly, in terms of
whose experiences I had direct access to. It also was very revealing in that it exposed
issues ofpower within the larger health services community.
In total twenty-seven formal interviews, thirty informal conversations and twelve follow
up interviews were conducted during the period of October 2000 to December 2001. The
interviewees ranged in age from 18-65, were predominantly white females of differeing
ethnicities, ofmiddle to upper class backgrounds with a university education. The
interviews were semi-structured, typically lasted from one to two hours in length and were
tape-recorded. Interviewees were offered access to see the transcripts if they wanted. I had
a long list of questions under various headings that would be asked depending on the role
of the person (staff, board, volunteer, consultant) and their knowledges or experiences
with anxiety/panic/agoraphobia and the ADAO (see Appendix III and IV- for interview
schedules). The interview questions always began with a series of introductory questions
about the person themselves. While I thought that this was a good way to ease into some
of the other questions about the ADAO or individual experiences of panic and anxiety, I
found that many of the people were confused by my interest in their lives outside of their
involvement with the ADAO. After interviews many people responded by saying that they
did not expect a lot of the questions, and did not realize that I was 'interested in their lives
and opinions', they 'just thought I wanted information from them'. 1 also always
concluded the interview by asking the person if they knew other people that would be
interesting to interview, if they had any questions for me, and if they had any suggestions
of research questions or themes that they would want to see be developed or researched.
Some interviewees were interviewed again in follow up interviews, or asked to be
interviewed again after they received copies of their transcripts. After each interview,
informal conversation, and at different points during the research, notes were made in a
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separate journal to reflect on the research process. This journal would influence the
creation of thematic codes, but journal material, which was often from confidential
informal conversations are not directly quoted, unless the interviewee gave permission to
do so.
Language played an important role in the construction ofmy interview schedule. Certain
words that are commonplace in discussions within political philosophy or feminist
geography were not appropriate for use in the context of an interview for a variety of
reasons. For example, 1 found it difficult and unhelpful to ask my interviewees questions
about citizenship using the term citizenship because most of those interviewed understood
that term within discourses on the nation state. In this way, using the term citizenship did
not contribute anything new to an understanding ofwhat role citizenship plays in their
lives. They would talk about voting, being able to attend Canada day celebrations and so
forth. Yet, discussions around alternative medicine contributed to interesting discussions
on being un-Canadian that would bridge further discussions about forms of health
citizenship. Some interviewees, particularly those who were service providers in social
work or health care institutions, were aware and frequently used theoretical language. For
example, one interviewee suggested that I should more appropriately use the term
interdependence, as opposed to independence or dependence.
I began my interviews by interviewing Cheryl at her home. I presented her with a letter of
introduction that further outlined the purpose ofmy research and an informed consent
form that gave her the opportunity to choose whether or not she wanted her interview to
remain confidential (see Appendix I for letter of introduction and Appendix II for
informed consent form). I informed all of the research interviewees that their decision
about confidentiality could be changed. If they did not want a part of the interview to be
identified with them or if they wanted to be taken off the transcript they should mention it
during the interview or phone me afterwards. Additionally interviewees were told that
they could stop the interview at any time that they were uncomfortable. Every interviewee
was presented with my business card, a letter of introduction and informed consent form
(ail on University ofEdinburgh letterhead to verify and legitimate my position as a
researcher). After the interview Cheryl presented me with a list ofnames and contact
numbers for current staff and board members of the ADAO, she also told me that she had
contacted all of those on the list and informed them that I would be phoning for an
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interview. Cheryl's seal of approval from the executive director was instrumental with the
ease with which I received consent from those on the list to be interviewed. When I
contacted the names on the list I mentioned that Cheryl had suggested that they would be
interesting and useful to speak with, which made those that I contacted more comfortable
with the request for an interview.
During the interviews I actively listened to interviewees' stories, asking questions to some
and not others in order to ascertain which paths to take and which issues to follow up,
which to ignore, and which to probe further. While I was guided by an initial set of
questions which on an interview schedule that were developed for different interviewees,
for example, board members would be asked different questions than long term
volunteers (see Appendix III). At each interview I was guided by what the participant said
to me and my interpretation and understanding of their words, this led to the shaping of
different interview questions (see Appendix IV). The interview content was therefore a
joint production. After each interview questions would be refined, as would my approach
to asking questions and listening to respondents. This dialogical processes between my
interviewees and me continuously helped to shape the structure and questions of the
interview as well as the interpretations of the narratives that were produced later on
(Ribbens and Edwards, 1998; Smith, 2001). This dialogue increases the probability that
the research may be transformed by the input of the researched and second and highlights
how the researcher is a visible and integral part of the research setting (England, 1994:84).
What was more time consuming and difficult was organizing the specific time and place
of the interview. The interviews occurred in a wide variety of places chosen by those
interviewed such as; people's homes, coffee shops, shopping centers, work offices and
most commonly at the ADAO's new office in the Bronson Centre. The centre may have
been a practical venue to meet in, but a horrible space for recording interviews due to
echo. I encouraged the interviewees to choose spaces in which they felt comfortable or
spaces that were convenient for them. I did so in order to address issues of unequal
hierarchies or levels of control that are perpetuated and (re) created within fieldwork
(Wolf, 1996). Unfortunately, as comfortable as those spaces were, some of the locations
turned out to be horrible for transcribing later on, and in future interviewing I might be
more forthright in setting up interview locations.
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After I contacted all of the current staff and board members for interviews I went back to
Cheryl to ask her for additional names of people, such as long term volunteers and
consultants, who might be interested in being interviewed. I was provided with additional
names that I contacted, and almost all replied and consented to be interviewed. At the
same time as 1 was interviewing persons from the list of names provided for me by
Cheryl, I was also attempting to contact clinicians within private practice clinics in the
Ottawa area and clinicians in key mental health institutions such as the Royal Ottawa
Hospital (ROH), which had recently opened up a new anxiety disorders unit. I had no luck
in contacting any clinician from a private clinic and only interviewed three clinicians at
the Royal Ottawa for the entire year that I was in Ottawa. However, I was able to contact
and interview a variety of staff from the anxiety unit at the Royal Ottawa from names
given to me by Cheryl. Because ofmy inability to contact these individuals, I consulted
and interviewed a number of individuals in key health service positions, counseling
centers, and academic institutions within the city to find out if there were other networks I
could tap into. Based on their suggestions 1 made more contacts with health services such
as the Canadian mental health association (CMHA) an organization that is central to the
implementation of services within the city as a contact between community groups,
institutions and the public.
In addition to semi-structured interviews I also collected data about the ADAO through
documents provided to me by the organization. These data included: copies of
newsletters; statistics on phone calls and questions received by the office; evaluation
forms from programs that the ADAO offers; copies of booklets; handouts; training
workbooks; statistics on numbers of participants and volunteers; protocols; scripts for
projects; workbooks designed for the youth education program; board meeting minutes;
copies ofproposals for funding and rejection letters. Essentially I was given access to
most of the documents in the ADAO office. The collection of this data has been valuable
in comparative analysis of the semi-structured interviews. I found that a comparison of the
accounts of those I interviewed and the quantitative documents suggested different and
often contradictory information about the ADAO. For example, interviewees discussed
how the ADAO had grown exponentially over the past five years, however statistics
suggested otherwise. This forced me to rethink and reanalyze material gathered during the
interview context. The data from the documents are useful as: a record of changing
discourses, programs and structures within the ADAO; as an evaluative and comparative
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tool between the written guidelines of the ADAO and the experiences as described to me
by those interviewed; and as information that contributes to a wider literature on anxiety
conditions.
3.5 Question 4- Frameworks of analysis and interpretation
3.5.1 Transcribing
The process of transcription can be difficult, time consuming and tiring. But, transcribing
for hours means you become intimately acquainted with the discussions and memories of
those interviewed. It also means that often the excitement of the initial experience is
turned into boredom. The process of transcribing highlights gaps that may occur between
the written and spoken word, as well as, gaps between the spoken word and the academic
presentation of those words. The interviews were transcribed using a transcribing machine
and took from between two to four hours per hour of interview to transcribe depending on
the quality of the tape. In transcribing my intention was to get as much of the conversation
as possible on paper. Voice intonation, punctuation pauses and other sounds would be
included during a second transcribing session. The first transcripts had the appearance of
run-on text. The division between speakers was indicated not through name but through
separation of paragraph. Participants who asked for copies of the transcript had name
headings included and correct punctuation.
While my initial intention was to transcribe all the interviews myself, this became
impractical at one point during the research. I could not afford to hire from a professional
transcribing service and instead sent an email to a government secretarial site for people
looking for extra work. The people I hired indicated to me that they were familiar with
transcribing documents, which was verified through references. The transcribers were
required to sign a confidentiality form, in which nothing concerning the interviews could
be repeated, and that all copies of the transcript would be destroyed. The tapes that the
transcribers received were ones where the interviewee specified on their informed consent
forms that confidentiality was not a concern. In the end a hired transcriber transcribed
eight interviews, and all were re-transcribed by myself to include more specific
information about intonation, pauses and voice but primarily to include missing
information, correct names and details. I also found that when reading the transcripts I had
not interviewed it was more difficult for me to recall memories of the interview context
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and I felt more detached from the text. In many respects this experience highlighted both
the time consuming process of transcribing tapes, and the problems one might have from
an outside transcriber who is not familiar with the interview in picking up on important
detail and context of conversation.
3.5.2 Working with the transcripts and other textual material
In order to guide me through the process of analysis I looked for examples within the
literature on methods of analysis and how these methods have been transformed and used
within research practices but have found little to draw on. Much ofwhat I have read has
provided me with a strong theoretical underpinning but has left me unclear of how to
translate those ideas into practice. Feminists for example have written on reflexivity,
power, voice and authority in methodology but little attention has been given to these
issues specifically in the data analysis stage of research (Mauthner and Doucet,
1998:121). I have found few journal articles or publications in general that have detailed
the process of analysis. And while many of these publications seem to require some
discussion ofmethodological analysis, they seem more a convention than an integrated
part of the discussion.
This is reinforced within the writings of various geographers who argue that practices of
interpretation are rarely discussed in final publications or written documents, leaving the
impression that the qualitative material magically appeared to support arguments
(Jackson, 2001; Crang, 2001). Mike Crang identifies three reasons for this. First, the
process feels un-glamorous and clerical. Second, it is an area where many people feel
insecure about the comments and scrutiny of other people over their work. And third, that
without common standards there is no shield of accepted practice to hide behind (Crang,
2001:215). Analysis is an area of the research where we are arguably most open to
criticism, as it is the portion of the research that is most directly visible in the text. It is
well recognized in feminist scholarship that research contains biases and values, that
knowledges are situated and that the production of knowledge must be acknowledged
reflexively (Flekman, 1990; Stanley and Wise, 1993). Feminists have had to accept that
there is no technique of analysis or methodological logic than can neutralize the social
nature of interpretation. Feminist researchers can only try to explain "the grounds on
which selective interpretations have been made by making explicit the processes of
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decision making which produces the interpretation, and the logic ofmethod on which
these decisions are made" (Holland and Ramazanoglu, 1994:133). In this way
interpretation is not a process of testing and searching for 'truth' it is about a process of
exploration and thinking through the material to construct arguments (Ramazanoglu and
Holland, 2002). However, reflexivity also requires a certain level of self-awareness and
transparency on the part of the researcher that not every researcher may have of their own
work.
According to Bailey et al. (1999) transparency of the research process is necessary in
order to develop analytic criteria that are systematic. Systematic criteria and analytic
techniques can practically and psychologically help to deal with large amounts of
qualitative material (Crang, 2001). Some feminist sociologists have used the notion of a
relational ontology to inform their method of transcript analysis and increase the
transparency of the analytic process. Relational ontology focuses on selves in relation and
selves in process. Thus the researcher and researched are viewed as embedded in a
complex web of relations and environments (Tronto, 1993; Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000).
Instead of focusing on a particular method, the focus is on interpretations, understandings
and versions of the method and of the transcripts (Mauthner and Doucet, 1998:126). This
involves a reflexive approach to research where the researcher socially locates
herself/himself in relation to the respondent. The researcher considers how one's thoughts
and feelings may affect one's understandings, interpretation, and the way we write about
people. And the researcher examines how theoretical interpretations of the interviewees'
narratives are constructed, simultaneously documenting these processes (Brown and
Gilligan, 1992). This is a process of listening to the interviewee, which creates a space
where we come to recognize the participants' way of speaking and seeing as well as our
own in order to understand how the interviewee speaks of him/herself before we speak
about him/her. In this way it is important to hear other people's voices as distinct from the
researcher's, and important for the researcher to continually come back to those voices
during interpretation and analysis (Crang, 2001:229).
Data analysis is a critical stage in the research process because it carries with it the
potential to amplify or decrease the volume of participants' voices. The research process
may be viewed as a balancing act between the multiple voices of our participants, the
voice of the researcher and the voices and perspectives represented in the theories or
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frameworks we use in the research (Mauthner and Doucet, 1998:140). One crucial
question within the context of analysis is how to keep the interviewees' voices and
perspectives alive, while at the same time recognizing the researcher's role in shaping the
research process and product (Mauthner and Doucet, 1998: 119).
The early phases of analysis were messy, confusing and uncertain. For some feminist
scholars this is the point of analysis, to learn from and about the data and to learn
something new from listening to other people (Mauthner and Doucet, 1998:122). My
process of interpretation began with rereading the transcripts. My resistance to computer
coding for example has been a response to my interest in the tactility of the text. In
analyzing data one is confronted with one's interviewees, and with their central role in
shaping the outcome. This is enhanced through a continuous re-reading of the transcripts
and journal entries in which one is confronted with the experience of the interview over
and over rather than computer coding material where we are presented with selective
segments of the interview which often seem fragmented from the interview as a whole
(Mauthner and Doucet, 1998:122).
Re-reading the interview and my journal text, is a method of saturating oneselfwith the
text, helping the researcher remember and re-enact the time and place of the interview.
The process is slow moving in that it is a long drawn out process of re-reading and
recalling, yet dynamic in the sense that new memories and connections are experienced
with every consecutive reading. I kept anticipating some moment of revelation, where
meaning would pop out from the text at me, but no such moment of immediate revelation
occurred. Yet, reassuringly with each consecutive reading of the interviews I realized that
there was a great deal of information in the transcripts that could be used, if not too much
information.
In the process of analysis and interpretation of the narratives a variety of information is
considered: verbal interview material, field notes, information received before and after
the formal interview, informal meetings with interviewees, and non linguistic and non
verbal information such as bodily and facial cues and pauses of breath. But the transcribed
interviews on paper contain little of this information and as a result the analysis is
informed less by these kinds of information. However, during the process of re-reading
the transcripts and journal memories, impressions, settings and non-verbal cues of the
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experience of each interview emerged and were noted down within the transcript text in a
separate column. To help with this process, interview tapes were also listened to with the
transcript text in hand.
Both the process of re-reading transcripts, journals and other material provided from the
ADAO has helped to inform my analysis. Yet, I have always found the term 'analysis'
less appropriate than 'synthesis' for the way in which I approach interviews because I am
much more concerned with seeing connections within interview material and collaging
these ideas together with broader theoretical discourses. Based on the readings, intuition,
and my memories of the interviews I began with the code of 'heart', which led to the
thematic identification of other embodied metaphors such as breath, then mind, then body.
I first looked for examples of these words in the transcripts and then in the documents
provided by the ADAO. Simultaneously I examined how particular words or themes
overlapped, were repeated or contested by my interviewees as a form of discourse
analysis. I then identified the contexts in which these words were used and the meanings
given to those terms. I used those contextual meanings to create another set of codes. For
example the term 'heart' was often used in the context of care and caring relationships,
connectedness to other people, or alternatively used as a reference for the embodied
experience of a panic attack. Thus, I created new codes such as "care" and "embodied
experiences of panic, sensations ofpanic" that became more specific themes to be further
analyzed. This process was repeated with each subsequent set ofmore specific codes
under the headings of heart, breath, body, mind. These were the primary codes or themes
of the thesis. These themes were subdivided into secondary themes for example heart-
care, passion, panic, which were further divided into tertiary themes i.e. care - clinical
care, lay experiences, personal, and so on. This process yielded a set of four folders that
contained quotes and material from the transcripts and ADAO documents that elaborated
on a specific theme or sub themes (see Appendix V for example). Essentially these four
folders contained large numbers of sorted quotes under different headings, similar to what
would be yielded through computer coding. All four folders were examined for overlaps
in thematic content, and a separate fifth folder identified these wider themes that structure
the thesis as a whole and included material from other theoretical and academic sources.
The thematic coding and discourse analysis produced material that was then synthesized
into a chapter outline. Mike Crang (2001) refers to this process as collage like, placing
fragments in such a way that they disrupt the seamless process ofmaking research in the
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end product. Additionally while I write about my methods in a coherent, linear fashion,
the process was often disjointed and interrupted.
Crang points out that interpretation around 'coding' and the fragmentation ofmaterial or
possibility ofmaterial becoming de/recontextualised into new analytic frameworks is a
methodological and ethical concern (Crang, 2001:228). The term coding can imply fitting
material into pre-existing set of categories. However, the codes developed for this thesis
did not preexist outside of the research material itself as these categories were largely
derived from my intuitive responses to interviews and the interview material itself. From
that specific material I then employed other theoretical frameworks around the categories
of body, mind, heart and breath to expand on interviewees discussions in multiple and
different ways. The theoretical material highlights tensions within the research process
that help to subvert, challenge or expand those theoretical discourses rather than simply
reconfirming them.
3.6 Question 5 - Writing up
The process ofwriting up the thesis has been a long and problematic one at times. The
process needs to be understood as constitutive of the 'field', because during writing up
periods we are still confronted with the presence ofour research subjects and the forging
of political objectives that cut across both time and space (Nast, 1994: 57). While writing
up issues of confidentiality become most pressing, as it is in the writing that we most
clearly expose our research subjects to public and private scrutiny. As per interviewees'
requests the names used within the thesis are pseudonyms, unless the interviewee stated
otherwise.
There are various issues that are of importance to feminist researchers involved in the
process ofwriting up. First, writing the research is a part of constructing and informing
the researchers' own identity. I am the research medium and common denominator that
has remained " both constant and in flux as the many facets ofmy life criss-cross, each
containing the possibility of understanding what I am doing in a different way" (Birch,
1998:172). For many feminist scholars this is simply a form of navel gazing. Yet, Liz
Stanley (1992) has suggested that rather than view an interest in researcher identity as
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narcissistic, it is a research tool necessary to understand the "social within each
individual" and that research itself is a relational process of social construction.
Second, Dorothy Smith (1989) raises an important issue for consideration within the
process ofwriting our research. She states: " we have developed methods ofworking with
women that are fully consultative and open, (yet) a moment comes after the talk has been
inscribed as texts and become data when it must be worked up as sociology" (Smith,
1989:35). Writing up is a process in which large volumes of research material may be
edited out or included within the final written product. Ultimately it is the researcher who
chooses what material is included where the act of looking of summarizing another
person's words and placing the within a different context or meaning can be an act of
objectification (Gilbert, 1994:94). It is the responsibility of the researcher that is engaged
in a mutual respectful relationship not to use one's own ideas and arguments to simplify
the experiences of those researched. It is necessary to work against the appropriation of
other voices and to resolve the research into neatly packed wholes, research which is
continually in tension without pretending to achieve resolution (Stanley, 1997).
Inevitably feminists work within the tension of placing our reading and writing subjects
outside of the experiences from which they start in the creating of a textual world, and our
memories and everyday experiences of the subjects themselves. Thus, the language we
use when we write may play a role in sustaining hierarchies of knowledge (Standing,
1998:186). There is a tension between the conventions and language of academia and the
comprehendibility of that language for people outside of the academic community, our
research participants in particular. This issue is central to feminist research that to claims
to be about, by and for women who may not have a background in academic terminology.
As a researcher I feel uncomfortable at the disjunction between my spoken voice and
written academic text, as well as the contrasts between the words of interviewees and my
academic writing. During the course ofwriting up I often cleaned up my own phrases,
pauses, and mistakes to make the text appear more seamless but did not initially tidy the
words of those I interviewed. This reinforced, to some extent, the difference between
researcher and researched. I felt this was problematic, as did those I interviewed who
received a copy of their transcript. Often researchers use our interviewees' transcript
material spoken as is, to make their words look more authentic, while our language from
transcripts is continually re-edited, or made absent, within the text (Standing, 1998:192).
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Beverly Skeggs has pointed out that often interviewees words are taken directly from
transcript to made their words look more authentic, however it often results in making the
interviewees look simple (Skeggs, 2000). "The ways in which we represent and interpret
our interviewees' voices reinforces hierarchies of knowledge and power" (Standing,
1998:190). Thus I made a conscious effort to equally tidy up my interviewees' language
as well, though I did not tidy up punctuation marks that would indicate pauses or speed of
speech. Tidying up the transcripts also made the interviews as a whole more homogenous,
which in many ways addressed issues of confidentiality, which was a concern for
participants.
Third, while I enjoy working with the complex languages and abstractions of theoretical
language, as a researcher I need to ask what impression does this leave for those we
research, does it reinforce the detachment of the academic world from the everyday lives
of the researched. Does the interpretation of the worlds and words of our interviewees into
more complex and difficult language imply that as researchers we have a greater
understanding than those who form the research, bell hooks suggests that the dichotomy
between academic settings and the everyday lives of our participants is a false one
because as researchers we make choices and choose our audiences, we choose whose
voices to hear and whose to silence (hooks, 1989:78). We are in the privileged position of
naming and representing other people's realities. Thus, in turning private issues into
public concern and in giving our interviewees a voice in public arenas, we have to ask
ourselves whether we are in fact appropriating their voices and experiences and further
disempowering them by taking away their voice, or by not providing them with enough
voice. An important question that arises then is how we might present our work in a way
that grants the speaking interviewee interpretive respect without relinquishing our
responsibility to provide our own interpretation of their experience (Gilbert, 1994:94).
We have to acknowledge that as researchers we have the last word, final editorial control
over the work and it is in this arena that we must ensure that our feminist politics, those of
the community and conflicts between the two, are reflected in the final form of the
research, whatever that form may take (Madge et al., 1997:108). In response to these
questions a separate shorter document, like an executive summary, has been written for
the ADAO and research subjects themselves. This document summarizes the work in




Feminist methodological discourses reflect a tension between the idealization of
reflexivity as a form of transparency, and concerns researchers have around issues of
power relations, knowledge production and relational ethics. Gillian Rose (1997) and
Geraldine Pratt (2000) pose a similar argument about how feminist geographers have
embraced ideas of reflexivity without adequately problematising their own ability to be
self reflexive. For Rose, many feminists are guilty of what she terms 'transparent
reflexivity' a type of reflexivity in which self location serves the purpose of stabilizing
interpretation and removing bias in order to uncover the truth (Pratt, 2000:641). I would
argue further, along the lines ofRose's arguments, that not only is there a tendency to
render the worlds of the subjects as coherent and transparent but, there is also a tendency
to present our research processes as coherent, linear, and contained, particularly when the
information and material collected within the research may be fragmented and complex.
In other words, when we read about methodology we are often presented with a
discussion of theory, methodological themes and methods that cohere into the 'object' of
our research, into organized distinct themes, which may not reflect the everyday practices
and experiences of doing that research. While feminists are attentive to the 'messiness' of
the contexts that are being studied, this messiness is often not explored within our own
research methodologies and methods. The information we did not collect, the interviews
we did not get, the projects that went hopelessly wrong, and the bearing these silences,
fissures and contradictions play in our research. Kay Anderson suggests that "an interview
that fails to expose the distortions and conspires to mask the facts and feelings that did not
fit...will miss an opportunity to document the experience that lies outside the boundaries
of acceptability"(Anderson and Jack, 1991:11). I think the same can be said of
methodology. Perhaps in not exploring the messiness of our own research, and by
pretending that research is a seamless production of knowledge gathering and analysis we
are missing an opportunity to explore aspects of research and methodology that may be
crucial to the research. As researchers we draw attention to the processes involved in
doing research (Skeggs, 1997:9). However we can do so in ways that keeps the researcher
in a situation that resists resolution in order to act politically without pretending that
resolution has come, to both stay honest and keep moving (Ferguson, 1991:338) what I
term 'methodological irony'.
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By 'methodological irony' I mean that as a researcher we explore the 'messiness' of our
own research rather than pretending that our research is a seamless production of
knowledge gathering and interpretation. The reader of this chapter may notice a tension
between a discussion of the methodological process, which is structured somewhat
linearly and my interest in methodological irony. However, I hope that the focus on
various methodological questions and problems encountered throughout the research
helps to show that the methodological process was far from seamless and linear.
A semantic definition of irony involves saying one thing and meaning another, moving
between the "unsaid that is nevertheless said" (Foucault 1972:110). From the point of
view of the interpreter, "irony is an interpretive and intentional move: it is the making or
inferring ofmeaning in addition to and different from what is stated, together with an
attitude towards the said and the unsaid... irony is the intentional transmission ofboth
information and evaluative attitude other than what is explicitly presented" (Hutcheon,
1994:11).
In feminist theory the power of irony is in its potential to destabilize. Sometimes this
power is directly harnessed to oppositional and critical ends; sometimes it is a more
indirect attempt to work through ideological contradictions and not let them resolve into
coherent and thus potentially oppressive dogma (Hutcheon, 1994:31). As such, irony has
been seen as "serious play", as both a "rhetorical strategy and a political method" that
deconstructs and decenters patriarchal discourses (Haraway, 1990:191). Irony is said to
work to change how people interpret meaning because it "springs from a recognition of
the socially constructed self as arbitrary and that demands revision of values and
conventions" (Walker, 1990:4). Irony becomes a means of critique, or resistance to claims
to 'truth'. Like other feminists I have found irony to be a useful way of thinking about
methodological concerns for a number of reasons. First, the scene of irony involves
relations ofpower based in relations of communication. It unavoidably involves issues of
exclusion and inclusion, intervention and evasion (Hutcheon, 1994:2). Second, irony also
highlights, that like discourse, it cannot be conceived of a speech act outside of a broader
political framework and to do so is to risk idealizing communication as a reciprocal,
Utopian exchange and thus minimizes the workings of power (Hutcheon, 1994:17). Irony
happens because of discursive communities that already exist, it is these communities that
provide the context for both the deployment and attribution of irony. Irony can also be
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used to avoid " premature foreclosure... to give the benefit of the doubt by allowing (a
text) to contain whatever doubts come to mind" (Culler, 1975:157 in Hutcheon, 1994:28).
What I find most useful and appropriate about methodological irony is in what Linda
Hutcheon calls its evaluative 'edge'. Irony can put people on edge- nervous about how to
fix meaning securely and how to determine motivation (Hutcheon, 1994:37-38). I feel that
this tension, or 'edge' is one of the defining characteristics of current feminist
methodology, as described by Rose and Pratt above, with its emphasis on the relational,
representation, responsibility and the reflexive.
One example ofmethodological irony found within this research project is a tension
around being a 'good' feminist researcher. One of the central tenets of feminist research is
that research should contribute to the empowerment of others and allow neglected voices
to be heard. Other authors have suggested what point is there to research if not to aim to
change the world around us. These authors raise important issues about the use and
purpose of academic research and at the same time they respond to criticism of the
frivolity of forms of qualitative feminist work (Smith, 2001). But I would argue, what is
the purpose ofdoing research if the researcher does not gain some enjoyment from or
within the process and why would that be considered a frivolous or narcissistic concern?
It would be difficult for me to sustain my ability to do this research if it did not give me
some pleasure and insight. Discussion ofenjoyment of the research process is often absent
or skimmed over in methodological writings perhaps because of a fear that the work will
be considered frivolous, and thus the aspirations of the project will be seen as unethical or
less than worthy. The lack of discussion of fun or play within academic process is
endemic not just to feminist geography but cuts across the spectrum of the social sciences,
as a way of distinguishing between what is and isn't 'serious' relevant academic work. I
conducted this research project, not only to raise awareness, but also because I enjoy
doing this work (some of the time). If I were to ask my research subjects, is it okay if I
take away something from this research, is it okay for me to learn something about myself
in the process, do you think they would say no? I think many research participants assume
that the researcher is getting something less than altruistic from any research project,
career advancement, publications and so forth. It may not be the primary aim of research,
but I think that in order to have a reflexive research process one must gain knowledge
about oneself, a self that is necessarily in flux, fragmentary and relational. The
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methodological process of a reflexive project is one where we deal with people who
through their narratives allow us to get to know something about them, as well as gaining
a sense ofone's 'self.' As Shulamit Reinhartz argues the key methodological tool is the
researcher herself and the multiple selves that are created within the research process
(Reinhartz, 1997).
In the context of the thesis as a whole, the focus on feminist and feminist geographical
methodologies should help the reader situate the research in the substantive chapters to
come within the context of feminist and feminist geographical scholarship.
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Chapter Four - Background chapter: A brief history of the ADAO
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explored methodological considerations that have directed the
thesis, in this chapter we come to know more about one of those research subjects. While
the methodological chapter highlighted the shifting relationships between researcher and
individual research subjects, the ADAO, the organization itself, is also treated within this
thesis as a primary research subject. This chapter provides more detail about this 'actor' in
the research project; its history, writings, the programs it provides, and the people who
come to shape its structure and mandate.
Since the time frame of the thesis interviews (2000-2001) and continued research on the
ADAO (1999-2002) there have been changes both within and outside of the ADAO.
However, the programs and services outlined in this chapter still exist as vital aspects of
the organization. Some programs have become larger and some have decreased in size.
Funding has improved in certain areas, while in others resources are still unavailable. The
context ofmental health service provision within Ottawa has also changed. Different
people head up various service providers and funding protocols have shifted alongside a
change in provincial and federal leadership. The relationship of the ADAO to other
anxiety disorders association has changed, and the ADAO plays a larger role within
federal service provision. In spite of these changes it is important to trace the history of
the organization, and to situate this history in relation to other service providers within the
city and within Canada.
The ADAO, previously the agoraphobia and peer volunteer association (APVA) was
established 1997. It was created in response to the lack of service provision for people
with panic and agoraphobia outside of an institutional or clinical care setting. Like many
grassroots mental health communities and self-help groups the organizing intent of the
ADAO was to provide an alternative and safe space free from the evaluation of a doctor-
patient relationship. The ADAO is a self help, consumer based, grassroots "registered
charity and non profit corporation dedicated to promoting public and professional
sensitization and awareness as well as assisting the community with early identification,
prevention and finding treatment for persistent anxiety conditions. Assistance is provided
through support groups, educational material and classes, companion support referrals,
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phone support, seminars and presentations" (ADAO, 2001a). The ADAO has initiated a
range ofnew programs and services since 2000 notably its youth education program, but
is best known for its volunteer companion program in which volunteers provide support
and assistance to agoraphobic individuals in becoming more mobile, as well as a fourteen-
week 'anxiety, panic and avoidance behavior management' educational program in which
individuals learn to manage and educate themselves about their anxiety conditions
(ADAO, 2001a).
4.2 Getting started - From the APVA to ADAO
The anxiety disorders association ofOntario is the longest running anxiety condition
group within the city ofOttawa, and province ofOntario. It has been described as a
registered charity, non-profit organization, self help group, sufferer led and based
initiative, grassroots voluntary association, and community based group. First established
as the agoraphobia and panic volunteer association (APVA) in April of 1996, the ADAO
is the brainchild ofCheryl Driskell, its current executive director. Cheryl started the
charity because of her own personal frustration in finding services for people who are
agoraphobic and have panic. She contacted the Canadian mental health association
(CMHA), a Canadian wide organization that assists individuals, organizations and
practitioners with mental health issues, for personal help and was told that they had never
worked with agoraphobics before. However, the CMHA was able to provide Cheryl with
a volunteer, as part of their volunteer program. Cheryl was matched up with a female
volunteer with over fifteen years of personal experience of agoraphobia herself. Based on
that volunteer experience, as well as the experience of other agoraphobics, she developed
a program to train volunteers for a volunteer companion program for agoraphobic
individuals and sent it to the CMHA.
The CMHA was impressed by the document and distributed it within their association.
The volunteer director and program coordinator of the CMHA at the time suggested that
because Cheryl was addressing a need within the community that the CMHA was not, she
should organize some group or agency herself and develop the volunteer companion
program. They provided free photocopying, help with putting proposals together and
connected Cheryl with three other people to help set up the APVA and the volunteer
companion program. Of the group it was Cheryl who took on a leadership role and began
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to train volunteers, in conjunction with the CMHA volunteer program for the volunteer
companion program. She then assembled a board of directors from the initial group of
trained volunteers, got the group incorporated as a charity and began to write material on
agoraphobia and panic as there was demand for such material. Cheryl wrote various
educational pamphlets, which later were used in the newsletters and became the basis for
the ADAO's booklets and workbooks.
In its early stages the APVA was focused on developing the volunteer companion
program for persons with agoraphobia and panic, however as the organization increased
the APVA began to branch out into other areas of interest - developing various anxiety
and panic management workshops, raising awareness of anxiety conditions through
promotional materials, and constructing a quarterly newsletter for members. The APVA
was also involved in promoting other services and programs for those with various
anxiety conditions within the city such as support group meetings, a twelve-week program
run out of the Royal Ottawa hospital, and a range of holistic therapies. The initial mission
statement of the APVA was:
"To develop and maintain a volunteer program in Ottawa Carleton to assist those
people who are living with agoraphobia and panic disorder and to educate their
family, friends, and community at large about these conditions. In addition we
provide referral information, phone support and continue to network with other
community organizations and programs" (APVA, 1997a).
As the APVA increased in membership and prominence within the city its mandate was
expanded to include more programs and services directed at persons with anxiety
conditions, their families, the public school system, a wider public, and clinicians
themselves. By 1999 the APVA's membership and program based had increased
dramatically. Thus, a decision was made to change the name of the group from the
agoraphobia and panic volunteer association to the anxiety disorders association of
Ontario (ADAO) to reflect the diverse range of conditions its membership were
presenting. The choice ofname was a contentious one because at the time the APVA only
serviced the Ottawa- Carleton region and its outlying areas and because of the use of the
term disorders which was seen to be stigmatizing. However, because 'disorder' was the
common clinical convention, it was agreed that a wider public and professional audience
would recognize the name.
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The change in name in January 1999 was accompanied by a consolidation of charitable
non-profit status, change of organizational structure, change of office location, and a
change in mandate. The mandate reflected a movement of the vision from a volunteer
companion network to an organization with a variety of different services with a primary
interest in public education and awareness:
"The ADAO is a registered charity and non profit corporation dedicated to
promoting public and professional sensitization and awareness, as well as assisting
the community with early identification, prevention, and finding treatment for
persistent anxiety conditions. Assistance is provided through support groups,
educational materials and classes, companion support, seminars and presentations.
Our aim is to aid individuals in achieving and or maintaining personal wellness
and independence" (ADAO, 1999a: 1).
The change from APVA to ADAO was formalized through the publication and
dissemination of the ADAO booklet/educational guide, which is a brief introduction to
the range and management of anxiety disorders and description of services and programs
offered by the ADAO. The booklet was distributed widely for a small cost, often at
information booths in shopping centers and increased the profile of the ADAO within the
city. But the booklet had a caveat, which reflected criticism the association had received
from various clinicians within the city about its authority and legitimacy to support
anxiety 'disorders': "this booklet is intended to be solely for educational and informative
purposes and in no way replaces medical and psychological support" (ADAO,1999a:l).
The name change was also accompanied by the introduction of a web site and a toll free
North American phone number that has allowed a wider range of people free access to
information about anxiety disorders and the ADAO itself. While the number of'hits' the
web site receives has not be recorded, the phone in and request of information statistics
average from 380 to 600 calls per month and the bulk of the calls are from clients looking
for information about volunteers and the various programs that are offered. Statistically
the number of calls dramatically increases around the time that the ADAO is featured on
television and radio.
Over time the ADAO has become savvier in areas of fund raising, raising public
awareness about the organization itself and raising awareness about anxiety conditions
more broadly. This has been translated into increased demand for the ADAO's
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informational services and programs. Thus in response to public need and demand the
ADAO provides a wider range of services, initiatives, materials and programs. In addition
to promotional materials, anxiety management workshops, the volunteer companion
program and the newsletters, the ADAO also provides the following services and
programs:
• Facilitated support groups
• Several anxiety and panic and lecture series
• Volunteer companion program
• Workshops
• Youth education program
• Local phone support and referral line
• Educational presentations for corporations and government departments
• Information, partner and volunteer manuals
• Awareness campaigns and information on the management, etiology and treatment
of anxiety, panic and agoraphobia
• A community bulletin board of events, programs and services throughout the city.
• Train the trainer program




• Toll-free phone line
When the APVA was started it had not anticipated that all of these programs and services
would be offered, aside from the original plan of a volunteer companion program. In the
original newsletter the 'five year plan' of the APVA is described. It includes maintaining
and developing the volunteer companion program; the development of an educational
program involving going into the schools to educate youth (12-14 years old), teachers and
parents about anxiety, panic and phobias, information sessions for the community at large,
selfhelp tape program that is affordable, more newsletters, and a center for healing.
Almost all of these goals would be ultimately realized by 2002.
4.3 Organizational structure
The structure of the ArVA/ADAO has changed several times since 1996 up until 2001.
The first form oforganizational structure consisted of Cheryl and three other people who
had responded to advertisements to volunteer for the APVA. Those three individuals had
training from Cheryl and the CMHA. At that time, in 1997, there was no paid staff and
80
approximately thirty volunteer companions. Thus, Cheryl and the Board ran all of the
office functions.
The second board was more formalized and was created very soon after the first in 1997.
Cheryl became the president of the board and thus was responsible for executing board
decisions. It was much larger in size consisting of two original members of the board,
including Cheryl, and eight other men and women. These board members were selected
because they were the first people to come out of training as volunteer companions from
the volunteer program. The board was organized into specific roles and committees, and
the board was responsible for directing the APVA's vision and programs. Committees
were set up to focus on specific aspects of the APVA's function such as education,
fundraising and clinical research. Various members were assigned roles such as treasurer,
secretary, but Cheryl made the bulk of organizational decisions. Cheryl was also still was
responsible for organizing staff and the office as well as acting as an intermediary
between the organization and its membership.
The third board reflected the growth in the APVA's program and member base. It
coincides with the organization's name change and consolidation of charitable non-profit
status in 1999. While Cheryl remained in her position as executive director, almost all of
the seven board members were new. It was decided by board members that Cheryl should
take on a different role from President of the board and act as an Executive Director
whose role was to bring ideas and information to the board, which would deliberate,
approve or reject suggestions. Thus she was responsible for managing the daily activities
of the organization, managing staff, providing ideas to the board and executing the
directives of the board. The president of the board was responsible for directing the
decisions of the board and managing financial and budgetary details of the organization.
The new board was smaller. It consisted of eight men and women in total, and two other
individuals filled the position of president of the board at different times. Board members
were still organized into specific roles such as treasurer, secretary, etc. and into various
committees. The committees remained roughly the same with an increased focus on fund
raising and education,
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Since the APVA/ADAO started many board members have left, either for personal
reasons or through disagreement. Yet most of those members still remain active with the
association as volunteers to this day.
4.4 ADAO locations
Initially the headquarters of the APVA doubled as Cheryl's apartment. The apartment was
both a functional office space and the site of board meetings. The office was an informal
and personal place but unfortunately limited in space. Due to the location of the office
Cheryl conducted most of the office business herself. The APVA phone information,
emergency hot line and referral services were managed through the office in Cheryl's
apartment. Because the APVA still did not have enough money to hire staff, Cheryl was
responsible for fielding most phone calls and responding to questions (money that was
raised at the time was used to cover office expenses and a small income for the executive
director). This meant that phone calls and email were responded to quickly but not
immediately. It also meant that the amount ofwork being done by the executive director
was exhausting. This became problematic for the ADAO as certain members felt that the
amount ofwork being done by the president (Cheryl) was detrimental to the organization
and more importantly to her health. Later when funds became available the APVA was
able to hire part time staff to assist with office work and staffing the phone lines.
In January 1999, the decision to move the office elsewhere was finally realized, largely
due to an improved financial situation of large donations and sponsorship. The office was
formally moved to the Bronson center, a large building that provides low rental rates for
non-profit organizations. The new office, in contrast to the old office, had one large room
for workshops and groups, and a very small room in back for the office. The new office
was not as inviting as the old office space and has acoustical problems but it allowed for a
wider variety of activities to occur on site. However as Cheryl, now executive director,
was not able to work outside of her apartment, but still responsible for the management of
ADAO programs and staff, the old office was still an important and well-used place for
the ADAO. For example, general meetings and board meetings were still conducted from
the old office space.
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The location of the new office meant that staff had to be hired, or needed to volunteer, to
run and manage the office, as Cheryl was not able to physically work in the new space.
Due to lack of funding, part time staffwere hired to work several days a week to answer
calls, email and organize information. There was no one single person working in the
office all the time. This resulted in a lack of coordination and the continued reliance of
many staff members on Cheryl's authority before attempting a task. This meant that many
people who phoned received an answering machine and would have to wait for a
response, and probably meant that many more people phoned in for help without leaving a
message. These problems were rectified later in the next year with the hiring of full time
consistent staff for the office. Due to funding difficulties however in 2002, the ADAO had
to relocate back to Cheryl's new apartment. However, consistent part-time staffwork in
the office, assisting the executive director with daily office tasks.
One of the goals of the APVA highlighted in the first newsletter was to establish a center
for healing that offers a "body, mind and spirit approach to treating anxiety disorders and
phobias" with subsidized costs and home support when necessary (APVA, 1997a). For
the APVA/ADAO rooting the organization in a shared and common space was thought to
help engender a sense and place for community that would be inclusive of the experiences
and mobility ofpeople with all sorts of anxiety disorders.
"Cheryl and I had an idea, our dream was to open like a little community center
where we would have different kinds of services. At the ADAO we believe that
any thing, any type of treatment is important, whether it is yoga, meditation,
everything helps certain people. And to have a community center devoted to this
where people could drop by and hear lectures and meet people that could talk to
them about all these different techniques, and women could get together and meet
and just talk, not just women but men too. To have that kind of community thing I
think would be great. Not always having to resort to an emergency room. If only a
corporation could donate a building, or give us rooms, it would be great. I know a
lot of people with panic or agoraphobia cannot get somewhere, but ifwe had a bus
service just for them, a mini van. For them its important they say ' I really need to
get out I need to be with somebody right now' and we could go and pick them up
and bring them there. They would interact with other people. I think it would be
great. It would really help a lot. It would help them reach their goal because they
feel isolated. Any organization that deals with panic and anxiety needs to deal with
physical and emotional isolation. You have nobody to reach out to, and no place to
reach out to. Some people they can barely pay their rent, there is nowhere for them
to go, no way for them to get anywhere and of course they are going to feel
isolated and alienated and crazy. I am thinking of someone with almost no income.
Someone who has more income has more ability, more ways for them to get out of
the isolation. People need to feel accepted and things need to be set up, so having
83
a building of the ADAO would be a big step forward in having a better
community" (Alexis).
For the ADAO the dream of a community center is a vision of a diversity of perspectives
and practitioners working for those with anxiety disorders. It is a safe space in which
sufferers can come and get help, an inspirational place that encourages people who are
agoraphobic to recreate their landscapes of fear, and engenders a sense of belonging
necessarily for the well being ofmany sufferers who feel alienated and isolated.
nfortunately, the goal of a center has still not been realized because of very limited
funds, yet it remains an important motivating vision for the organization.
4.5 Fundraising
For the first several years the APVA had no government funding and relied solely on:
donations; membership dues; fund-raising activities such as bingo, raffles, 'bowlathons',
a golf tournament, garage and bake sales; the proceeds from anxiety and panic
management workshops and some revenue from the twelve-week and the fourteen-week
program. Funding has always been a central issue for the organization. The ADAO's
increased membership and popularity did not guarantee financial profits, and funding was
still a pressing issue. Previous funding ventures, such as the bingo, dances and bake sales
were providing a stable and consistent amount ofmoney, but not a large amount. The
ADAO received a number of sizeable donations that allowed them to print and publish the
ADAO booklets and hire more staff. However what has been most influential in raising
monies for the organization has been the fundraising committee.
A fundraising committee had been established back when the association was the APVA,
but became more aggressive about fund-raising when the charity was incorporated as the
ADAO. A charity golf tournament was held which increased the profile of the
organization and introduced the association to a wider number of corporate sponsors,
which resulted in corporate donations. The fundraising committee, and its chair in
particular, were moving towards larger single events rather than smaller sporadic events,
culminating in the charity ball event, which has been an annual event since 2000. The
charity ball was set up as a costume masquerade ball, a theme appropriate for an
organization of anxiety and panic sufferers, with meal, entertainment, speakers, and a
silent auction. The masquerade ball was located in one ofOttawa's most prestigious
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locations, the Fairmont-Chateau Laurier, and was well attended by a very influential
group of dignitaries, politicians and media as well as the general public. The event was
widely enjoyed and raised a significant amount ofmoney, less than expected though
because ofhigh output costs. In its second year the ball was sold out, and made more
money from the event, attracting media personalities as masters of ceremonies and
speakers. Since then the ADAO has hired a professional fund-raiser to help organize more
events and media campaigns for funding. The ADAO recently has also managed to
receive several government grants to support its youth educational programs.
4.6 Programs/services/campaigns
This section elaborates on several the programs and services the ADAO has offered.
4.6.1 The web site
The web site, which was awarded a web award, is a combination of information provided
in the educational guide and the newsletters. It also has a chat room for people to discuss
material on the site or about anxiety conditions more generally. The web site allows for
easier public access to the ADAO, which is particularly useful for agoraphobic
individuals and is used as a source of information.
4.6.2 The commercial
In order to raise public awareness about panic conditions and the ADAO itself, the ADAO
created a commercial that was aired nationwide for a number ofweeks. The commercial
was part of a Canadian broadcasting corporation competition for non-profit organizations
to convey a public service announcement using youth services that would get street kids
to film the commercial. The ADAO's commercial focused on descriptions ofwhat it is
like to have a panic or anxiety attack using a diverse number of individuals from a range
of races, ethnicities, gender, and ages. The message was that anyone and everyone can
experience a panic attack at some point, and that many people who experience a panic
attack may not have the words for what is happening to them, but ifyou experience these
symptoms you may have had panic or anxiety and most importantly you are not alone in
your experience. The commercial ended with the presentation of the ADAO's contact
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numbers, which resulted in a massive surge of phone calls for the organization following
the commercial from Canada and the nited States.
4.6.3 The newsletters
The newsletter has had a varied distribution list, in 2002 there were 83 subscriptions to
the newsletters, but in the past there have been more and more who have received copies
of the newsletter without subscription. The first official newsletter of the APVA was
distributed around June of 1997. The newsletters provide anecdotal information and more
general information about anxiety, panic and agoraphobia, p until 2002 there have been
fourteen newsletters distributed, progressively the newsletters have become more
formatted and professional in appearance, though the appearance and typeset of the
newsletters change almost every new issue. The newsletters are an attempt to bridge
together conventional clinical thought on anxiety conditions with more alternative health
practices and spirituality. The newsletters, more than any other written documents, reflect
the spirit of the APVA and its transformation into the ADAO and unlike some other
informational writings is directed specifically for an audience of sufferers and their
relations. But, as the newsletters progress there is more overlap in content between
program material and the articles in the newsletters, which is still balanced by personal
stories. There is also increased advertisement of community and ADAO services and
fewer requests for volunteers, in spite of the ever-growing demand of volunteers for
various programs now offered by the ADAO.
4.6.4 Support groups
By 1998 it was obvious to those at the APVA that there was a large demand for services
and outlets for discussion and support for those with panic, anxiety and agoraphobia, as a
result the support group and twelve week programs were established. The support group
was based out of a local community center in the Hintonburg area. The support groups are
generally facilitated by a person with social work or other professional training with first
hand experience of anxiety or panic. The meetings were weekly and generally eight to
fifteen persons show up every week and they have continued to this day. Additionally two
locations outside ofOttawa, Morrisburg and London, have been created as ADAO support
groups. While the meetings are directed by a support group facilitator, the issues
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discussed are subject to the concerns of the members of the group, and the meetings are
most often about sharing personal experiences and relaying tips to one another. The
support groups are currently operating in a diverse range of locations across Ontario.
4.6.5 The volunteer companion program
The volunteer companion program is still central to the ADAO, and is the organizations
longest running program. The program was the first of its kind in North America, and
perhaps world wide, in offering home support services for severely agoraphobic
individuals. The volunteer aims to assist and support the participant in accomplishing a
variety of goals leading to experiencing the 'outside world'. The support that is required
may vary from daily chores, social contact and companionship, outdoor excursions; or
just conversation, but the volunteer is not meant to be a personal assistant who runs
errands or acts as a personal slave. Initially the process of acquiring and training
volunteers was informal. Because the APVA needed volunteers, anyone who volunteered
would receive minimal screening and a one-day session at the APVA office trained by
Cheryl herself, alternately Cheryl would send volunteers to the CMHA for a three-day
training workshop on a variety ofmental health ailments. As more persons volunteered,
and as the demands for volunteers grew, the training process became more consolidated
and extensive two full day sessions (9 hours class time).
A volunteer companion training manual was written which provides information for
volunteers unfamiliar with anxiety, panic and agoraphobia, training exercises, the roles
and responsibilities of a volunteer and ways ofhandling various situations. The volunteer
matching program is adapted from the Canadian mental health association's guidelines for
volunteer programs. The process begins with volunteer training, and then participants and
volunteers complete applications and are asked to provide references that are checked.
Once it has been established that a volunteer has 'enough' information, knowledge and
understanding of panic and agoraphobia they are placed on a list and matched up with a
participant based on: age, sex, skills, awareness, commonalities of interest and ability,
geographic area, availability of vehicle, smoker or non smoker, individual needs and
goals. When a match has been established, a profile of each individual is given to one
another verbally and if issues arise then further assessment is done. If everything seems in
order that the volunteer must make an introductory phone call, in which volunteer and
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participant can negotiate a course of action. A first meeting will follow the phone call to
further establish the companion relationship. After the first meeting a trial period of one
month takes place, after the month period a review takes place and if the match is
unsatisfactory for either person then the match will be discontinued and alternatives
investigated. If the match is satisfactory then the volunteer is asked to remain an
additional six months with the participants, at the end ofwhich another formal review and
assessment will take place and both participant and volunteer can decide whether or not to
continue the match. Most of this process was supervised by Cheryl directly as well as
other members of the APVA. Feedback was also mainly filtered through Cheryl. While
there are records of feedback from the formal six-month review process, there is very
little formal recording of the process ofmatching, or why various people were matched
together. Even today the current volunteer coordinator does not have a formal 'codified'
system for matching. The training occurred in the APVA's headquarters.
There has always been a lack ofvolunteers to meet the number of requests for matches.
However, the program has always been viewed as highly successful overall. Most
volunteers remain long term volunteers often taking on more that one participant over the
course of volunteering, and many participants become volunteers as a result of their
experience with the program. Both volunteers and participants have become board
members and have sat on ADAO committees. The program still continues today and
demand is greater than ever.
4.6.6 Fourteen-week program
Due to the success of a twelve-week program jointly set up by the APVA and Dr. Dave
Erickson, a psychologist at the Royal Ottawa hospital the ADAO developed its own
fourteen-week program. The twelve-week program was run by Dr. Erickson and two
assistants of his, who videotaped the program. It focused on cognitive behavioral
techniques to develop coping strategies to deal with panic and anxiety. Issues that were
central to the course include: relaxation techniques, self-esteem issues, how to deal with a
panic episode, how to work with uncomfortable body sensations, how to work with
catastrophic thoughts, assertiveness sessions and goal setting.
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The fourteen-week program, unlike the twelve-week program was run entirely by people
hired by the ADAO. Two extra weeks were added for discussion of anger management
and more focus on aspects of nutrition and breathing exercises (ADAO, 2002a). The first
fourteen-week program in March 1998 was facilitated by an interviewee who describes
the original program as being largely derived from lectures and exercises in a cognitive
behavioral framework, a lot of homework but not a lot of room for facilitators to chose a
variety of exercises to be done in class. The success of the fourteen-week program
resulted in the expansion of the program to two at a time twice a year in 1999, and the
formalization of structure through exercises and information in the Anxiety, Panic and
Avoidance-BehaviorManagement Workbook (2002a). The later fourteen-week programs
were also facilitated by a senior and junior facilitator, ideally one male and one female to
reflect the various gendered issues and genders of the clients, practically this was only the
case for several of the programs.
The interviewing of the facilitators, like the hiring and interviewing of all of the other
ADAO staff, was done in pairs in the APVA/ADAO Office, or Cheryl's apartment. This
was ironically rather anxiety provoking for most of the people interviewed because the
majority of interviewees had experienced panic or anxiety and because each interviewee
was positioned anxiously in competition with the other. It was later explained that the
hiring committee was interested in observing the dynamic between people, as the program
involved working with another facilitator, the committee wanted to observe first hand
how potential interviewees relate to one another and work with one another as well. The
training initially involved reading over the workbook, asking questions and then being
brought right into the orientation process as a junior facilitator for a trial unpaid period.
The facilitators all had some experience of counseling, and to aid the process a program
coordinator was hired who had previously run many of the workshops in the seminar
series on self esteem and assertiveness which was her area of interest and professional
specialty. The program coordinator oversaw the training and management of the
facilitators throughout the courses.
The workbook, which accompanies the fourteen-week program, was distributed to
facilitators and clients was organized as a series of holistic chapters moving from (in
weekly order): general information about what anxiety disorders are; to treatment,
medication, nutrition and relaxation; to emotional well-being; automatic and catastrophic
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thoughts, to core beliefs; exposure avoidance and goal setting; mindfulness techniques
and coping strategies; effective communication, speaking and listening skills; self esteem
issues; assertiveness training; anger management; and how to address various setbacks or
awakenings (ADAO, 2002a:5-7). The workshops were well received and highly
recommended by the clientele, but there were criticisms about the workbook and are
currently being amended to reflect these criticisms. Eventually the workbook is slated for
publication to be distributed more widely, similar to anxiety management and self- help
workbooks such a Bourne's The Anxiety and Phobia Workbook (2000).
p until fall 2001, the fourteen-week program was fully booked and had a long waiting
list, but with the development of the Royal Ottawa's anxiety workshop programs, the
demand for the fourteen-week program has lessened, much to the disappointment of the
ADAO.
4.6.7 Youth education program
One of the initial visions of the organization was to set up education and awareness
programs for children and youth, and it is an idea that has been developing slowly since
1996. In fact the ADAO received a trillium grant from the Ontario government to help
cover the costs of the youth education program. The focus on education of youth and
children comes from the personal experiences of anxiety and panic in childhood by those
who have organized the ADAO. The initial plan was to inform teachers and parents what
can be done for children with anxiety and panic, and to give children the vocabulary to
describe what is going on with them, thus, recognize what is happening to them, and
perhaps change their core beliefs about those experiences. There have been a number of
attempts to introduce these issues, through speakers and lesson plans within the public
and roman catholic school system, and in 2000 the roman catholic school board allowed
the ADAO to present speakers in class, while there are still administrative delays by the
public school board and delays for finalizing a 10 week in class program for youth
(ADAO, 2002c). The presentation and protocol for speakers revolves around the
discussion ofF.E.A.R steps and a youth screen play to be acted and read in class (ADAO,
2000b). F.E.A.R stands for: "feelings, how does one know they were frightened;
expectations, how did they interpret that experience; attitudes, how one can reinterpret
that experience; and rewards, positive affirmation" (ADAO, 2002b: 1-2). The speaker not
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only introduces to the students what anxiety conditions are, but the prevalence of these
'disorders' and the supportive message that those in the class who may have experienced
a panic/anxiety condition are not alone and not abnormal. The protocol for an in-class ten
session program expands on this message including sessions on relaxation, goal setting,
core beliefs and thought patterns, self esteem issues, exposure and desensitization
exercises; communication and assertiveness skills, nutrition and emotional responses
(ADAO, 2002c). The youth screen play which is discussed in both the speaker session
and 10 week program focuses on a girl who has a panic attack, what it feels like and how
she proceeds to get information and help for treatment options (ADAO, 2001c). In all
cases the message is a positive one, that one can live happily with anxiety conditions and
that one can overcome these conditions as well.
The ADAO had focused on anxiety and panic for youth under eighteen years of age
bracket previously on the web site and in newsletters. A number of booklets and
pamphlets have also been published and distributed that provide information for students
about stress and anxiety management, A Parent's Guide: Youth andAnxiety (200 Id), a
small pamphlet on helping to manage stress, anxiety and fear for young people, and a
parent and teacher educational guide on the ADAO's: Life Potential Program for Young
People (2001b).
4.6.8 Train the trainer program
The ADAO is also expanding its network of professionals and health service providers
within the province. In September 2001 the ADAO offered its first 'anxiety, panic and
avoidance behavior management training for trainers'. A program specifically offered for
private practitioners and agencies who may need specific training for clients with anxiety
conditions. The program reflects the initial spirit of the ADAO and its holistic philosophy
that combines CBT, mindfulness practices, nutrition, relaxation, stress and anger
management and assertiveness training. Through this program the ADAO has become a
professional consultant, selling its fourteen-week program as a professional course for
health service providers and practitioners, along with (sliding) professional membership
fees and ongoing support and education by ADAO consultants.
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4.7 The ADAO and the wider community - the context of mental health service
provision in Ottawa.
The anxiety mental health service 'community' in Ottawa is dominated by clinical
organizations, with the anxiety and mood disorders unit and pharmacologically oriented
anxiety research unit (SACR ) in the Royal Ottawa hospital (ROH) at its center. Within
Ottawa an increasing number of private practices and private anxiety disorders clinics
has emerged since 2000, as have the number of research centers based at the University
of Ottawa that investigate anxiety disorders. Alongside these clinical practices are state
based organizations, such as the Canadian mental health association (CMHA) and
Canadian center for addiction and mental health (CCAMH), that attempt to bridge the
link between public health and clinical institutions. CMHA and CCAMH also assist
individuals and their families in connecting with existing mental health services and
practitioners, act as patient advocates, provide the public with educational material of
mental health issues, and inform the public what services are available for those with
mental health problems. Since 2000 there has also emerged a range of non-clinical
therapists and alternative non-western clinics and therapeutic programs that offer
sufferer's different perspectives on anxiety conditions. In spite of the increase of clinical
and non clinical services offered to those with anxiety conditions, the number of
community based, voluntary, self help, consumer based groups that directly deal with
anxiety conditions has decreased in large part due to financial setbacks. During the time
of the research, 1999-2002, the ADAO, which is the longest standing voluntary
organization in the city, was the only self help consumer based group in the city that
focused on anxiety conditions.
In the landscape of service provision in Ottawa there are those within and outside of the
clinic who do not think that clinical and non-clinical spaces should meet, or overlap one
another, while there are some who would prefer that those spaces overlap. More often it is
institutional (ROH) and bio-medical service providers who believe that there should be a
clear division been the clinical and the non clinical, and within the clinical its own sub¬
divisions. For those service providers the non clinical should remain a separate sphere and
place, though there is little differentiation between various community group services and
alternative or 'complementary' clinical practices. There are those members of the ADAO
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who want non-clinical practices to remain separate from the politics and problems they
observe within the clinical health care system in Ottawa. Yet, most interviewees within
the ADAO discussed the importance of networking amongst other service providers,
expanding the range of services, both clinical and non-clinical, that the ADAO could offer
in order for the ADAO to be seen as legitimate and important within the city and beyond.
Thus, members of the ADAO were concerned to enter into a network of formal clinical
landscapes of health care and overlap their functions and spaces with those of the 'clinic'.
The ADAO's relationship to other service providers within the city has been mixed. The
ADAO has historically not had a productive relationship with biomedical service
providers, and various private clinics that are more medically oriented. Yet the ADAO
has a working relationship with the anxiety disorders unit at the Royal Ottawa and sits
on one of its advisory committees. It has a good relationship with various clinical and
non-clinical practitioners and has established itself within the governmental and social
services sector where it is respected, referred to, and considered an effective,
professional and credible organization. Since 2000 the ADAO has increased its
partnerships with private professionals and academic researchers. The ADAO has also
extended its network by partnering with other non-profit associations across Canada that
address anxiety disorders such as the anxiety disorders association of Manitoba
(ADAM), the anxiety disorders association of British Columbia (ADABC), and the
newly formed anxiety disorders association of Canada (ADAC), where the ADAO has a
member on the board of directors. These associations tend to be dominated by clinicians
rather than consumers in staff and board positions, an organizational trend that the
ADAO is also moving towards.
4.8 Conclusion
As discussed in the introduction and methodology it is important to do research and
provide information about the ADAO whose experiences and histories have remained
largely silenced, unacknowledged or subjugated within the health service sector and
beyond. Conducting in-depth research on organizations that deal with anxiety conditions
contributes to the aims of the thesis: first, to expand on the experiences of those with
anxiety conditions suggesting the interconnectedness of individuals and groups for
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meanings of anxiety; and second to constructively question the forms and effects of
anxiety service provision for individuals and groups that deal with anxiety conditions.
This chapter has provided background information of the ADAO and its wider mental
health context. The chapter has highlighted important aspects of the organizations history,
structure, mandate and its current services and programs. The chapter has also elaborated
on the relationship between the ADAO and other service providers within the city in order
to further understand the context ofmental health service provision. This chapter provides
information that helps to construct new and critical questions about knowledge practices
and power relations that are constitutive of the identities and communities that have
shaped the ADAO in more precise and informed ways.
As a research subject the ADAO served as inspiration for the substantive chapter titles
that follow - 'body', 'mind', 'heart', and 'breath'. These words and the metaphors they
imply were used by interviewees to describe the organization, and were found throughout
ADAO literatures. 'Body' and 'mind' represent particular tensions within the ADAO
linked to body/mind dualisms, while 'breath' acts as a metaphor for the holistic nature and
practices of the ADAO. The metaphor of'heart' was most important and central in
characterizing the ADAO by interviewees. For those interviewees without 'heart' the
organization would have never lasted or persevered in spite of its difficulties and
obstacles, described in this chapter. The substantive chapters that follow further unpack
the difficulties, challenges and successes of the ADAO in order to address the question of
how the ADAO attempts to balance its own desire to create its own unique place with its
desire to be an active and integral part of the wider community.
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Chapter Five - Body: 'Imagening' panic
5.1 Introduction
Our bodies are increasingly presented to us visually in ways that help construct
representations and understandings about the self with direct implications for the
construction of identity and community. The process of imagining oneself and one's
body comes from a repertoire of images and imagery that constructs and shapes our
bodies, subjectivities and identities; hence the term imagening (Van Dijck, 1998).
This chapter examines how the legacy of imagening mental illness affects individuals
with panic and agoraphobia and looks at the meanings of those images for organizations
such as the ADAO that aim to assist and to raise awareness about anxiety conditions
including panic and agoraphobia.
The experience of panic illustrates how our bodies are imagened and have been affected
by a genealogy of imagening. Largely invisible and undetectable by others, the panic
experience is not marked by glaring external signs and symptoms and is often
undetectable by medical apparatuses. Sufferers however, believe that others can see
their panic, becoming hypersensitive and hyper-self aware of themselves. They fear that
others will see them in an out of control, panicked state and assume that they are crazy.
The resulting cycle of self-monitoring and avoidance behaviors stemmed in feelings of
otherness, shame and alienation leads to less frequent public discussion. Which further
results in a perpetuation of misunderstandings and misinformation about panic affecting
sufferers and organizations seeking to increase awareness and educate the public about
anxiety and panic conditions.
The task for organizations like the ADAO is to address the association of mental illness
as madness, and to negotiate the invisibility of panic and other anxiety conditions within
the public sphere. The experience of 'being seen' is connected to a politics of
recognition and increased awareness. This chapter explores this tension between the
visibility and invisibility of panic as a consequence of the legacy of imagening, and how
it affects individuals and groups that deal with panic conditions.
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This chapter examines issues of the 'body' that have become an important subject and
object within social sciences and geographical discourses. This 'body craze' is rooted in
critiques of mind/body dualisms that underlie the production of knowledge within the
same context. It seeks to investigate the material and representational ways in which our
geographies, subjectivities, identities and communities are negotiated and produced.
The 'body' is discussed and the question of whether an examination of the body can
help to achieve more emancipatory social and political relations in addressing issues of
marginalization and social justice is touched on (Longhurst, 2001:5).
The chapter further demonstrates how an examination of the body offers a way of
promoting new understandings of power, knowledge and social relationships between
individuals, groups and geographies. In it a case is built for the importance of the
'visual' in the experience of panic and agoraphobia and the creation of specific 'mad'
identities, subjectivities and geographies. Two sections, section 5.2 and 5.3, will
analyze how the in/visibility of panic affects the daily-lived experiences of individuals
with panic and agoraphobia and organizations that address those conditions. Section 5.2
introduces the experience of panic through the question - what is a panic attack? It then
examines the genealogy of the visual within western medicine with a specific focus on
the histories of hysteria that have informed the imagening of panic. Next comes a more
thorough exploration of how the tension between the beliefs that illness can be read as a
surface presentation of, or within the body. Section 5.2 addresses several questions that
affect the lived realities of anxiety conditions such as panic, such as: why do people
think panic is visible to others? What do sufferers imagine they look like to themselves
and others? What effect does the legacy of imagening have on people with panic? And
why are the fear of the hysterical, and the legacy of visualizing illness problematic for
individuals? Section 5.3 focuses on the issues developed within section two in the
context of the ADAO, related to why the tension between the in/invisibility of an
ailment is problematic for organizations that address issues of panic. It offers some
examples of how the ADAO has worked within a dominant scopic regime and
negotiated the tension between the invisibility and visibility of panic. The chapter
concludes by drawing together analysis within the chapter sections to elaborate on the
connections between imagening and the healthy citizen. It does so in order to suggest
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issues the ADAO must address in order to create a space that is inclusive of the lived
realities of its membership, a place central to the ADAO's vision of inclusivity.
5.2 Embodying panic
5.2.1 What is a panic attack?
Panic 'disorder' is often described as a fear of fear itself, or as a fear of having a panic
attack. Interviewees often describe panic in terms of mind and body and oscillate
between the two in the experience of panic, simultaneously reinforcing and
reconstructing a mind/body dualism.
"I think panic is a loss of control. It's a physical reaction and a mental reaction
that, uh -1 guess it's a mental reaction first which causes the physical reaction,
and usually the physical reaction is not one that would be considered
normal" (Sarah).
"I think I would describe panic as, uh, first of all, the, the physical sensation of
having a panic attack so what that feels like, um, all the seen, the bodily
sensations that you get from actually having it, and then it's the worry that, that,
that constant worry, that interferes with your functioning on a day to day basis
of, of when the next one is going to be. So it's really worrying about um, when
am I going to experience that stage again. So it's really a state of heightened,
heightened, heightened stress I guess would be the best example of what it sort
of feels like to be in one. And then, the anticipatory anxiety that occurs in
between the panic attacks I think is really, um, what, sort of how you know, that
you have, I think that you suffer from a condition rather than an isolated
event" (Amanda).
A panic attack is an important characteristic of panic conditions and a primary reason
why individuals develop agoraphobic avoidance behaviors. Panic attacks are
experienced in as many different ways as there are persons with panic, and are
associated with a variety of fears, depending on the individual. Panic attacks are
somatic sensations that are unexpected, that appear 'out of the 'blue' and include an
overwhelming sense of fear and terror (ADAO, 2002a).
The physical sensations of a panic attack often resemble a heart attack. They are
characterized by heart palpitations, increased heart rate, shortness of breath, numbing of
various body parts, sweating, dizziness, faintness, hot or cold flashes, shaking or
trembling, terror, fear of dying or losing control, and a sense that things either outside
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or inside the body are unreal, to name a few (APA, 2000). The experience of panic and
its pain shatters the self into a series of lived oppositions, therefore the fidelity of our
bodies that characterize and ground our everyday functioning are substituted for a
heightened sense of bodily disappearance (Leder, 1990; 1992). This bodily
dysappearance, in terms of a panic attack were often described by current and previous
interviewees (Bankey, 1999; 2001) in terms of:
1) Depersonalization, the feeling that one is being dissociated or detached from one's
body:
"I thought that people could see that I was losing control of my body, you know,
that other people would see me as 'unreal, that I am fading away... but
sometimes I think... what if people can sec me panic and then I get paranoid and
think I must look like I am going to scream, like everyone can see me fading
out, screaming out of my body" (Lauren).
2) Derealization, the sensation that one is being detached, slipping away from one's
environment:
"For instance I walk out of my door...The street would seem kind of foggy and
the dark down the street looked so much further than it really was. The street
would feel off kilter, you would feel unbalanced. Sometimes the road in front of
the sidewalk would feel like it was dropping and your next step you were going
down. The noises were louder and more profound and upsetting, petrol smells
and that kind of thing got worse. Everything is intensified, except you're not, I
couldn't tell you where I am" (Manon).
3) An increased awareness of external and internal sensations where the boundaries
between self and environment are blurred:
"What happens to the space around me? I remember pretty much to notice what
is happening in the moment when I am panicking. I'm thinking this is my
environment and I will notice everything that's going on, and I will panic in that
environment and try not to avoid the things I see and hear outside in order to
avoid the things I feel in my body. As much as I am noticing everything, I have
this shield going on, I don't want to be more focused on my body its scary, so I
focus on what's going on in my world that I shouldn't be noticing, because its all
too much, but I'm searching for something to distract me" (Nancy).
Derealization, depersonalization and the blurring of boundaries are all examples of the
spatial expression of a panic attack, as the experience of panic is connected to the
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spaces within the body, the production of landscapes outside the body, and the
indistinguishability of the boundaries between those geographies. These spatial
experiences also directly contribute to the development of agoraphobia, which is why
according to the diagnostic and statistical manual (APA, 1994; 2000), agoraphobia is
almost always seen by clinicians in conjunction with panic disorder, and 'rarely to never
seen' without the onset of a panic attack. In this way panic is an important example of
how the sensations and perceptions of our selves and our bodies affect how we
understand the wider environments in which we are situated.
5.2.2 Why do sufferers think that panic attacks are 'visible'?
One central fear associated with having a panic attack is being seen in a panicky state.
Individuals fear the physical experience of a panic attack. They also fear the thought
that someone else might see them losing control and judge them to be crazy, mad or
deviant. Individuals with panic think that others can see them having a panic attack
because of a legacy of visualizing mental illness within clinical practices that has led
people to believe that illness and madness can be read as a surface presentation of the
body. The centrality of the visual within medical and clinical practices is based within a
'realist' positivistic perspective that focuses on observable 'facts' about the body as a
way of understanding what that body is (Ussher, 1997:2). Here health and illness is
measured through observation and visualization of bodily processes, what Gilman
(1993; 1995; 1996) has described as the "primacy of the visual in western medicine" or
the "medical gaze".
From this perspective comes the belief that mental illnesses are observable through and
read on the body. The primacy of the visual in western medical and clinical practices
has resulted in images of mental illness that have helped to define the meanings we
ascribe to mental health- madness, deviance, abnormality - and that have helped create a
preoccupation with how we look, how our bodies 'appear' to others and how we are
thought of (Finklestein, 1991).
5.2.2.1 The genealogy of the 'gaze'
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To understand how panic is imagined it is important to situate those images within a
legacy of visualizing mental illness and illness more broadly. In Naissance de la
Clinique (1963) Foucault introduces us to the "spatialization" of the body and the
medical profession itself through the creation of medical landscapes mapped and
inscribed on and within the body. These landscapes are created through Te regard de
medicine' that becomes translated in the English version, The Birth of the Clinic, as the
medical "gaze" (1976: translator's note). It is this gaze and the centrality of vision or
seeing that gives meaning to our bodies while reinforcing the legitimacy of the medical
profession's authority to construct that meaning.
Sander Gilman expands on Foucault's work on the gaze and its meaning for western
medical cultures. The use of the image in medical history enabled the mass reading
market to observe the physician at work. It not only enabled other professionals access
to the body, but made parts of the body, and the body itself accessible to a much wider
public (Gilman, 1995:13). Gilman argues that the history of western clinical practices,
with specific reference to mental health issues, was organized primarily around the
visual "dominant scopic regime" of the medical profession, itself derived from a long
standing western medical tradition of representing the insane (Gilman, 1993:359).
Observation has been used to identify medical problems in the body from the time of the
ancient Greeks to contemporary western medical practice. Practitioners require
observable symptoms to make a diagnosis or disease classification.
"To see the patient means to develop a technique for seeing, a technique that is
scientific; the patient in turn, as the object of the medical gaze becomes a part of
the process of the creation of the ontological representation of the disease..."
(Gilman, 1993:353).
Thus clinical representations and images are situated within a "logic of visibility"
(Chow, 1992), that is, techniques that privilege vision as a means of revealing 'truths'
about the body, thereby assuming that illness and madness can be read as a surface
presentation. This logic of visibility, or the 'penetration' of the medical gaze into the
interior of the body in the practice of pathological anatomy, has been described by
Foucault in The Birth of the Clinic as "the technique of the corpse" (Foucault, 1976).
He notes that the opening up of the body in autopsy in hopes of exposing the origin of
disease ultimately failed to render pathology fully visible, but led the physician instead
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to map disease upon organs and surfaces, it became an exercise in the creation of new
spaces for professional medical knowledges (Cartwright, 1995:xiii).
In the twentieth century, medical recording, viewing instruments and visual techniques
have been crucial in the emergence of a distinctly modernist mode of representation in
western scientific and public culture. A "mode geared to the temporal and spatial
decomposition and reconfiguration of bodies as dynamic fields of action in need of
regulation and control" (Cartwright, 1995:xi). Where medical textbooks and cadavers
once replaced and provided a substitute for 'real' patients and 'real' specimens, new
imaging technologies, health Internet sites, and Medical CD-ROMS now provide a
"complex new reality of health and disease related to a new aesthetics of hyper reality
and cyberspace - no longer is the static image the best reflection of the world of medical
image making" (Gilman, 1995:174). Technologies such as the microscope, x-ray
machines, ultrasounds, EEG, ECG, allow clinicians, patients and the general public to
witness and animate the landscapes of their bodies and survey those spaces.
Donna Haraway talks about this in the context of the immune system, where the "dark
recesses of the body become the domain of apparatuses of biomedical visualization"
(Haraway, 1988:320). She describes how our insides are made comprehensible by the
presentation of images of internal bodily processes. Thus the body becomes a frontier in
which our own parts are seemingly being invaded by both "non selves that the immune
system guards against but more fundamentally by our own strange selves" (Haraway,
1988:320). Twentieth century medicine does not so much 'flay' the body as it does
away with distinctions of interior/exterior, object/ground; the body is rendered a part of
a living system that incorporates technologies of its representation (Cartwright,
1995:xiv).
Biomedical apparatuses for visualizing the strange selves of the body have several
implications for individuals and communities with anxiety conditions, specifically for
panic conditions. They reinforce the credibility and reliance of biomedical approaches
in the etiology, verification and treatment of panic. They also affirm the general belief
that authenticity of experience is communicated visibly on and through the body.
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People must be able to see what it feels like to have panic on the one hand, and on the
other that if people can't see it, the pain cannot be that important a problem.
5.2.2.2 Vision, the body, and public health
The dominant scopic regime of medical practice has become central to established forms
of medical and clinical practice, health promotion and public health care. Within current
health promotional practices, techniques of seeing are transferred from the gaze of the
clinician to the internalization of expert discourses that support constant self monitoring
and vigilance in the maintenance of one's health and body (Petersen and Lupton, 1998).
Public health practices are reliant on self-surveillance and on technologies of
surveillance that permit the professional to verify to health of the subject.
Contemporary clinical discourses, such as public health, move the body from a passive
receptacle of disease to a responsible and active agent of self-care (Lupton, 1995; Parr,
2002a). Self-care (connected to the self-care ethic developed in the next chapter) focuses
on how bodily mechanisms, processes and internal images of 'our strange selves' are
examples and emblematic of our bodies themselves (Haraway, 1988). Visualizing
landscapes within our bodies require us to become fearful of our bodies and to maintain
them vigilantly. A self-care ethic promoted through contemporary clinical and public
health models does not produce an autonomous subject. Instead, it produces a citizen
who is subjugated by professional discourses, technologies and representations of the
body that become indistinguishable from the materiality of bodies themselves.
Current use of visual imagery and technologies of visualizing the body in public health
practices emphasize that by seeing and identifying an ailment one is closer to self-care
and cure. Bodies become a site of surveillance though the rise of visual public health
information available through media forms such as television, radio, the Internet and the
availability of pamphlets and written literatures (Parr, 2002a). Visual images of the
body, fused with increasingly available medical expert knowledge, enable subjects to
become "informed, technical actors in the creation of their body spaces" (Parr,
2002a:365). Individuals often fail to recognize that contemporary health practices lead
them to adopt a carefully worked clinical script. These subjects of health promotion
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discourse are not mere containers passively receiving information they are given instead
they are seen as active agents in the consumption and production of self-defined healthy
objectives (Brown and Duncan, 2000:265 in Parr, 2002a:365). Here individual body
spaces are seen as complex sites of risk assessment (Lupton, 1999) that are 'worked on'
by their owners to produce more sanctioned subjectivities, inscribed with medical and
health knowledges that are appropriated and reworked by these "self made corporeal
experts"(Parr, 2002a:365).
5.2.3 What do sufferers think panic looks like? Panic and Hysteria
When most interviewees described how they thought they looked during a panic attack
they used images of hysteria, which carry connotations and representations of femininity
and illegitimacy. In this way panic could be described as a fear of being thought of as
hysterical - a fear of the hysterical woman. The dominant scopic regime of medical
practice is clearly used in the history and imagery of hysteria. While the image of the
hysteric may have changed, in terms of its acceptability and meaning, over the centuries
the hysterical woman remains a powerful marker of mental illness. It is the predominant
image of the body that interviewees with panic identified with, and is an image found
throughout the ADAO writings (Showalter, 1997; Bronfen, 1998; Micale, 1995).
The image of the hysteric in the medical literature of the nineteenth century is an
"essential image of deviance" associated with irrationality and ugliness, which are both
highly gendered and sexualized (Porter, 2001; Gilman, 1993:362). These images
present the hysterical woman as: dramatically writhing and possessed in convulsive,
contorted "hystero-epilepsie" fits - often using images of other ailments, such as tetanus
and epilepsy, to represent hysteria; bulging eyes and mouth wide open, nearly
screaming, tearing at her clothes, often being observed by male onlookers; as the
passively willing, fainting, patient of the master with no will of her own; or as a curved
contorted body the frozen woman in an "arc en cercle" (arched back) position (Gilman,
1995; Bronfen, 1998:189).
This image allowed other physicians to readily identify hysterical symptoms and to
identify overtly female sexuality as deviant, at the same time as it allowed the hysterical
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woman to shape her identity according to this imagery (Gilman, 1993:367). These
images of the hysteric always assume that there is a normal image of a productive
healthy human, and that the deviant is marked by external signs (Gilman, 1995). The
image of the hysterical woman is laden with implications of illegitimacy, inauthenticity
and trickery, which translate into contemporary images and meanings of panic. Like
hysteria, panic is often thought of as not being a 'real' or legitimate disorder worthy of
much attention.
Two interviewees describe how they connected the experience of panic to a fear of the
image of the hysterical. Both women acknowledged that panic cannot be and is not
generally seen by others, the sense that panic can be read on the body is a strongly held
belief structures the sufferer's sense of self. The private sensations of panic are
translated into a public expression:
"[Sufferers] would say that they think everybody was staring at them, that
everybody knows what's happening to them, maybe they're being laughed at,
that there's just a sense that everything that's happening to them physically is, is
for everyone to see" (Brittany).
Another interviewee elaborates by describing what happens during a panic attack but
focuses on how those sensations are connected to what panic sufferers imagine other
people think a person with panic looks like:
"Okay, well, I can tell you technically what happens, you start to feel fearful, so
you get that feeling that I am in danger, I need to escape, because it is like, they
feel as if there life is being threatened, so there adrenaline starts to go, the heart
starts to pound, they start to breathe very shallowly, that makes them dizzy, you
lose your ability to handle yourself properly because you don't feel strength, and
then you become afraid that you are going to lose total control of yourself. Yet,
because you are going to faint or you are going to collapse or your going to
become hysterical, or have some kind of undesirable reaction in front of another
person or people and that will cause them to judge you in a negative way. Then,
I would expand that, panic, to what I think I look like, and I assume that's what
other people see and there is a big thing that I look like... I imagine... I think I
am going, they are going to see a weak individual who cannot control
themselves and cannot handle a seemingly simple situation ...I guess maybe they
would see someone who is bodily very emotionally, like a lot of emotions in the
face" (Ashley).
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Exploring the ways in which hysterical imagery is traced onto the contemporary beliefs
about the experience of panic, illustrates how imagenings of mental disorder are traced
and re-inscribed onto bodies, identities and subjectivities, and how these are translated
into further representational practices. In exploring how those interviewed identify with
the image of the hysterical I am also drawing upon histories that show how women and
the feminine were and still are portrayed and labeled as deviant and irrational.
5.2.4 Panic and pain
A condition of the dominant scopic regime of medicine is the ability of an expert to see
and measure illness. For any ailment to be authentic the pain associated with that illness
must be measurable, quantifiable and observable. Pain like disease must be seen to be
believed, authenticated, and confirmed. Telling the physician about the pain may result
in diagnostic testing, but if those tests yield no observable results then the complaints of
pain are not taken as seriously.
For interviewees both public spaces and spaces of professional medical consultation can
become spaces of dismissal. The lack of noticeable symptom readings on biomedical
apparatuses of visualization, or verifiable proof of panic reinforces the stigma that
anxiety conditions are not 'real' problems:
"Number one, few people talk about panic if they suffer from it, and secondly,
you don't look different, so anybody walking down the street that would look at
you, they wouldn't have a clue what you were going through. I mean, you
could be in the midst of a huge anxiety attack, and someone might not know it.
Or, they [persons with panic] constantly go to the doctor and just say you know,
I'm not feeling well, I don't know what's wrong and the doctor looks at you and
says well you look great, there's nothing wrong with you, you know, your blood
work is fine" (Madison).
This helps to compound sufferers' sense of distrust with their bodily sensations, and
their own sense of insecurity about the authenticity of their complaints. While a panic
attack is thought to be visible to others, the pain and the terror of panic is often not
communicated or understood by other people. Since panic is not often recorded by
medical devices, panic has not been considered a serious or even 'real' condition
worthy of attention, research or sympathy.
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The experience of panic is physically and emotionally painful. Meanings of pain, and
our responses to it, are shaped by the medical gaze and biomedical imagery, which
helps to authenticate our feelings and sensations (Shildrick and Price, 1998). In western
medical regimes pain and visualization of (potential) pain are depicted as having a
common motivational value that helps facilitate compliance to medical knowledge
(Vasseleu, 1998:67). Biomedical images are used to transfer pain or emotion to an
audience and in so doing fashion and construct responses to the meaning of pain and
illness, of suffering and illness (Price and Shildrick, 1998:169). These images are also
about the production of an individual who is capable of the surveillance and care of him
or herself, an alteration of the embodied subject's relation to him/herself and his/her
increased 'self care' through self-surveillance. This is not a process we undertake by
ourselves, nor is the individual or group entirely active or passive in the configuration.
The body of the clinical subject is never merely an object - its compliance is the object
(Vasseleu, 1998:70).
Pain and chronic pain, in particular, is a betrayal of our fundamental trust of the body.
"We feel under siege: untrusting, resentful of uncertainty and lost. Life becomes a
working out of sentiments that follow closely from this corporeal betrayal"(Kleinman,
1988:44-45). Pain produces:
[A]lienation...being cut off from the outer world thrown back upon the body
itself, in isolation, disintegration, pain...the unpleasantness of pain, the body and
"I" instantly seem to have parted company...pain makes us believe that we can
cut our self off from the body. Through rationalizing pain, my body and I
become two separate entities"(Vrancken, 1989:442 in Williams and Bendelow,
1998:159).
When the pain of panic cannot be effectively communicated to others and believed to be
real then individuals suffer the physically debilitating effects of a panic attack, and a
profound sense of loneliness, isolation, stigmatization and dependence that often
accompanies it. This loss of self becomes a fundamental form of suffering in which a
'painful' body emerges as an estranged, alien, thing like presence, separate from the
self (Williams and Bendelow, 1998:160-161).
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A problem for those with panic, or chronic pain, there are no cultural resources for
organizing their experience because they cannot rely on the visibility of their ailment to
inform a wider public:
"I think there are a number of issues, I think the first one is that it's [panic and
anxiety] not something which has readily identifiable characteristics its not
clearly visible, so a you don't know it exists unless you or somebody you know
suffers from it and even then it is by its nature very difficult to understand... It's
called a mental condition that isn't quite the right phrasing but its not an obvious
physical condition, panic... it's a physical condition, you are in a flight mode
but that's only visible to you, so its hard to recognize and even having
recognized it, it's even harder to understand" (Frank).
Sufferers often say that other sufferers are the only ones who can really understand their
pain and audit their experience empathetically. This understanding however is often
achieved through communication based on 'communitas' of mutual recognition and
shared understanding of identity politics (Jackson, 1994 in Williams and Bendelow,
1998:163). The language of pain paradoxically becomes an anti-language - a kind of
code and increasingly a rite of passage (Williams and Bendelow, 1998:163). When this
language is told, its "'lack' becomes producing" (Frank, 1991) shifting the dominant
cultural conception of illness away from passivity to activity (Frank, 1995). But those
narratives of panic and illness still largely exist as private rather than public stories, and
both private and public narratives are required for the painful panicked body to be
understood and acknowledged.
Keeping pain private or expressing it publicly depends upon the context, beliefs and
values of a particular group or individual and the ability for that individual or group to
express it publicly (Williams and Bendelow, 1998:165). In the case of panic and
agoraphobia the expression of the 'disorder' may have no accurate public face or outlet
to draw upon or to begin with. For many of those with panic conditions, the pain-
afflicted person may decide to conceal the experience of pain from potentially critical
audiences if the social and emotional costs of disclosure outweigh the perceived
benefits. The benefits of disclosure could include access to health care, sympathy and
help in adjusting to effects of the pain. Experience may suggest that the costs of pain
disclosure can be perceived as overwhelming. Certain reactions of critical audiences
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may elicit feelings of shame and guilt which is common in the narratives of those with
panic conditions (Kotarba 1983:134-35 in Williams and Bendelow, 1998:166).
5.2.5 Panic and shame
Because sufferers fear being seen in a state of panic, as hysterical, mad, or out of
control, many hesitate to discuss their experiences of panic, contributing further to
processes of otherness, shame and the development of agoraphobic avoidance
behaviors. This contributes to the development of stereotypes of panic based upon the
imagening of panic, caricatures of hysteria and mental illness, within various visual and
print media. Images of panic are laden with stereotypes of femininity, fakery and
madness leading to a cycle of self-deprecation, lack of self-trust and withdrawal. The
alienation and privatized nature of panic and agoraphobia results from a loss of
confidence in the body and a loss of confidence in the self, assisted through the
reactions or lack of responses by others. Individuals feel isolated and ashamed of their
panic so they do not create public discourses around panic that might increase public
awareness of panic conditions. Many individuals develop agoraphobic avoidance
behaviors and so the experience of panic is silenced and panic is relegated to the private
spaces of individual experience.
The feelings of shame and guilt that are common in the narratives of those interviewed
can be viewed as a process and product of a lack of discourse within the public about
anxiety conditions such as panic and agoraphobia. For those I interviewed this was
connected to the lack of visible signs of illness or pain in the experience of panic and
agoraphobia resulting in its dismissal as a legitimate health concern, or completely
ignored. For one interviewee panic and agoraphobia are beginning to be taken seriously
but the single largest obstacle to awareness is that "when someone is having a panic
attack you can't tell, so it's hard to be empathetic and understanding and supportive
when there's no outward signs. So often, I think it's just missed" (Emily). This is
repeated in another interviewee's discussion of the politics of recognition of anxiety
conditions more generally:
"I think the general public does not realize how intense the feelings are, if you
have not experienced it, it's hard to realize how intense it is, so unless they have
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experienced it. I think depending on the individual if they are compassionate
they can, I don't think they truly understand the extent of the feelings of terror
that the person is experiencing" (Ashley).
Both of these interviewees are concerned with the development of empathy or sympathy
in the politics of recognition, but invariably argue that the invisibility of pain in a panic
attack works against the construction of a public discourse around the effects and
consequences of their invisibility as examples of systemic discrimination. But making an
ailment visible does not guarantee well being. The visibility of illness and impairment
can be problematic when bodies are subject to mandatory regulated visibility and
clinical surveillance. Thus, ailments are never a simply a private disease but always a
public syndrome subject to a continual and all pervasive visual record (Nair, 2000:55).
The bodies in these images are both an abstract conceptualization and a materialized
effect, carrying with it the markers of racial, gendered, ethnic and sexual identity (Nair,
2000:56). As a discursive production these bodies are subject to what Arthur Kleinman
describes as the "existential space between the immediate embodiment of disease as a
physiological process, shown in the image, and its 'meaning laden character' that is
created as a part of our experience" (Kleinman, 1988:56). This can be problematic as it
creates both stereotypes and misrepresentations of experience that serve to dehumanize
or objectify the self.
5.2.6 Summarizing the cycle of imagening
Both the body and images of the body in disorder are central to the construction of
identity. The experiences of panic reconfigure a person's relationship between self and
other, inside and outside, sound and sight, body and environment. But, while the
resulting negotiation of spatial relations are dynamic and reveal much about perceptions
and understanding of place and spatial practices, the spatial and somatic experiences of
panic are not readily 'visible' by others. The sensations of panic cause the individual
intense pain and fear that the sufferer feels must be visible. The person then associates
their panic with imagery of madness and deviance that inform the panic sufferer's sense
of self and boundaries. The person in panic often assumes, based on the legacy of the
visual in medicine, that others see what they feel they look like and will realize that they
have lost control, become hysterical, or that something is terribly wrong. But as most
109
people with panic come to realize their panic is not outwardly visible, and therefore
their pain and suffering is not conveyed to others. This communicative barrier creates
further problems for both individuals and communities that deal with agoraphobia and
other panic conditions.
The belief that panic can be seen on the body as a marker of madness is a significant
problem for those with panic conditions. The legacy of the medical gaze has resulted in
the belief that if an ailment cannot be seen or read on the body then nothing is wrong.
Yet, anxiety conditions such as panic are often not visible, either as an inscription on
the body, or as something that can be read by a physician or by various other
'technologies' of the body (i.e. medical devices). This has resulted in the belief that
panic is not an authentic or legitimate problem that does not require serious medical
attention. This invisibility of panic fosters a sense of shame and otherness, both in the
sense of feeling abnormal in relation to other people, and otherness in the sense of being
invisible, of not being considered. The apparent invisibility of the ailment also results in
a heightened need for self-monitoring strategies that can lead to further alienation and
isolation from others in the form of agoraphobia. Additionally, the medical gaze helps
to transform the nature of what is public and private in ways that are not necessarily
enabling for those with panic conditions. In effect the medical gaze helps to create a
docile body, subject to the expert discourses of clinical practitioners, and a body that is
perceived to be even more unstable and untrustworthy without help and direction from
clinicians. The legacy of imagening panic has become problematic for individuals with
panic because it contributes to processes of othering the self.
5.3 Representing panic
5.3.1 Challenges faced by the ADAO
The way in which panic is imagened affects individuals' well-being and the ability of
community groups and organizations to service and assist those persons. The ADAO
faces several challenges in their attempts to help individuals and their families, educate
the public and raise awareness about these conditions.
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First, the ADAO needs to deal with the stereotypes of panic resulting from the legacy of
imagening panic, as well as the popular usage of the term panic, as panicky. Second,
the ADAO needs to raise awareness about the misperceptions of panic and dismantle
these stereotypes without the use of an obvious visual referent as available images of
panic are problematic. The experience of panic cannot be easily conveyed through a
singular image. Additionally, many panic sufferers develop agoraphobic avoidance
behaviors that make the 'face of panic' even more hidden from the purview of the wider
public.
5.3.1.1 Stereotypes of panic
The lack of understanding about panic (because of a lack of visible imagery to
communicate the experience of panic to a wider public) has perpetuated stereotypes
about panic. These stereotypes have become the 'meaning laden character' of panic that
further complicates an understanding of anxiety conditions by the general public -
closely associated with the images of hysteria. One interviewee characterized 'public'
perceptions and understandings of panic and agoraphobia:
"I think they wouldn't know. I absolutely think they wouldn't know. I think
most people, um, if they do know anything about it, it's, it's - aside from people
obviously that have family members and become educated through life...Anyone
who's seen sort of a typical ER episode where they've got someone coming in
screaming...I remember seeing once a woman who was screaming her head off,
being brought in on a gurney having a panic attack. O.K., that's just not very
realistic, most people having a panic attack no one even particularly notices.
You know, and they are certainly not screaming" (Brittany).
Stereotyped images of hyper visibility contrast with the invisibility if panic in the public
sphere and within the spaces of medical diagnosis and treatment. These stereotypes are
further compounded the development of language practices around the terms panic and
anxiety. The word 'panicky' minimizes the severity of the experience of panic as a
momentary product of nervousness, stress and fear that we can 'get over'. Both the
general public and many academics have conflated panic with panicky, and thus have
helped to sustain misconceptions about the experience of panic (Kroker & Kroker,
1991; Wilkinson, 2001).
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We have all felt panicky or anxious at some point, but feeling panicky is not the same
thing as a panic attack. In the absence of an image that conveys the embodied
experience of panic, language practices have developed that represent panic in similar
ways to the imagery and comical caricatures of mental illness and madness which
highlight a lack of severity and non life threatening nature of mental disease (Porter,
2001).
"The label, the name, anxiety disorder, hey I have anxiety every time I go to
make a presentation to a potential sponsor, I have anxiety every time we go into
our selections, my athletes have anxiety every time they are in a starting gate, I
don't know if there is a better phrase. It's a poor label if you are trying to create
public awareness for it" (Frank).
The increasing presence of images of the body in panic based on stereotypes of hysteria,
in the media, television in particular, frequently draw on simple caricatures of madness
and hysteria. These images, largely ignored by public health and medical practices,
reinforce the sense that our bodies are visualized and seen by others, heightening a
sense of self scrutiny and self monitoring which reinforces the dominant scopic regime
of the body (Lupton, 1999b).
5.3.2 Absence of representational form
5.3.2.1 Introduction
Anxiety conditions are the most pervasive form of mental ailment in western cultures.
Invisibility of anxiety conditions within the public sphere creates specific agoraphobic
geographies within the private sphere. A lack of accurate visual images of panic, and
the prevalence of stereotypes that misrepresent the experience of anxiety conditions,
lead to a lack of sympathy, interest and understanding of those conditions. This is one
of the central concerns of the ADAO.
There is no simple way to explain panic to a wider public that highlights both the pain
and severity of panic conditions. It is this lack of "visible messiness" (Longhurst, 1999;
2000; 2001), or the assumption that messiness is something visible on and through the
body, that places many individuals and organizations that deal with panic at a
disadvantage. They cannot rely on the visibility of an ailment to legitimize and further
112
their cause. The general absence of visible, biomedically measurable signs of panic
means that it is hard to raise awareness about these conditions, no matter how painful or
urgent the problem. This makes it hard to elicit a recognition of need within the public
sphere.
Interviewees discussed the effects of the lack of visible messiness in terms of what the
ADAO could use in awareness and educational campaigns. Section three explores issues
identified by interviewees that may help lend credibility to organizations that deal with
mental health issues. This section expands on the role of the poster child and the role of
celebrity that interviewees identified as central to increasing awareness of health issues.
The section concludes by offering counter models and ideas about the visual
representation of mental health provided by the ADAO. These models may work within
the language of the dominant scopic regime in which the body is scrutinized and
understood, or they may offer an alternative way of thinking about the spaces of the
body altogether.
5.3.3 Appealing to the public
5.3.3.1 The poster child
There is a need to create greater public awareness about panic conditions, such as
agoraphobia, something that is central to the activities of most community-based groups
such as the ADAO. Many other health awareness campaigns have converted the
'messiness' of bodies into streamlined objects of sympathy for the general public. Each
image provides simultaneous, multiple meanings that the viewer accesses immediately
and attempts to reduce to a single coherent meaning (Gilman, 1995:31). These images
not only talk about the power and authority that are awarded to clinical expertise but
they also show us how images that come from clinical practices are socially accepted
and culturally dominating (Shildrik and Price, 1998:6).
The 'poster child' has become a convention of health awareness and funding campaigns
in the late twentieth and twenty first century (Sturken and Cartwright, 2001). The poster
child is a powerful image as Lauren Berlant describes: "the child's wounded image
speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: s/he has not freely chosen her/his
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exploitation"(Berlant, 2000:35). The poster child becomes an object of disavowal and
fascination, the figure for the injured adult; it stands in for the traumatized virtuous
private citizen (Berlant, 2000:38). The poster child of health is an image which is
objectifying, in that the child becomes the sign/signifier of pain/death and thus stresses
the urgency of need of care. But, it is also an image with whom we can connect to, as
ill health or sickness is an experience that we all can relate to in some way, a reminder
of our own imminent vulnerability and death (Porter, 2001). The poster child oscillates
between pain as experience and pain as representation. As one interviewee describes:
"an awareness campaign is successful because it's been marketed well, it's had a human
face put on it. People are able to see that, that really could happen to me, or somebody
I care about" (Stephanie).
Many of those I interviewed at the ADAO recognized the importance of a 'poster
child', or a poster adult, for raising awareness and funding. One interviewee describes
in this conversation some of the issues facing organization trying to raise awareness and
the issues of identification that are necessary for effective communication of meanings
of panic:
I think [panic and anxiety] ironically lacks from having a poster child. There are
no obvious role models of people who suffer from anxiety disorder, so its hard
to identify with it. If I'm a middle aged Canadian male and I start developing
arthritis I can identify with Wayne Gretsky. I feel a lot better now, and I feel
that there is a connection here, it is very, very difficult to develop that and by its
nature it does not lend itself to that role model creating of awareness. So that's
one of the major things, also at the other end of using the use media, it's a
complex syndrome or issue to solve which is deadly if you are trying to go
through the media, if you can't explain it in 15 seconds you've lost them and this
is pretty difficult to explain. So those are some of the challenges" (Frank)?
5.3.3.2 Mobilizing role models
In the previous excerpt the interviewee highlights the need not only for a poster child
but a role model for panic and anxiety conditions more broadly. He suggests in further
conversation that unlike the poster child that many adults can sympathize with and care
for, people of varying ages need models they can identify, emphasize with and be
inspired by. The role of celebrity and importance of celebrity identification and
confessional was an issue mentioned by various other members of the ADAO. For one
114
interviewee, the seriousness of anxiety conditions is directly linked to the belief that
"not enough people are known to have it, maybe nobody important (laughs) it seems to
me" (Alexis). For another interviewee celebrity is an essential part of the politics of
recognition and the development of sympathetic dialogue and role models within the
public sphere.
"I haven't seen any media representations of panic or agoraphobia so I don't
know, and off the top of my head I can't, but there are quite a few celebrities
that have come out and made a point of saying that they do suffer from panic
and agoraphobia such as Kim Basinger...cause If you can relate to someone who
has had it, and may have gotten over it, it might not seem as overwhelming...
Celebrity confessionals are healthy, just for the fact that if someone in the
spotlight admits to having something wrong, you might not feel so alone, as in
so Kim Basinger has it, she has to do movies, she has to work, she had to make
a living, and if she can overcome this, maybe I can do that, I am not in such a
high demand or in the spotlight as such, and maybe I can do this, because my
situation might be slightly easier than hers" (Amy).
The ADAO actively uses celebrity in their youth educational program and newsletters to
show the wide variety of people who suffer from anxiety conditions. The celebrity
confessional helps to both destabilize and reinforce the importance of illness or health
being read on the body at the same time that it challenges the association between
illness/madness and ugliness. Within western culture beauty and youth has been
conflated with the healthy and normal body, while the aged, deviant/mad/ill body was
characterized by its ugliness (Gilman, 1995; Porter, 2001). The association of
celebrities, who are thought to be examples of beauty, with illnesses and mental
diseases that are thought to exist in ugly bodies helps to shift public perceptions about
that relationship (Finklestein, 1991). The celebrity shows through their own embodied
presence that the appearance of a normal healthy body may not mean that person is free
of illness or disease. The normal beautiful body as that which is absent of visible signs
of pain and suffering reinforces the belief that - "I am healthy, because I look good, I
might say that I am not feeling well, but at least I look good " (Michelle). This image of
health is the subject of cultural fantasies about the body in a particular culture- the
theatrical function of illness and health is both an actor and frame of the action (Gilman,
1995:18). But, there are those who criticize the importance placed on the appearance of
health and normality because through focusing on appearance very little is done to
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substantively address the concerns and issues raised through illness experiences (Batt,
1998).
In spite of this criticism, the focus on the appearance of normality is very important in
the campaigns for 'mental illnesses' in the hope of both de-stigmatizing previous
representations of people with mental illness and of letting people who suffer from such
ailments know that they are not alone in their experience and are not abnormal. It is this
focus on the appearance of normality that predominates the imagery within ADAO
booklets, pamphlets, youth and adult education and to an extent it is what motivates the
ADAO's commercial. The appearance of the 'normal' healthy body; characterized by
smiling faces, able bodies and a visible lack of panic, suffering or other markers of ill
health on the body; are used by the ADAO to show that people who have anxiety
conditions are "perfectly normal", like everyone else. The dominance of images of
'normal' in ADAO materials is significant. While it is impossible to accurately
represent panic as a simple fifteen second sound or televisual bite, the ADAO's need to
create images of the body absent of signs of ill health and pain reveals its willingness to
adopt the dominant scopic regime and imagenings of the body.
5.3.4 Countering/displacing stereotypes
In spite of this, the ADAO has attempted to increase awareness of panic through a
number of different educational programs. In this section of the chapter I focus on ways
in which the ADAO has adopted, utilized and subverted both the imagenings of panic as
well as the centrality of imagery and the visual within awareness campaigns. I describe
the commercial made by the ADAO and how this visual presentation disrupts and
utilizes the dominant scopic regime in which the body and clinical conditions have come
to be understood. I also offer a different imagening of panic developed by the ADAO to
suggest that the organization does have the ability and opportunity to move beyond the
legacy of imagening mental illnesses.
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5.3.4.1 The commercial
The ADAO commercial was part of a larger community scheme in Ottawa to provide
teenagers an opportunity at television production. Community agencies would provide
the material, scripts, actors and direction, while local teenagers would produce the
commercial for the Canadian broadcasting corporation (CBC). Cheryl Driskell
executive director of the ADAO wrote the script. In writing the commercial Cheryl had
specific intents, representations and images that she wanted to include:
"Okay what I was trying to do when I wrote the script and got the people I
wanted multi cultural, a different ages, so I had an aboriginal Canadian, I had an
Asian Canadian, a black Canadian, a white Canadian I had a large Canadian, I
had a small Canadian I had a young Canadian, I had an older Canadian, and a
medium and a whatever, average person, I had them all in there and then I
wanted to point out what does it feel like and where does happen because that
will get people's attention. Its not enough to go on line and say do you deal with
an anxiety disorder blah, blah, blah, because people are going to go well what is
an anxiety disorder? So what I did was presented a symptomatology, so I have
one person say it happens in a crowd, in mall, in the middle of the night, well
what happens, you now you've got their attention, and then it goes: my heart
begins to race, I feel shaky, my legs go weak, I start to sweat, feel dizzy or
whatever. And then people will go oh I have that. And then the commercial
goes: if you are one of the millions of us who live with anxiety you can contact
this agency blah, blah, blah, and the heart is beating in the background and it
makes sense, because that is what got people's attention" (Cheryl).
In this commercial inclusivity and commonality of experience was expressed through
the presence of different sexed, ethnic and racialized bodies of different ages. In
interviewing one of the actors in the commercial I asked him how he was briefed about
the commercial and what message the commercial was trying to convey:
"Yes, the impression or the message. My understanding is that this disorder is
not only limited to any particular group. One of the reasons why I was in the
commercial was because I am a visible minority. This disorder is not only
limited, kids, and people of different ages and I guess social groups and what
not, and combined message, or at least I understood it off the bat" (Brian).
As Cheryl describes, the 30-second commercial consists of persons of various ages,
gender, ethnicity and race who each speak a portion of the overall dialogue, though
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certain words are said by the entire group. During the dialogue, in the background, the
sound of a heartbeat gets louder and faster until the word "overwhelmed" is spoken.
The commercial begins:
"It happens in a crowd... in class... in the middle of the night... in a crowd... when I
leave my house... just out of the blue... my heart begins to race... I feel dizzy... My
hands and feet go numb... Terror (said by the entire group) (image of an fearful eye,
with pupil dilated) ... I feel fearful... helpless... alone... overwhelmed (group)... If you
are one of the millions of us living with anxiety related problems take the first step to
being fear free call us and get educated (disembodied male voice)". This is followed by
the ADAO's website and phone numbers.
The commercial presents us with two interrelated discourses one which develops
through the dialogue and another through the presentation of the actors and close ups to
parts or expressions on their faces. The dialogue itself moves through a variety of
spatial scales: time and environment, specific locations and times (or lack there of in the
case of just out of the blue); the physical body and its sensations; the emotional body
and its feelings. The spaces of panic described within the commercial are both within
and outside of the physical body. There is a specific focus in the commercial on the
word 'terror', which is not just said by all the actors but appears in bold type on the
screen superimposed over a close up on a wide-eyed woman who looks fearful because
her pupil is widely dilated and her eye is enlarged. It is this technical visualization of
the widening eye that reinforces the legitimacy of the words spoken by the actors. We
move between the dialogue to the bodily presence and cues of the actors in an attempt to
bridge the dialogue with that image of fear represented not by the 'normal' looking
actors but by the eye itself. The last section of the commercial's dialogue seems to add
an authoritative and clinical overtone to the commercial, through the disembodied male
voice that provides the ADAO's information and the lack of any actors.
The commercial, like many of the other pictures of persons used throughout ADAO
materials, presents us with a variety of 'normal' looking bodies, reinforcing to both a
wider public and to those who suffer from anxiety conditions that anxiety and panic
sufferers are not abnormal, they come from every walk of life and are just like
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everyone else (on the outside at least). The image of the eye is purposively disassociated
from the body so as not to be identified with a specific actor because it might stigmatize
or isolate that person from the other actors. The eye also acts as a signifier and
embodiment of fear. One of the dilemmas for the ADAO has been the absence of any
visual cues to provide visual representations of panic that can be understood by the
public without panic; which is also why the commercial is primarily descriptive. In this
respect the fearful eye is both suggestive of intense fear and panic that reflects the
embodied experience how many people feel and look with panic, but is still reliant on
visual bodily cues to convey a condition that is not visible to others.
"It [the commercial] was only 30 seconds long, and yet they had a huge impact
because the drama was there, the darkness of anxiety. I wish they'd make a
commercial about not primarily speech; it's very descriptive. There are reasons
why a descriptive format or describing have as opposed to a physical or more
visual representation of panic or anxiety was chosen. Well, I would tell you
from experience that anybody looking at it from panic and anxiety would not
know. Most people if not all people around me when I was having severe panic
and anxiety had no idea what I was going through, so visually it doesn't mean a
thing. You have to represent it at the core, and that's exactly what you're
feeling, what you're experiencing at the physical level, because it's not visible"
(Emily).
When I spoke with people informally outside of the ADAO about the commercial most
of those I spoke to who had no experience of panic were still confused about what a
panic attack is and its severity, while those who had experienced panic immediately
connected with the commercial and its message, and found the commercial both
inspiring and useful. As well the response to the commercial by persons with anxiety
and panic conditions was evident in the tripling of phone calls from across Canada to
the ADAO after the showing of the commercial. This reflects its target audience of
potential clients for the ADAO, though according to the ED the commercial was meant
for both a wider public and more targeted audience of client/consumers. However, there
are differing opinions about who the target audience of the commercial is. For one
interviewee it was:
"For the average population in general, because, it's just because the profile of
the actors involved in it its supposed to represent everybody...I would go back
to the bottom message, which is it does affect everybody and if that's the case,
don't feel that you are one of a kind, it's a normal problem" (Brian).
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Another interviewee felt similarly that "the commercial was addressing anybody who
could identify with those symptoms, it was not limited to any age, color, race, it was
multi ethnic, but defined by those symptoms" (Emma). While as some interviewees' felt
that the commercial was:
"Directed at people who have experience with panic and anxiety because that's
our [the ADAO's] mandate; if it helps us to get a broad public, a commercial to
involve other people, great but, I don't think a general public would get it"
(Emily).
Despite these differing opinions the commercial has had an effect both within the wider
community and in attracting a community of potential sufferers. People with anxiety
conditions across Canada responded to the commercial very positively, increasing the
ADAO's membership. Here the visibility of the ailment, through the use of images on
television has contributed to a wider awareness of the organization and of panic.
5.3.4.2 Creating new <7mopenings
For those interviewed, both within and outside of the ADAO, the most successful image
in conveying the severity of panic to those who have and have not experienced panic or
an anxiety condition is an image which has little to do with the legacy of imagenmg
panic. Alongside these images in the commercial the ADAO has also created images
that help to convey to those who may not have had anxiety or panic, what a panic attack
actually feels like. One of the most poignant allusions used by the ADAO, is the
portrayal of panic in the car stuck on the train tracks, with the person unable to get out
of the car and the train coming towards them. This is used in both the educational guide
and youth educational program. It conjures up images, which can be understood by a
broader public without first hand knowledge of panic, and be empathetically identified
with:
"Imagine yourself in a car that has just stopped directly over a train track. You
twist the key, on, off, on, off, but the car won't start. The more you try, the
more worried and frustrated you become. Suddenly you hear the distant sound of
a train whistle and at that moment you start to sweat and tour heart begins to
race. You pull on the door handle and its stuck. The sound of the train is getting
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louder. You're trapped and feeling completely out of control. The terror has
begun. You move over to the passenger seat and desperately try to push it open.
It won't budge! You jump into the back seat and continue to fight to get either
door open. By now you're as white as snow and desperately trying to catch your
breath. You don't know if you'll ever see your family again and you feel as
though this is it, you're going to die" (ADAO Educational Guide, 2000a:5)!
The ADAO suggests that this image is useful for those who have not experienced panic
and "have wondered how your family member, friend or colleague may feel when
experiencing a panic attack" (ADAO Educational Guide, 2000a:5). The experience
described is not a 'normal' experience in the sense that it is both unexpected and
traumatic, yet it is a 'normal' everyday experience for many with anxiety conditions. It
is an image that moves away from the space of the body and its visual presentation and
instead focuses on the construction of a sense of place, empathetically placing the self
within that physical and mental space. It is an image that suggests that the feelings of
having a panic attack can be felt by any 'body', that anyone can place themselves in the
car/train scenario an imagine the horrors of a panic attack. Here an entirely different
language of experience is created. By moving away from the space of the body the
ADAO constructs an image of panic that is not based in the legacy of the 'clinic',
removed from existing stereotypes of the mad, deviant or disordered body and the
dominant scopic regime of the clinic. The experience of panic is understood through the
ability to empathetically enter into an imagined geography rather than through the
creation of an imaginary geography of the body bound within mind/body dualisms and
prevailing stereotypes of mental illness and panic. This image of panic, allows the
ADAO to move beyond its dilemma of (in) visibility, and perhaps serves as a useful
model for the kinds of images that are useful in promoting awareness and education of
anxiety disorders.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter is structured by the tension between the hyper visibility of the body felt by
those with panic and the invisibility of this experience to others, resulting in a lack of
public discussion and awareness of panic and agoraphobia. This tension is developed
within the context of individual and organizational experiences. This chapter focuses on
how the legacy of the visual still remains as a means by which information about mental
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illness is conveyed, as well as, the struggles and repercussions of the imagening of
panic for individuals and the ADAO. The chapter offers examples of how that legacy
and the stereotypes that surround it can be reconfigured through the creation of a
different set of sympathetic or empathetic images and spaces that are not based on
existing imagemngs of mental illness or madness. In this way the ADAO helps to create
a new vocabulary of panic based much more in a geographical imagination than within
the primacy of the medical gaze.
In connection to the wider themes of this thesis this chapter explored an aspect of the
clinic and self care ethic that is necessary for its maintenance- the construction of a
body that is made intelligible through visual monitoring and the 'gaze'. This contributes
to the production of a body, and self, understood through continual self-surveillance and
regulation. In this respect visibility becomes a component of the spatial reproduction of
'madness' and 'disorder. These issues were explored through an analysis of how being
(in)visible is a central problem and topic for the ADAO, how this has contributed to the
organization's difficulties and the difficulties of much of its membership, both literally
and metaphorically.
This chapter has highlighted how the healthy citizen is constructed on the basis of a
particular type of body that 'appears' to be 'normal', where what is normal is both
culturally defined and historically specific. To be a healthy citizen involves self-scrutiny
of the body through constant monitoring of surveillance, subjecting the body the
processes and mechanisms of surveillance that make both what is inside and outside of
the body visible and readable. During these processes however, the body is often read
in isolation from the person's life experiences, beliefs, values and social relations, and
as such the body becomes objectified as an object of risk (Scott, 1999:134). The self
monitoring process becomes a means towards making the body intelligible to others and
to the self, but the healthy citizen is concerned primarily with maintaining an intelligible
body that conforms to a particular set of standards or ideals. Once one attains that ideal
or standard one becomes a healthy citizen. As Lupton argues the healthy citizen is
directed towards the "development of a certain kind of mind/body relationship: All are
directed at constructing and normalizing a certain kind of subject; a subject who is
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autonomous, directed at self-improvement, self regulated and desirous of self
knowledge" (Lupton, 1995:11 in Scott, 1999:138).
The experiences of anxiety disorders, such as panic and agoraphobia, form a 'body
politics' from which we can derive different notions of subjectivity and citizenship. The
experiences of anxiety disorders highlight how focusing on 'reading' and 'seeing' the
body, does not necessarily lead to a better understanding of the body, or health and well
being. In this way a 'body politics' should include experiences of the body as told or
described to others- narratives of health, disorder and illness. It is these "stories of
sickness" (Brody, 1988) that become the basis for understanding the body alongside
other techniques that involve testing, measurement and visual assessment of the body.
Within a model of health citizenship we move from the marked bodies of patients, of
sufferers, of the disordered, knowledge based on existing norms, and the reading of the
body by health care providers or by the self; to an embodied knowledge, that is
knowledge grounded in bodily experience in specific materialities (Dyck, 2001a: 418).
It is this knowledge that the ADAO needs to focus on through its programs, education
and awareness campaigns to create further public discourse that is inclusive of the lived
realities of anxiety conditions and thus foster the creation of a space for its membership
that is its own.
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Chapter Six - Mind: Governing panic
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter two, anxiety conditions, panic in particular, are generally
thought of and identified within the dominant discourse of clinical science as a mental
disorder (Wilkinson, 2001). In this way panic always has some explanation connected to
the 'mind'. By identifying anxiety conditions within the mind, persons with those
conditions are subject to the stigma of mental illness. By stigma I refer to the portrayal
of illness as a "one dimensional category of negative consequences and meanings"
where loss of self and dependence on others supplants a positive sense of self (Barnes
and Mercer, 1996:5 in Butler and Parr, 1999:5).
As developed in chapter five, 'body', the stigma of the mental is historically linked to
images and beliefs about madness that have been used to help define whom or what
behaviors can be considered normal, as well as, the kind of person or citizen we aspire
to become. People with panic and agoraphobia often discuss how the stigma of the
mental - the belief that an ailment is all in the mind and therefore not authentic- has a
direct affect on how those people come to understand their bodies, themselves and
others, as well as the places they live.
Mental health conditions are construed to undermine or even destroy the capacity of
sufferers to look after, or govern, themselves appropriately. This is one reason why
mental illness is so stigmatized. A consequence of the idea that those suffering from
mental illness are incapable of governing themselves means that authority tends to be
transferred to professional clinical experts. The privileging of clinical power and
knowledge often results in the devaluing of non-clinical forms of knowledge such as the
know-how of sufferers, identified as lay. This presents a self help organization for
people suffering from mental health 'disorders', such as the ADAO, with significant
dilemmas in terms of its ability to represent and address the concerns of its members.
This chapter examines how the stigmatization of anxiety conditions, in particular panic
and agoraphobia, impacts sufferers' identities and affects the ADAO's organizational
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development. The main analysis of this chapter is structured into four sections - from
section two to five:
Section 6.2 is concerned with a theoretical discussion of mental illness and governing
the self. The section begins with an analysis of the connections between the history of
madness that underpins the stigma of the mental and regimes of governmentality. The
section then focuses on a discussion of how processes of governmentality are implicated
within public mental health care practices to help produce a particular form of moral
selfhood or ethical subject. This process is described as a self care ethic.
Section 6.3 provides more details about how the stigma of the mental is embodied and
experienced by those with panic conditions. This discussion is expanded within the
section to help locate the geographies of fear in which that stigma is actualized and
experienced.
Section 6.4 explores how the ADAO has addressed the stigma of the mental by
becoming a more 'professional' and 'expert' oriented organization. This has meant that
the ADAO has increasingly adopted more clinical expertise into its structure, mandate
and programs at the expense of other forms of expertise.
Section 6.5 concludes the chapter on a different note from the rest of the chapter
material by examining how the ADAO attempts to reclaim its capacity for self-
authorization. This section is concerned with ways in which the ADAO resists forms of
authority and meanings of expertise associated with professional clinical experts.
The chapter is concerned with meanings of expertise and professional knowledge.
However, in this chapter the terms: 'professional', 'expert', 'clinical', and 'medical' are
often used interchangeably by interviewees, which can be problematic as it suggests
homogeneity of clinical practice that is inaccurate. Many clinicians would not claim to
have their knowledge practices based in, or validated by, 'science' or would want to be
lumped into one general category. However, the term clinical or clinician is used within
this chapter as a reflection of interviewees' discussions.
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6.2 Mental illness and self-government
6.2.1 Introduction
Historically madness and mental illness have been expressions of the human condition
and expressions of the state of a particular society. However as the meaning and place
of mental illness shifted from a social or public sphere to the private sphere of the
individual madness ceased to become a reflection of societal problems and became an
expression of lack of self-control, whereby the individual is in need of self-disciplinary
practices and governance through clinical institutions (Porter, 1998).
"In our later modernity, our personalities, our subjectivities, our relationships with
others, while considered private by most people are intensely governed, such that
even aspects of the self deemed intimate and individual such as thoughts and
feelings are socially organized and governed" (N Rose, 1992:1).
The shift in perceptions and the spaces of madness from society to self has meant that
mental illness is directly implicated in ideas regarding personality (Richards, 1996:80).
The stigma of the mental is a process by which meaning is ascribed to the body and
self. It is part of the process of bringing the sufferer back, or pushing the sufferer
further from, the boundary between normal and abnormal. It is part of the cultural
process by which that boundary is continually revised and the meaning of madness and
mental illness constantly reformulated. In this way madness has not only been used to
help define whom or what behaviors can be considered normal, but the kind of citizen-
subject to which we aspire.
If the citizen is marked by his rational mastery predicated on the centrality of his mind,
then an unstable mind, signaled by mental illness is by definition an unstable citizen and
unsuitable or unworthy person. Having a panic condition signals a character flaw in the
individual and that the individual's capacity for self-governance and autonomy is
undermined or diminished. Thus, forms ofmoral prescription and individual self-
management- governmentality, care/practices of the self and the ethical subject- become
more central to the development of the subject (Galvin, 2002). These three interconnected
ideas- governmentality, care/practices of the self, and the ethical self - help to further
explain the ways in which the stigmatization of mental illness have undermined sufferers
beliefs in their capacity for self governance. Each will be explained in within this section.
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6.2.2 Governmentality
The idea of governmentality originates with Foucault's work on the clinic. Understanding
what Foucault means by the clinic is important in the context of this chapter and the thesis
as a whole because the research is concerned with the relations between the ADAO and
the 'clinic' as the clinic is central to anxiety service provision. The clinic refers to the
dominant practices, discourses and knowledges (centered on the visual) that have helped
to construct the institutions and understanding ofmedicine, psychiatry and other 'psy'
disciplines as they are practiced today (Foucault, 1963, 1976). The clinic is linked to an
ideal of democratizing "a general medical consciousness, diffused in space and time, open
and mobile, linked to each individual existence, as well as to the collective life of the
nation" (Foucault, 1976:31 in Philo, 2000:16). The term clinic is also important, because
as Philo points out, Foucault's use of the clinic is not just about the practices ofwestern
medicine but about the spaces ofwestern clinical enterprise. As Foucault writes in the
preface of The Birth ofthe Clinic "this book is about space" (Foucault, 1976 in Philo,
2000). Thus the clinic involves exploring the actual spaces and places of clinical practice
as well as the subjects and processes of subjectivity involved within those geographies.
Governmentality, a term used by Foucault and later used by a wide variety of theorists,
can be explained as a kind of political technology in which practices and techniques align
political objectives with the self governing capabilities of those individuals (Rose,
1992:147 in Galvin, 2002:122). Foucault's work on governmentality began with an
exploration of the way in which expert knowledges are translated into "regimes of
practice" thus institutionalized and spatialised in concrete forms of power and
knowledge (Foucault, 1984). For Foucault governmentality is an explicitly spatial
process that is extended into the structures and geographies ofwestern culture (Philo,
1997). Governmentality involves a process in which space and place are interconnected to
the knowledge practices of the clinical institutions and organizations. The privileging of
expert, clinical forms of knowledge results in a spatial hierarchy that remains outside of
the critical purview of a wider public yet is able to extend its influence into the public
sphere (Foucault, 1975; 1977; 1980; 1984).
Governmentality incorporates an analysis of both the coercive and the non-coercive
strategies that the state and other institutions urge on individuals for the sake of their own
interests. It is a form ofpower that Foucault believes has dominated political and medical
127
power since the eighteenth century (Foucault, 1984; 1986a). The logic of governmentality
entails that 'the characteristic outcome ofpower isn't a relationship of domination but the
probability that the normalized subject will habitually obey (Johnson, 1993:142 in
Lupton, 1995:10) Experts and their expertise are central to governmentality because in
"modern societies power operates not so much through repression, violence, direct
coercion or blatant control as through the creation of expert knowledges about human
beings and societies, which serve to channel or constrain thinking and action" (Petersen
and Lupton, 1998:xii). It is through processes of governmentality that expert knowledge
is disseminated and internalized, producing particular versions of selfhood and the
material environments and structures that (re) produce those subjectivities and identities
(Foucault, 1984). Governmentality involves the construction of a subject through a web
of expert judgments around the body; shaping conduct not through compulsion but
through the power of truth and the potency of rationality and the alluring promises of
affectivity (Miller and Rose, 1993:93 in Lupton, 1995:10). Governmentality is a diffuse
array ofpower relations emerging from all areas of social life directed towards a plurality
of specific aims (Foucault, 1984:95). While the clinic is important as a part of the
structure of power relations, so too are the myriad of institutions, sites, social groups, and
interconnections at the local level, i.e. the ADAO, whose concerns and activities may
support, but often conflict with the imperatives of the clinic.
6.2.3 Practices of the self
In his later writings Foucault moved away from examining the external features of
governmentality, those formulated and disseminated by institutions and agencies, to the
autonomous modes of self government engaged in by the individual as part of everyday
life (Lupton, 1995:12). He moved away from the geographies of external clinical
structures to the relationship between those structures and the geographies and
spatialization of the self and the body. Power operates diffusely and directly through
investing bodies and populations with new capacities, especially the capacity for self-
government (Petersen, 1996). This calls upon the individual to manage their own risk,
using prescribed techniques and methods handed down through professional guidance,
what Foucault has described as a "technology of the self', "practice of the self' or "care
of the self' (Foucault, 1980 in Shaw, 2002). In Foucault's discussion of care however,
unlike the feminist discourses on care examined in chapter two, the care relation invoked
by Foucault is a subject/self one rather than a self/other relationship. By this I mean that
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in his work on practices of the self he reflected on the processes by which the practices of
the clinic and disciplinary power are internalized and embodied, seeking to explore the
manner in which dominant discourses may be taken up, negotiated or resisted by
individuals. Foucault became interested in the "ways in which individuals act on their
bodies in order to attain certain states of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or
immorality"(Foucault, 1988:18). For Foucault morality in particular is intimately
connected to practices of the self. He used the phrase 'ethical subject' to describe how
practices of the self are connected to emerging within moral action, and governing
oneself morally. The ethical subject is:
"A process in which the individual delimits that part of himself [sic] that will
form the object of his [sic] moral practice, defines his [sic] position relative to
the precept he [sic] will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will
serve as his [sic] moral worth"(Foucault, 1986b:109).
Emerging as an ethical subject requires understanding how various discourses assist us
to avoid bad habits, conquer fears, and unlearn the past for the purpose of self-
cultivation. However, Foucault was also interested in the possibilities that the ethical
subject, and care of the selfmore broadly, presented for the development ofmodes of
existence that broke with the normalizing tendencies in contemporary society, particularly
the endless examination of one's inner self which he saw as the dominant characteristic of
modern society (Petersen and Lupton, 1998:10). Therefore, Foucault's reflections on
practices of the self suggests that although individuals constitute themselves as subjects in
relation to external imperatives, there is a complex relationship between dominant norms,
individual behaviors and actions, leaving much room for playful engagement with those
norms and even resistance (Foucault, 1988:199).
6.2.4 The 'self-care' ethic
These aspects of the production of power: governmental ity, practices of the self and the
ethical subject have been extended into a system of clinical and public health
promotional practices, of which the ADAO is a part, described as the "new public
health" (Lupton, 1995; Petersen and Lupton, 1998). The new public health is based
upon what I describe as a 'self-care ethic'. The phrase refers to the tension between an
understanding of health 'care' as that which is provided for us by others, and as that
which we are responsible for. This self-care ethic is central to the creation of the healthy
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citizen and provides a means of understanding the social and political roles ofpublic
health and health promotional discourses and practices (Petersen and Lupton, 1998). As
Lupton and Petersen describe the term public health includes within it an assumption that
members of the public are citizens, or will become citizens through the exercise of health.
This healthy citizen, as s/he is represented in public health discourses emphasizes both the
rights and the obligations of individuals to take up and conform to the imperatives of
expert public knowledges (Petersen and Lupton, 1998:61).
The self-care ethic highlights how practices of health are imbricated in an individual's
sense of citizenship because citizenship is embodied. As Foucault notes relations of
'power' in health care practices do not exist independently of the body, and are not
external to the self: "nothing is more material, physical and corporeal than the exercise of
power" (Foucault, 1980:57-8). Subjectivity, and processes of subjectivity are constructed
through and by the articulation ofpower as 'one of the prime effects of power is that
certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified
and constituted as individuals" and healthy citizens (Foucault, 1989b:98 in Lupton,
1995:7). This is identified by Foucault as "biopower", or the ways in which power
relations work in and through the human body (Foucault, 1991). This is exercised through
interpersonal relations in the clinical encounter and through disciplinary power of the
body politic (Lupton, 1995:6).
With the growing emphasis on health as a personal strategy of self-care and resource for
self-development, the pursuit of good health is considered both an obligation and a right
of the healthy citizen (Petersen and Lupton, 1998:64). Good health is required for people
to become healthy citizens because ill health removes individuals from the workforce and
other responsibilities and places an economic (or social) burden on others. In
contemporary health care systems the right to health involves taking on personal
responsibilities for one's health by accepting that there is an imperative, ethic or duty to
stay well (Petersen and Lupton, 1998:65). Individuals can express their ethical selves and
fulfill their responsibilities as good citizens by managing their relationship to health risks
(Lupton, 1999).
What differentiates the new public health from older health care systems is how the
subject aligns personal satisfaction with the public good (Petersen and Lupton, 1998:70).
The individual needs to consider what one can do to protect his/her own health and the
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health of others (Petersen and Lupton, 1998:ix). However this consideration for others is
structured by the imperatives of the clinic created through expert discourse and
professional knowledge. The institution of public health, and a self care ethic that
accompanies it, has served as a network ofexpert advice that have strongly coercive
elements that set out to shape and normalize human behaviors in ways that are often not
recognized as coercive because they appeal to widely accepted norms and practices
(Turner, 1987; 1994). Within public health discourses individuals are obliged to take up
and conform to the imperatives of expert public knowledges. (Petersen and Lupton,
1998:61) Personal choice is choice in as much as the options available are aligned with
the objectives of the clinic and other social authorities and institutions (Miller and Rose,
1993 in Petersen and Lupton, 1998:63).
Health professionals within the new public health are less likely than they once were to
directly intervene in people's lives in top-down efforts, instead they seek to assist subjects
to develop their own capacities through detailed work on the self (Petersen, 1996:164).
Thus, expert advise can be viewed as a process of consumption in which the individual is
directed by expert power/knowledge to re-create themselves in ways guided and bounded
by the professional (Kangas, 2001; 2002; Shaw, 2002). Individuals are supposed to
continually interrogate themselves in the quest for self-improvement. Here, subjectivity is
created through techniques of governmental self formation that are affected by external
authorities and agencies and by practices of ethical self formation where individuals come
to know themselves and give meanings to their experiences (Foucault, 1984).
Hence the creation ofpublic health communities and groups that address public health
concerns are central to the maintenance of the healthy citizen. These groups have the
ability to highlight the connections between individual and group health issues. They also
help mediate relations of clinical power, adopting wider clinical beliefs within a language
and structure of lay knowledges. These groups can act both as mediums for forms of
governmentality, or alternatively, and often simultaneously as forms of resistance to
governmental structures and practices. This chapter highlights how the ADAO adopts
forms of the new public health and self care ethic as it aspires to be viewed as an
organization with the professional credibility to affect and direct change in people's lives,
such that those people feel that they are the one's creating the change. Yet, additionally
the chapter also offers ways in which the ADAO resists forms of, and particular
discourses on, governmentality.
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6.3 The stigma of panic
The stigma of the mental, the belief that an ailment is "all in the mind", (Davidson, 2003)
has become a marker ofwestern culture, behavioral norms and geographies of fear and
disorder. The stigmatization ofmental illness comes to affect how people understand
themselves, others around them, and the worlds in which they live. It is a stigma of
associated with the spaces of institutionalization marked by the presence of the mad or
mentally ill. These landscapes are imagined to be places of deviance to be avoided, feared
and isolated (Gleeson and Kearns, 2001; Philo, 1997; Tuan, 1978). Drawing on material
from chapter five 'body', the stigma of the mental is also associated with images of
madness, what some interviewees described as the "mental health look". Thus the stigma
of the mental affects processes of identity and subjectivity focusing on the body and self
as an imagined geography. The mental health look is associated with persons who are
'out of place' within the public sphere and are therefore discouraged to enter or are
excluded from public spaces unless properly controlled, disciplined or surveyed.
"Imagine a panicky person is always panicking can't do anything, not functional,
looks funny, looks crazy, going nuts" (Hannah).
"Representations of people losing it, totally, of going ballistic and picking up
guns and hurting people or smashing things" (Beth).
"Images of the stereotyped schizophrenic who talks to him/herself and has
violent outbursts... images of the "homeless, alcoholic, heavily medicated"
(Olivia).
Anxiety disorders, in particular panic and agoraphobia are intimately connected to
feelings that one is going crazy, losing one's mind, otherness, abnormality, is a sign of
personal weakness, or lack of self control associated with madness and mental illness
(Bankey, 2001). Interviewees' discussion of panic as a mental condition was couched in
a language of embarrassment, negativity, shame and otherness.
"People have fearful assumptions about different emotional and mental
conditions and that, you know, if you have a quote unquote disorder, a mental
disorder, then you're you know, you're crazy and you should be hospitalized,
and you're non functioning and all of that kind of stuff, that even people that
don't suffer from anxiety fear" (Brittany).
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These views on mental illness are complicated, first, by the way in which mental health
issues are often reduced to individual character flaws:
"I think before panic was, its all in our head, something is wrong with you. If
it's something like cancer or MS or a broken leg, oh you poor thing. But, if it's
something mental then they automatically assume that there is something wrong
with you" (Samantha).
And, second, because of a disbelief of the seriousness or legitimacy of an ailment:
"There are probably a lot of people out there who feel just shake it off, and move
on. Um, whether it's family members, friends, just people in the community, um,
employers, um, there's nothing to be scared of, there's no reason for you to panic,
shake it off and let's go" (Elizabeth).
The belief that panic is a sign of personal weakness, something that one can just "get
over" produces a sense of shame that results in a lack of communication about their
experiences to others:
"In our society mental health issues have not been regarded as politically and
historically important. It has always been well it's in your mind, don't worry
about it, well you will get over it. It's something that in order to feel comfortable
and not be shamed about, it, then you have to say I am not telling anybody and
this is the way that I am comfortable... or you have to say I am going to avoid
everybody and this is how I am comfortable" (Amy).
The stigma ofhaving a mental 'disorder' also contributes to processes of alienation that
lead to the development of agoraphobic avoidance behaviors:
"You question your own sanity. Uh, you know you're trying to think, well,
what is really wrong with me, and I think the whole fear factor and the isolation
can leave you feeling very lonely and you know, withdrawn from the outside
world, metaphorically and literally" (Madison).
The stigma of the mental involves fears that others will judge the panic sufferer to be
crazy, abnormal or deviant, which is why persons with panic attempt to avoid the places
in which they may have a panic attack, or be seen in a state of panic. These avoidance
behaviors perpetuate a cycle of fear, shame, otherness, and dependency that often creates
more problems for the individual. The restricted spatial mobility of those who are
agoraphobic means that many of those individuals cannot do the daily activities they used
to. Not only is there shame around being thought of as crazy, but interviewees described
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the embarrassment agoraphobics feel about needing help from others and not being able
to act normally, that is, independently.
"There is a lot of shame around just the things that they can't do, right? Which
they perceive as very problematic because they are the things that everybody
can, everybody else can do... the social norms that everybody is involved in"
(Amanda).
In summation, the stigmatization of mental illness causes many people with panic,
including those interviewed, to feel that they cannot trust themselves, their bodies or
their judgment. As a result those individuals tend to believe they cannot help themselves
and need to get expert or professional help. As the tendency of clinical institutions is to
value certainty over reflexivity (Beck, 1998) there is a belief amongst the public and
patients that the authoritative advice given within institutions by experts is more
trustworthy and dependable than their own (Philo, 1997:75). These institutions offer
sufferers advice, direction and explanation in an authoritative expert manner, which helps
to reassure the sufferer who is wary of his or her sense of self. The demystification of
mental illness offered by governmental forms of clinical practice is grounded in scientific
rationale and the importance of evidence and classification that involves a preoccupation
with diagnosis, sorting and labeling (Philo, 1997:71). Professional institutions and the
role of experts are characterized by an absence of self-criticism and constructed
certitude, in contrast to the experience of a panic sufferer who is plagued with self-
doubt and self-criticism (Beck, 1992). Clinical institutions and experts are an expression
and image of the modernist belief in the power of science and expertise to solve
problems, reinforce professional dominance and facilitate the search for technical-rational
solutions to complex problems (Petersen, 1996:157). In this way we can understand how
an individual struggling with their sense of self and bodily reactions, as well as, a group
trying to gain credibility within a larger system that values scientific facts would move
towards institutions that claim certainty over reflexivity and move towards the
professional away from a personal 'lay' perspective.
6.4 Expertise and the 'professional'
6.4.1 Introduction
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The stigmatization of mental illness not only affects sufferers' perceptions of
themselves, but the ability of sufferer-led organizations to gain credibility and
acceptance within a public health care system. Because the wider public tends to view
institutions of the clinic as the sites of primary health care many members of the ADAO
want to share in the authority of clinical institutions that adopt hegemonic forms of care
and clinical knowledge (Busfield, 2000). However, in doing so the ADAO devalues of
forms of care that privilege non-expert experiences and knowledges that have historically
been central in defining the ADAO's 'community' and its vision.
Within the landscape of anxiety service provision in Ottawa there are those, within and
outside of the ADAO, who do not think that clinical and non-clinical spaces should meet
or overlap one another, while there are some who would prefer that those spaces overlap.
"I've also picked up in the wind that there is a power struggle between the
medical profession and the ADAO in a sense of uh, you shouldn't be doing this,
because this is I don't know, we've classified the problem, so you can't touch it
because you don't know what to do with it" (Chris).
More often it is institutional and bio-medical service providers who believe that there
should be a clear division been the clinical and the non clinical, and within the clinical its
own subdivisions. There are also members of the ADAO who want non-clinical practices
to remain separate from the politics and problems they observe within the clinical health
care system in Ottawa. Yet, most interviewees discussed the importance of networking
with other service providers, expanding the range of services, both clinical and non¬
clinical, that the ADAO could offer in order for the ADAO to be seen as legitimate and
important within the city and beyond. For many interviewees it is important that the
ADAO establish itself within a network of service providers in order to disseminate
information about anxiety conditions, create effective awareness campaigns, and
provide programs for those who are affected by anxiety conditions. Thus, members of
the ADAO were concerned to enter into a network of formal clinical landscapes of health
care and overlap their functions and spaces with those of the 'clinic'.
It is easier for the ADAO to network within a public health care system in which
clinical structures are dominant if an organization incorporates forms of
'professionalism', associated with spaces of expertise and clinical knowledge practices,
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into their structure and programming. It is important that the ADAO network with other
service providers within the city because government funding for mental health care
requires that clinical/professional organizations and institutions partner with non-expert
initiatives located within the 'community'. Community, grassroots or non-clinical
organizations cannot apply for government funding unless they are affiliated with an
existing government funded program (Canadian mental health association), professional
(university researcher, psychiatrist) or health care institution. This has meant that the
sharing of knowledges within the mental health sector has become a requirement, but the
extent to which knowledges are shared and what kinds of knowledges are produced as a
result of this process helps us to see the dominance of expertise and clinical approaches in
the Ottawa area.
6.4.2 The power of professionalism
According to many interviewees one of the struggles the ADAO faces in attracting
attention, and getting its message out, lies in its status as a professional group. Being
seen as professional is connected to an organizations ability to raise awareness, attract
the public's attention and gain the trust of both a wider public and other service
providers.
"I think they [the public] feel more confident if the individuals are professionals
and that's just the way society is, and I think it depends on the character type of
the person phoning, some people need that authority figure" (Ashley).
Professionalism is associated with greater legitimacy of purpose, more credibility within
the wider community, financial accountability, and a more organized hierarchal
'business-like' structure. While the ADAO feels that it needs to become a more
professional organization many within and outside of the ADAO already felt that the
ADAO is a professional organization. Board members described how in terms of
financial accountability, and the ability to balance their books the ADAO is a
professional organization. Board and staff members also described how conduct
between ADAO members, and between staff and the public is also professional. In
terms of public perception, many outside of the ADAO assume that the ADAO is a
professional clinically run group staffed by experts because the ADAO has the
appearance and the "trappings of an established larger professional organization"
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(Beth). The ADAO is in the phone book, it has a toll free number, newsletters,
booklets, website, charitable and corporate status, and the ADAO runs publicized
activities such as bingos and golf tournaments. Additionally according to many health
professionals the ADAO is both a professional and credible organization:
"I just can't believe how that group has developed into such an astoundingly
significant organization in town, I mean it is just remarkable what has been done
by that group, I get goose bumps actually" (Kelly).
This interviewee attributes the ADAO's success to the hard work, comprehensiveness
and drive of members of the ADAO, however she does focus on the influence those
clinicians and other service providers have had on the ADAO's organizational growth:
"People like Dr. Dave Erickson were very instrumental in fostering the
development and fostering the recognition and acceptance of this being a very
credible organization, we (CMHA) still do a lot of mail outs if we can for the
group to promote the credibility as well of the group, because I think we have a
fairly good reputation as well in town" (Kelly).
In this way it is through its association with, and recognition by, other professional
service providers that the ADAO is seen to be professional. The ADAO's position
within the city is seen to be both a product of its own skill and enthusiasm and its
networking with 'professional' practitioners and services within the city. This helps to
contribute to the organizations 'anxiety' about its professional status. For the members
of the ADAO the creation of a space in which the ADAO is recognized as professional
for its own independent achievements is instrumental for its growth as a service
provider.
6.4.3 Including professionals
The ADAO has tried to become more 'professional' in its appearance and in practice in
a number of ways. First, the ADAO has included more 'professionals' who have
clinical training and post secondary education as staff and on the board of directors.
"We started hiring only people with higher education...people didn't have to have
anxiety anymore but they had to have a master's degree pretty much to get in our door"
(Beth). Additionally including more professionals to the mixture of knowledges at the
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ADAO enhances the range and diversity of approaches to anxiety conditions that is
central to the holistic mandate of the organization:
"We want, we need more professionals, we need to bring in advisors, because
we need that, you need the sort of getting help from all available aspects, not
only physicians, it could be a psychologists, it could be a talking to a counselor,
to someone who has had the disorder and it could be a homeopathic approach,
and ours is an organization that welcomes all of these methods, whatever works
for the individual, you don't only go one route"(Ashley).
6.4.3.1 Places of professionalism
Second, the ADAO moved its office from the executive director's home to a separate
building that houses non-profit organizations. The site of the ADAO was a point of
controversy for various members of the ADAO. For some, the original office, located
in the executive director's apartment was a "refreshing change from board rooms",
"separate from a cold business formality"(Hannah). Thus the office was more
informal, comfortable, intimate, enhancing a sense that the ADAO is a "grounded
organization"(Emma). Board and staff members "felt at home" in the space and were
thus more inclined to ask questions, give input and participate (Emily). For others the
ADAO's original office was inconvenient, uncomfortable, without a proper board table.
The space was also perceived as "unprofessional" for holding large meetings or
greeting the public, which meant that the ADAO could not have a public space or face
(Michelle).
When funds were available, the ADAO moved its headquarters to the Bronson Centre; a
building that provided reduced rent for non-profit groups. As one interviewee stated the
move "looked good on the business cards and books", but for those who worked in the
space, its characteristics were highly problematic (Olivia). The rooms were still small,
and the office area: "too small to effectively work in, because it's always getting
cluttered" (Samantha). The echo and noise pollution in the room made the space seem
"cold and uninviting "(Sarah). Ultimately the ADAO could not afford to keep the new
office and the ADAO moved back to its original headquarters. The move back, for
many interviewees, did not detract from its professionalism because the space, "very
pleasant, very warm, is at the same time very professional and organized"(Madison). In
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this way interviewees discussed how it is not the physical space that matters for a
professional organization, but how that space is created into a place, and its sense of
place:
"Having it at Cheryl's place doesn't have to be a problem, I mean you can still
be very professional no matter where you are...it can give the sense of an unfair
advantage because it's not neutral ground. But it doesn't have to. For myself, I
have no problem being who I am wherever I am at this point. That's because
I'm bold. For some, it may be intimidating. Because you're comfortable, you're
sitting on a chesterfield. It's different from sitting around an office sitting on
uncomfortable chairs. It can be...the tendency is toward a non-business focus,
but the meetings are organized and run well most times "(Emily).
6.4.3.2 Labeling the organization
Third, the ADAO changed its name from the agoraphobia and peer volunteer
association to the anxiety disorders association of Ontario in order to appear to be a
more professional clinical organization. The current name suggests that organization
operates within a wider geographic range and uses the clinical nomenclature of anxiety
"disorders" to imply that the organization is connected to the wider professional health
care community.
"The APVA didn't give us clout in the community nobody wanted to hear that
the clinicians or the community, they wanted to hear the big words, so we
decided that when we got charitable status that it would be time to change the
name... the ADAO works for us it gives us a lot more attention, it's a lot more
prestigious within the community. I think that while the medical terminology is
the number one influence it has to stay this way, but I can guarantee you as we
grow we will change it"(Cheryl).
6.4.3.3 Clinical language practices
Fourth, the use of clinical terminology and language has increased in members'
vocabulary and within ADAO writings. Through the use of clinical language practices
the ADAO are implicating themselves in processes of professional authority and
maintaining power:
"There is power implicit in using language of pathology...I see a person in all
their various richness as a person, not as a label of science through the language
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of pathology... but sometimes I think, this is an "anxiety disorder" and that can
be a short cut way of helping them [ADAO and individuals] identify some of the
struggles that individuals have and connecting to the wider medical culture"
(Jessica).
According to clinicians interviewed it is important that the ADAO adopt forms of expert
power/knowledge and maintain its use of clinical terminology. This is because clinical
language is associated with effective communication and identification in health service
provision:
"Professionally within the metal health social services field you have got to have
terminology to be able to talk to a person, and to explain to them you are not
able to do what you want to do, having identifiable labels is a factor for getting
them to see the psychiatrists" (Kelly).
Over the years of interviewing ADAO members (since 1997) it has become apparent
that clinical terms and language have become more naturalized and unproblematised in
taking about anxiety, panic and agoraphobia. Clinical terms are evident in the
newsletters, anxiety workbook and in the development of a children and youth education
program that is explicitly cognitive behavioral. The process of clinical labeling and use
of cognitive behavioral (CBT) language is a sign of the eroding boundaries of the
ADAO, due to its networking and partnerships with clinical service providers. It is also
an example of the ADAO's desire to privilege expert professional and academic
practices. By using CBT the ADAO has further informed some of their initial
approaches to anxiety conditions. Yet additionally, in using psychological discourses,
such as cognitive behavioral therapy, the ADAO is making a gesture of concession to a
clinical audience. It is a kind of exchange in which the ADAO agrees to use and accept
clinical understandings in order to secure for itself a safer place in which it can continue
to develop and express its own unique ideas.
However, the ADAO does not adopt all dominant clinical discourses in the same
manner. Biomedical or pharmaceutical treatments are approached with much more
caution, and at times contested creating divisions between communities within the city.
"Well I know that we had problems with the Royal Ottawa, we invited them, we
invited one of the great researchers over there to be a masters of ceremony,
speaker, the honoured guest. He declined, because we don't represent what he
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wants basically, we don't think. We need the pill and that's what he is studying,
how to create more pills what pills do you need he was working on some part of
the brain" (Beth).
The lack of receptiveness to biomedical approaches is a reflection of the kinds of
networks the ADAO has developed, the personal experiences of those at the ADAO,
and the responsiveness of various organizations and institutions to the ADAO's interest
in collaboration. Not fully adopting biomedicine is an example of resistance to (and
resentment of) various forms of knowledge and power.
6.5 Reclaiming the capacity for (self) authorization
6.5.1 Introduction
In Foucault's description of governmenality clinical power structures and expert
knowledges of the clinic are normative and dominant while non-expert discourses are
largely subsumed or resisted. But processes of governmentality also provide examples
of how clinical discourses and forms of power/knowledge are incorporated and resisted
in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. In this way I argue that the ADAO is
not forcibly dependent on expert knowledge; there are resistances and differences to
expert/clinical knowledges in forms that can often be quite subtle (Kangas, 2002:303).
The ADAO is not a passive recipient of expert knowledge, nor is the process by which
the ADAO has taken on expert knowledge a simple, easy or straightforward one. It has
at times been a very uncomfortable process that has been fraught with argument and
complication.
For some, within and outside of the ADAO, adopting expert discourse is a sign of
growth and is well received, resulting in increased clientele and networks of other
'professional experts. For others, within and outside of the ADAO, capitulating to
expertise has been an invasion of territory. The adoption of expert knowledges has
resulted in a variety of criticisms amongst differently positioned interviewees. First, the
ADAO is making claims to areas to which it does not belong and knowledges that it
does not have. Second, clinical experts are taking over spaces within the ADAO that
should be more clearly defined in opposition to professional clinical practices, as an
alternative space of healing. Third, letting go of earlier holistic ideas in favor of more
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clinical opinions and approaches to anxiety conditions does not guarantee recognition by
dominant clinical service providers and experts because according to many clinical care
service providers: "no matter what 'knowledges' are adopted the ADAO will always be
characterized as a 'self-help' and thus lesser form of service"(Jacques).
There is considerable resistance amongst those interviewed within the ADAO to its
incorporation within the clinic. Many interviewees were fearful that this would "dilute
the community" (Alexis), that it signals the end for the organization, that it goes against
some of the original and motivating visions of the organization, and that many of the
voices and stories within the organization would be silenced.
"Well I hope it doesn't, um, become and us and them um, but at the same time,
I think the ADAO should protect itself so that it doesn't lose its own authority to
do its business the way it wants to do it. If it wants to include aspects in its
therapeutic approach that the medical professional thinks is right...but, I don't
think it, it should put itself in a position where it's not allowed to be
experimental" (Chris).
In this section I provide examples of how the ADAO resists or modifies forms of
clinical knowledge in order to foster spaces where difference is possible rather than
replicating spaces and services that already exist.
6.5.2 Transforming clinical language
While the adoption of CBT is an example of the ADAO's desire to privilege expert
professional and academic practices, the ADAO has developed CBT protocol in ways
that are different from psychological practices, for example placing an emphasis on
nutrition which is not included in most clinical writings, and by resisting the use of
certain labels. Clinical language is seen to be part of a patient-clinician hierarchy that
helps to perpetuate unequal power relations in which the clinician is seen to be the one in
the powerful position. These language practices involve processes of identification and
labeling which are often stigmatizing. Thus within the ADAO it is important to "not be
locked into a label mentality" (Chris) and actively use language to disrupt conventions of
mental health writings.
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"ADAO has chosen to use inclusive, supportive and meaningful language when
referring to what are usually called anxiety disorders. Therefore throughout our
booklet (workbook) we use the words "condition" and "persistent" to replace
the current recognized medical terminology "Disorder". Because "With labels
such as "Disorder" we separate ourselves from the people who need us most and
whom we also need. We unconsciously create barriers to real support, add to
personal embarrassment and shame, and foster discrimination and isolation... in
time our associations name will change to reflect this commitment" (ADAO
Educational Guide, 2001a: 1).
According to interviewees it is also important for the ADAO to contest clinical language
because it is an expression of the rigidity of clinical power structures, rather than
flexibility or diversity of thought:
"Doctors suggest or prescribe medication, the ADAO does not necessarily preach
that, each individual has their own choice, so therefore they provide options and
alternative methods and they let the individual choose, a doctor might not
necessarily provide the alternatives, so that is there way ofpracticing, but in our
society doctors are brought up prescribe something rather than offer an alternative
because they might not necessarily be aware of the alternatives or it contradicts
their way of being educated themselves" (Amy).
6.5.3 Challenging professionalism
While in section four I noted that some interviewees' discussions of 'professionalism'
challenge traditional definitions of the professional associated with business and clinical
practices and structures. For those interviewees what makes an organization
professional involves a different, yet connected, set of criteria such as: a diffuse or lack
of hierarchy, characterized by a lack of a traditional paternalism; the centrality of care
and support structures; the ability to network; openness to ideas and willingness to share
knowledges; and the ability to carry through with projects and provide accessible and
useful services. What many interviewees saw as most professional about the ADAO was
its commitment to its membership and inclusiveness of a diverse range of ideas and
individuals.
"The ADAO is not like a lot of other groups or organizations and health
institutions...I think the people in the ADAO are very much focused on trying to
help people, its not the least bit bureaucratic, every one is approachable in the
organization and I think that is very uncommon, that makes a big difference, in
terms of making it feel like a community to, you know, there is just no bull, it's
just I don't know how to describe it but like for instance in other health
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organizations there is always people around that don't focus on the people they
are trying to service"(Hannah).
6.5.4 Reframing expertise
The most prevalent expression of resistance to the pressure to becoming more clinical
was a rejection of the association between clinician and expert/professional.
Interviewees discussed how the meaning of expertise needs to be reframed in terms of
the first hand expertise and knowledge of anxiety conditions. Thus marginalized forms
of care need to be thought as a kind of expertise and knowledge, which is central to
organizational development (Gleeson and Kearns, 2001, Wilson, 2002). In this way
sufferers are involved in a process of reclaiming authority over their own experiences in
an attempt to challenge or resist forms of clinical expertise or to share in that authority
(Hawkins, 1993; Frank, 1995; Couser, 1997). By transforming the identification of
expertise with people who are not situated in positions of authority, interviewees increase
the authority they have over their own lives. Through a recognition of the importance of
sufferers' experiences the ADAO does not fully accept a dominant version of expert as
detached professional and has reframed expertise in terms of people who have first hand
knowledges of anxiety conditions, and people who can empathize and care for others.
Redefining who has 'knowledge' and who is the expert is a result of rethinking whose
experiences should be counted and listened to, as well as a revaluing of care. In this way
forms of care become a type of expertise and valued knowledge.
The discussion of lay expertise is connected to the question of whether or not
volunteers, staff, and board members need to have experienced some form of anxiety
condition. It is also connected to the fourteen-week program where the issue of who can
provide 'therapy' and the efficacy of clinical knowledges such as CBT in the hands of a
trained professional in comparison to a 'lay' program instructor has been debated. Many
clinicians outside of the ADAO have rejected the ADAO's fourteen-week program as
ineffective because for them without professional guidance CBT programs are not as
effectively managed. One interviewee who works for the ROH's Anxiety Disorder unit
outlines many of the key themes expressed by those outside of the ADAO:
"I think it's fantastic to have that kind of a program [Fourteen-week program], I
think it would be important that when they have people in their program, they
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were able to identify folks who needed a different kind of expertise. So for
example, you can have panic disorder, and you can go out and buy yourself the
anxiety and phobia workbook...and you can read all the stuff, and you can
implement it, and you can do your own exposure, and there are going to be
some folks who can do that. There's another group of folks who really need to
be in touch with like-minded people, and that's more the AA style community
support. Where they can get education, they can talk about their struggle...And I
don't see that as less than the kind of treatment we offer here. I see it as
different. The issue becomes when does using cognitive behavioral therapy
principles become treatment that should be based in a health care facility or
where the group leaders are health care providers. The jury is out on that
one...because there are some folks in the medical community who would be
concerned that a self-help group is treading into a treatment area. When you
start to do cognitive behavior therapy, um, it's like any other sort of, um,
psychiatric tool. You can use CBT principles in your day to day life, and all the
self help books are full of it, but CBT in the hands of a skilled practitioner, the
tool will be used in a different way. It's like listening, you can talk to a friend
about something, or you can talk to somebody who's an interpersonal
psychology person. The intensity and the, willingness to take risks and the skill
to be able to dig yourself out of a hole are maybe different" (Stephanie).
Within the ADAO program instructors without clinical backgrounds identify their first
hand knowledge of anxiety disorders as central to their expertise and as what is
important in instructing the course. Program instructors with clinical backgrounds feel
that while first hand experience is useful, good training and a technical understanding of
anxiety disorders is just as important if not more important. Though most interviewees
who had some experience of panic felt that the ADAO should have volunteers,
workshop facilitators and board members who are sufferers themselves, some
highlighted that what was really important was to be understanding and empathetic. In
this way the 'layness' of knowledge is connected more to the quality of care then
similarity or particularity of experience. This echoes what Joan Tronto describes as a
care ethic, where care is not associated with particular persons but where care is a
practice that is reliant upon a political commitment to value care and practices of care,
especially forms of care that have been historically devalued i.e. lay expertise (Tronto,
1993; 1996). A care ethic is grounded within a politics of difference and the importance
of interdependence. Thus in accepting difference one's own sense of self is viewed as
positive rather than as a threat to social stability (Mackay, 2001:153).
6.6 Conclusion
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This chapter focused on a number of issues. First, the chapter explored how processes of
governing the self are implicated within the history ofmental health. Second, the chapter
examined the effects that the stigmatization of'mental disorders' has had on persons with
anxiety conditions, notably panic and agoraphobia. Third, I discussed how the ADAO is
structured in relation to expert knowledge and how it has consciously and unconsciously
adopted, and sometimes resisted, professional clinical discourses into its organizational
structure, language practices and mandate. The ADAO is an example of how
governmentality, care/practices of the self and the ethical self are malleable processes
involving both capitulation and resistance.
As mentioned in chapter four, one of the aims of the ADAO is to demystify the
stereotypes and misperceptions about anxiety disorders perpetuated through the stigma of
mental illness. The ADAO feels it can best disseminate its information and create
awareness campaigns if it is seen to be an organization that is professional. However, the
ADAO's focus on being professional involves adopting forms ofgovernmentality, i.e.
expert clinical knowledges, that result in devaluing of forms of care that privilege non¬
expert experiences and knowledges that have historically been central in defining the
ADAO's 'community'. This also results in replicating the model of the healthy citizen as
causes, processes and symptoms ofmental illness are given meaning by clinical practices
in ways that reinforce the division between what is and is not normal, and thus reinforce
the separation between the disordered sufferer and normal productive person.
Clinical expertise and knowledge dissemination is focused on getting the person back to a
state of active and productive 'normalcy'. While this is centrally important for persons
with anxiety conditions, the process of bringing the sufferer into a state of normalcy is
more concerned with outcomes and end products rather than daily-lived experiences of
between being healthy or ill. Thus the message is you can get better, you can live a
normal life again, and where what is normal is an absence of panic or anxiety. This
message does not allow for those who do not get better, nor for an account of the time in-
between being well and unwell. Nor does it recognize anxiety conditions as part of a
continuum, as discussed in chapter two, that affect those who are 'healthy' and
'unhealthy'. The message is not, these are the conditions and barriers experienced by
those with panic, how can these dilemmas and problems be directly addressed? Clinical
expert knowledge directs us on how to be well where becoming healthy involves a
process of following and adopting experts.
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In this way this chapter discusses another central issue pertinent to the creation of the
clinic, self care ethic and normative concepts of the healthy citizen- the function of expert
knowledge, professional discourses and the reliance on that expertise. The metaphor of
'mind' in relation to this issue addresses dilemmas generated by the meanings, stigma and
'object' (Foucault, 1967) of'mental' illness through the knowledge production of the
clinic, and discourses within the ADAO. In this chapter I have further explored processes
of governmentality and the power exercised by expert knowledges that help to shape and
delimit our identities, subjectivities and communities. Governmental ity is connected to
the normalization of experience and the creation of categories of deviance and disorder
linked to the stigma of the mental, of being "all in the mind" (Davidson, 2002).
The chapter is reflective of an ongoing tension within the organization and amongst
interviewees, discussed throughout the thesis, about the balance between networking with
other, larger and more dominant clinical organizations, and maintaining its own vision.
This tension or balance is about the potential for creating alternatives spaces, or spaces of
difference, that do not duplicate but supplement or allow for different voices and
knowledges from those spaces created within institutions, clinical practices or the formal
third sector, what I have described as part of the process of health citizenship. By drawing
on state-like qualities of the more dominant clinical institutions populated by experts and
professionals the ADAO can better accommodate the demand for services that
accompany increased needs. But, by drawing on grassroots origins, volunteer
organizations like the ADAO can better identify with the needs that those institutions
within the clinic and state failed to identify, or had not even considered (Brown,
1997:117). For some, the ADAO's incorporation of clinical knowledges is a sign of
being taken over and subjugated by dominant power structures. But, by adopting those
dominant clinical discourses the ADAO is able to network with more organizations and
the potential for knowledge sharing amongst those organizations, through the creation of
spaces and relationship of trust and friendship, is advanced. This process of sharing
knowledges, explored in a different way in chapter three, has transformative potential
for both the ADAO as well as expert organizations themselves: both become more
receptive to the possibilities of the other. Therein lies a central tension for the
organization.
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The following two chapters do not address this tension directly rather they restructure the
question of creating spaces in which knowledge sharing is central. Chapters seven,
'heart', and eight, 'breath', move away from discourses within 'the clinic', discourses
central to this chapter and the previous chapter 'body' towards discourses that are
structured in relation, in opposition, or as a form of resistance to those discourses. In so
doing the possibility of fostering health citizenship is enhanced. The following chapters
focus more on the possibilities of subverting and transforming the bodies and expert
knowledges that sustain certain clinical discourses and practices. In this way chapters
seven 'heart' and eight 'breath' explore in more detail how the ADAO has created a space
for itself conducive to sharing knowledges, its own sense of place, identity and
community within the broader local and national context.
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Chapter Seven - Heart: Connecting the self
"Our unique character comes from our commitment to showing compassion and
concern for individuals who have been ignored at the biopsychosocial realm. At
present in Canada and in Ottawa specifically, there is a lot of focus given to
treating the anxiety disease, but not the illness. Researchers have spent a lot of
time and money trying to figure out what causes panic disorder, obsessive
compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder etc. are and as a result have
developed numerous medications and therapies to support treating the disease.
Unfortunately very little focus has been paid to the individual him/herself who has
to go home each night after therapy and suffer, perhaps alone or with frustrated
family and friends who are at the ends of their own ropes. We were established to
provide the additional support the individual needs to treat their illness... the way
the disease assists in the manifestation of physical, spiritual, mental and emotional
needs becomes the illness... for so long, people with agoraphobia and panic have
been left without the additional support to treat their illness. Where are they to
turn when nobody understands their conditions? By providing continual
encouragement and helping to motivate the individual with panic and agoraphobia
we are helping them raise their spirits, work with their emotions, think more
clearly and become active again" (APVA, 1998a:36-37).
7.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters, 'body' and 'mind', focused on ways in which models of the
healthy citizen are incorporated and adapted by the ADAO and its membership. This
chapter builds on those chapters differently, focusing more on the development of health
citizenship rather than the healthy citizen. But similar to the previous chapters draws
upon embodied metaphors as a point of departure. Like the words body and mind, 'heart'
carries powerful connotations about self and identity (Birke 1998: 197). The heart is a
metaphor for the self as characterized by attachments to others. 'Heart' highlights how
identities and communities are formed within the context of geographies and relationships
shaped by a complex set of intersecting social, political and economic determinants. The
metaphor of'heart' is connected to characteristics of the ADAO that interviewees
discussed in the context ofwhat makes the ADAO distinct and different from other
service providers within Ottawa. These qualities include: an ethic of care; empathy; trust
structured through informal relationships such as friendship; openness and receptiveness
to a wide variety of ideas and perspectives; and the fostering of relational autonomy.
These characteristics involve an understanding of the world as relational and of human
relationships as interconnected and intersubjective. They focus on how connection to
others is a positive attribute rather than a liability of dependency.
149
All of these characteristics are important within a model of health citizenship, as
organizations with these attributes are more focused on the importance of lay knowledge,
which is necessary to foster health citizenship. These characteristics suggest the unique
and important contribution the ADAO, as a sufferer led initiative, can make as a mental
health service provider. Within literatures on self-help, community, grassroots and
volunteer based organizations the characteristics of care, empathy, friendship and
openness are well discussed. However, there is little discussion within this literature, or
within geographical writings, of the importance of relational autonomy. Thus, this chapter
focuses on relational autonomy as a quality of the ADAO.
Through an analysis of relational autonomy this chapter explores how the ADAO claims
a space for itself that is mindful of and negotiated though wider relationships and
practices of power/knowledge. What is the balance for an effective community, between
having its own sense of self, and a self that is connected to others? These questions are
connected to autonomy because "autonomy involves choosing and living according to
standards and values that are in some plausible sense one's 'own'" (Friedman, 2000:37).
This chapter explores the ways in which the ADAO has created and negotiated a place for
itselfwithin the wider context of health care in Ottawa. The chapter examines how the
ADAO has created for itself an autonomous space, its own space, defined by its capacity
for relational autonomy - a space in which one gains a sense of autonomy because of
supportive, caring, social relationships and a sense of'community'. It is within this space
that the importance of interdependence, encouraging self-trust and self-reflection is
emphasized. It is a space that fosters what Diana Meyers calls 'autonomy competency'-
"the repertory of coordinated skills that makes self discovery, self definition, and self
direction possible"(Meyers, 1989:76).
The focus on relational approaches to autonomy helps us analyze the implications of the
intersubjective and social dimensions of selfhood, identity and community for
conceptions of autonomy, moral and political agency (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000:4).
Developing relational autonomy competency is central to the ADAO. This involves skills
that do not encourage the creation of individualistic atomistic individuals, but individuals
who recognize that autonomy is contingent on embeddedness and connection to others. It
is through the positive reframing of dependency relations that the ADAO plays a central
role in the fostering of autonomy competency. In this way the ADAO also distinguishes
itself from other service providers and creates its own supportive space where sufferers
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can exchange their feelings and lived experiences. This creates a place in which people do
not feel abnormal, alienated and isolated; conducive to the expression of ideas of self-
exploration, self-definition and self-trust.
This chapter is subdivided into four main sections. Section 7.2 helps to explain what
autonomy competency and relational autonomy competency is. Section 7.3 expands on
section 7.2 by illustrating how autonomy is contingent on positionality and context.
Section 7.4 explores the ways in which relational autonomy competency is fostered by the
ADAO. And section 7.5 describes the ways in which the ADAO helps to create
organizational autonomy. Section 7.4 and 7.5 more specifically shows how the ADAO's
capacity for fostering autonomy through sociability acts as a model for anxiety suffers
and other service providers. This section is concerned with how relational autonomy
competency within the ADAO helps to create spaces in which difference is possible
rather than suppressed. However, section five also highlights how the ADAO's
'expansion' and collaboration with other service providers may compromise the ADAO
sense of autonomy competency or effective relational autonomy.
7.2 Relational autonomy
7.2.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on the literature review of autonomy in chapter two, with a more
sharpened focus on the topic of relational autonomy and the work of Diana Tiejens
Meyers (1989; 1997; 2000). The issue of autonomy is connected to the normative ideals
of the Cartesian mind/body dualisms discussed in chapters 'body' and 'mind'. The
normative autonomous self has historically been envisaged as a process by which 'man'
[sic] who is essentially alone, suddenly springs out of the earth and is suddenly fully
mature and autonomous- like mushrooms (Hobbes in Benhabib, 1992). This image of the
autonomous subject is highly contested as it neglects the effects and importance of child
rearing in the development of personhood, or that there are large periods of dependency
through which we develop capacities like autonomy (Okin, 1989). From this image of the
Cartesian 'mushroom' subject autonomy derives its spatial form at a variety of spatial
scales- the sharply bordered self that is extended into the form of the sovereign state
(Elshtain, 1994). Autonomy is bound up in the construction of both spatial metaphors and
in the spatial imagining of the individual. The Cartesian self and body, is a subject
defined by its autonomy- an impermeable body controlled and mastered by a rational,
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autonomous mind. Thus the experience of panic or anxiety, along with other 'mind
disorders' has historically precluded the possibility of an autonomous self.
Autonomy is a central issue for persons with anxiety conditions such as panic and
agoraphobia for a number of reasons. First, people with agoraphobic avoidance behaviors,
including those interviewed, often describe how their spatial immobility impedes their
sense of spatial autonomy, to move to and from various geographies as they desire or
need. Second, as I have argued in chapters 'body' and 'mind', panic and agoraphobia
contributes to lack of self-trust and confusion about self-definition that are fundamental
for developing autonomy. Panic and agoraphobia make people less confident about
exercising their autonomy in certain areas of their life; because they are unsure if they can
be autonomous, thus shield themselves in relationships and spaces of dependence that can
be debilitating.
Marilyn Friedman describes this as "autonomophobia", or fear ofautonomy, which is
connected to the experience of agoraphobia and panic (Friedman, 2000:45). Friedman
focuses on the fear of the autonomy of others. In the case of agoraphobia and panic
autonomophobia is more closely associated with a fear of being able to control one's self
independently and thus act autonomously. Agoraphobia and panic is a good example of
how people develop unhealthy dependencies on spaces and places, creating zones of
safety that are both enabling and disabling, because they are fearful of what will happen
to them in those various spaces, or are thus fearful that they cannot do anything in those
spaces, they cannot act competently or autonomously. Here dependency on a particular
space as 'safe' is problematic. Attachments to the space and to those within the space are
governed by fear and, thus, are limiting. This form of dependency should be differentiated
from other dependency relations, which are viewed positively in processes of relational
autonomy.
The proceeding sections of this chapter explore how relational autonomy and the
connection between the self and the social is central to the ADAO's programs, mandate
and aspirations. This chapter does not suggest that other service providers do not foster
relational autonomy, but that relational autonomy is a particular quality of the ADAO that
is important for the ADAO's mandate and that allows the organization stand out within a
network ofanxiety service providers. I am particularly interested in Diana Meyer's
discussion ofautonomy competency and the ways in which the ADAO fosters relational
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autonomy competency within the organization. The ADAO creates a space in which the
primary skills of autonomy competency - self-definition, self-direction, and self-
knowledge - are negotiated ( Meyers, 1989). They do so in a way that focuses on the
interconnectedness of individuals and sociability, thus the ADAO is engaged in a process
of relational autonomy competency. I am not interested in autonomy competency as a
checklist where people must follow a set of criteria in order to be autonomous. I am
interested in exploring the belief that autonomy is a situated process that is both
transformative and contributes to an intersectional identity. An intersectional identity
entails analyzing the social significance of one's community of origin, disclosing to
oneself the ways in which associated norms have become embedded in one's own
cognitive and motivational structure, appreciating how entrenched they are, and assuming
responsibility for the ways that one may repeat them (Meyers, 2000:159). This
contributes to autonomy by connecting individuals to systemic social relations and to the
social meanings of those structures (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). An intersectional
identity is similar to Lorraine Code's description of the ecological perspective of the self,
which is based on relational autonomy (Code, 1995; 2000). The image of the ecological is
meant to remind us of how subjects are organic, intersubjective and social beings, rather
than understanding the subject and thus autonomy as individualistic (Code, 2000:197). It
is a perspective in which mastery over one's self, over others, or one's environment, the
goals of an enlightenment legacy and normative subjectivity, are viewed as problematic.
An ecological perspective of the self resists the desire for a contained, homogenous
unified self in favor of reconfiguration, difference and pluralism. Ecological thinking, and
relational autonomy, disrupts the social imaginary governed by the rhetoric of
autonomous individualism (Code, 2000:202). Both perspectives decenterthe place of the
individual relative to his/her context and situate the subject within a series of
interconnected communities. Thus both relational autonomy and an ecological
perspective highlight the importance of intersectional, relational selves in the creation of
community.
7.2.2 What is relational autonomy competency?
The term relational autonomy arises from feminist criticism of traditional ideals and
notions ofautonomy as individualistic and rationalistic. Diana Meyer's concept of
autonomy competency is motivated by a concern to explain the autonomy impairing
effects of oppressive socialization for women and to develop a theory that is able to
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explain how agents who are subject to oppressive social circumstances may nevertheless
be partially autonomous, or autonomous in certain aspects of their lives but not in others
(Meyers, 1989). For Meyers' autonomy is a matter of degree - it is episodic, resulting
from individual events; and programmatic, affecting entire areas of one's life (Meyers,
1989). Autonomy competency is achieved through the development of a variety of skills
that contribute to self-definition, self-direction and self-knowledge. These skills should be
viewed as qualities and goals present, at different times and in different spaces, within the
ADAO and its programs. They include (Meyers, 2000:166):
1) Introspective skills that sensitize individuals to their own feelings and desires, which
enable them to interpret their subjective experience.
2) Imaginative skills that enable individuals to envisage a range of self-concepts that they
may adopt.
3) Memory skills that enable individuals to recall relevant experiences not only from their
own lives but also experiences that their associates have recounted or that they have
encountered in other forms.
4) Communication skills that enable individuals to get the benefit of others perceptions,
background knowledges, insight, and support.
5) Analytical and reasoning skills that enable individuals to compare different self-
concepts and assess the relative merits of those alternatives.
6) Volitional skills that enable individuals to resist pressure from others to embrace a
conventional self concept and that enable them to maintain their commitment to a "self
portrait that they consider genuinely their own, that is authentic" (Meyers, 1989).
7) Interpersonal skills that enable individuals to join forces to challenge and change social
norms.
In addition to the list of autonomy competency skills Meyer's describes, I add a skill not
discussed within work on autonomy competency that I term spatial knowledge skills.
Autonomy is connected to spatial relations, culturally specific and historically defined,
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both within and outside of the body that affects our subjectivity and sense of identity.
Spatial knowledge skills enable individuals to recognize the importance of space and
place in relation to the construction of an autonomous self. Meyer's autonomy
competency skills focus primarily on the self in relation to social environments or
processes of subjectivity (social norms, values, beliefs), and the self in relation to other
people and groups who influence a sense of selfhood - rather than the complex
interrelationship between our physical environments, social environments and identity.
The centrality of spatial relations for autonomy competency is particularly evident in
processes of disablement, impairment and disability. Often mobility/autonomy is
discussed within disability studies in terms of accessibility or as being 'barrier free'. The
belief here is that without socio-spatial restrictions one would be able to exercise and
direct one's actions more autonomously. Within discussions of disablement, impairment
and autonomy systematic structures of discrimination and a notion of'ableism' are
primary obstacles in developing autonomy. This was described by many of those I
interviewed who were agoraphobic in terms of the forms of discrimination they felt
within socio-political structures and in particular within the culture of their workplaces.
Additionally, problems that family, friends, other clinicians or co-workers created for the
individual affected their sense ofautonomy and well-being.
Ultimately for Meyers the development of autonomy competency skills is a means
towards understanding one's "authentic self' (Meyers, 1989:77). The concept of the
authentic self is a highly contested issue, however it is central to Meyers discussion of
relational autonomy competency. The authentic self should not be understood as a core
that can transcend its context and processes of socialization, or that precedes, preexists
and preempts any other factors or life experiences. The authentic self should also not be
conflated with an 'original' self, if such a self exists. The authentic self characterizes who
we are, and what we want but is not fixed or immutable, it is transformed over time and
place. For Meyers the authentic self consists of "the repertory of skills that make up
autonomy competency along with the collocation of attributes that emerge as a person
successfully exercises autonomy competency" (Meyers, 1989:92). Thus the authentic self
is never separate from the agent's environment.
For Meyers autonomy competency is relational in the sense that it can only be developed
in the context of social relationships, practices and institutions. Social environments
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foster the development of the self differently over the life course. Agents are more likely
to develop those aspects of themselves that are socially reinforced and incorporate these
aspects into their self-concepts. In this way the quest for individuality may be undermined
by various conventions, roles and norms. Some environments encourage the growth of
some skills at the expense of others. Western cultures for example encourage in women
the skills of self-discovery because women are more closely associated with emotional
receptivity and perceptiveness that are crucial for self discovery (Meyers, 2000).
However women are less likely to develop skills of self direction and self definition that
men are more likely to be socialized to develop (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000).
Autonomy is a competency involving skills of self-discovery, self-direction and self-
definition that involve reflection. Thus, Meyers sees self-realization as crucial to self-
respect. (Mackenzie and Stoljar: 2000:17). In this way autonomy competency is more of a
process in which self-understanding and self-definition is possible rather than a specific
quality of an individual or group. The distinction between autonomy competency and
relational autonomy competency is the extent to which sociability, interconnectedness
and interdependence is central to self-discovery. Thus relational autonomy competency
skills focus on how our choices are made in relation to, and affected by, other people.
7.3 Placing autonomy competency in context
7.3.1 Introduction- Procedural and substantive accounts
Autonomy competency as Meyers defines and discusses it is often described as an
example of a procedural account of autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). Mackenzie
and Stoljar describe how within a procedural account of autonomy:
"[T]he content of the person's desires, values, beliefs and emotional attitudes is
irrelevant to the issue ofwhether the person is autonomous with respect to those
aspects of the agent's motivational structure and the actions that flow from them.
What matters for [procedural] autonomy is whether the agent has subjected his/her
motivations and actions to the appropriate kind of critical reflection" (Mackenzie
and Stoljar, 2000:13-14).
For Meyers, as long as the subject comes to realize why they make the decisions they do
and act on that realization in some way then they can be said to be autonomously
competent. For Meyers' autonomy is a process of reflection on one's actions, no
particular actions are more autonomy conferring than others. Individuals can choose
oppressive ideals and goals and make oppressive choices that are still plausibly their own
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decisions. What distinguishes autonomous people is that they have reconciled those
beliefs that they incorporate into their system of thought (Meyers, 1989:30). While
Meyers recognizes and discusses oppressive forms of socialization, what is most
important is that individuals recognize that they are situated in contexts that shape their
decisions and beliefs, even if they are oppressive. Exercises of autonomy competency can
reinforce established reasons and courses of conduct, but it can also propel people into
new directions (Meyers, 1989:96).
This section explores how autonomy competency skills and relational autonomy
competency could be developed in the context of substantive accounts of autonomy. In
contrast to procedural accounts of autonomy, substantive accounts of autonomy reject the
content neutrality ofprocedural accounts and insist that autonomy can only be realized
when one considers the specific contexts and preferences of agents (Benson, 2000).
Substantive accounts reject the notion that autonomous choices can be made when
socialization is oppressive. Within a substantive theory of autonomy oppressive
socialization impedes the agent's ability to discern norms that are accepted and
perpetuated by the oppressive context in which they are operating. Oppressive contexts
are also linked to the impairment of one's sense of self-trust, self-worth and self-respect
that undermines one's autonomy. Lacking self-worth is an obstacle that results in
individuals making normative, and oppressive choices that are deceptively autonomous.
Substantive accounts highlight how self-respect and self-trust are necessary conditions of
autonomy.
Substantive accounts are about curtailing bad judgments we make that help to perpetuate
an "illusion of choice" where there may be none (Foucault, 1996). To this extent, not only
is relational autonomy competency about understanding why we believe or make the
choices that we do, it is also about dispelling the myth that choice is always available, at
any time, in any place and for anyone. Within substantive accounts of autonomy the
creation of alternative and antagonistic choices rather than presumed informed consent is
more central to the creation of autonomy. Additionally within a substantive account of
autonomy there is a recognition of how the decisions we make not only affect our own
sense of autonomy but the autonomy competency of others.
The context in which relational autonomy occurs is important for a substantive account of
autonomy. Relational autonomy develops within a wide range of environments and
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contexts, but develops differently in those various contexts, producing a different sense of
subjectivity and identity. In this way the qualities identified by interviewees as central to
the ADAO - care, empathy, friendship and its diversity of approaches - that help
distinguish the ADAO from other service providers, also help to situate relational
autonomy competency skills.
7.3.2 Coercion and autonomy
A good example of how context is central to the creation of relational autonomy, is a
comparison between contexts that are perceived to be coercive in contrast to non coercive
and how these varied contexts result in different autonomy competency skills and situate
the way in which autonomy is developed differently. Interviewees, to distinguish the
process by which they developed a sense of self and autonomy, often used comparison
between the programs the ADAO offers and services offered by various clinicians; where
clinical services were often described as coercive and the ADAO's programs as non¬
coercive. For example, many clinician-patient interactions are structured on the hope of
developing relational autonomy competency in the patient. Within these interactions
introspective skills and memory skills are central; imaginative skills and analytic and
reasoning skills may be fostered depending on the range of options presented to the
patient; while communication skills, volitional skills and interpersonal skills may not be
well developed or fostered. Programs within the ADAO such as the fourteen-week
program and support group that present a diversity of subject positions and highlight the
efficacy and importance of alternative approaches are better suited to develop not only
introspective and memory skills but imaginative skills, analytic and reasoning skills and
volitional skills as well. And due to its group and participatory dynamic structured as a
social setting with an informal flexible hierarchy communication skills and interpersonal
skills may also be developed.
Criticism of the clinical system is that it often neglects the voices of those who are
sufferers. That it replaces that voice with a more authoritative, more enlightened 'other'
voice that is meant to create a better new self that is harmonious with the suffers initial
agenda as opposed to something which is imposed or taken on (Frank, 1995; Couser,
1997; Nelson, 1999). Yet this 'other' voice is informed by different desires, needs and
goals than those of sufferers themselves. While it is widely agreed that in clinical arenas
patients should make autonomous decisions about their health care, certain degrees of
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paternalism still remain reducing self trust and a person's ability to act autonomously
(McLeod and Sherwin, 2000:266). People often subjugate their own beliefs and
knowledge in favor of that of a clinician knowingly and unknowingly, thus the extent to
which an autonomy competency is developed is an important question in the context of a
patient-clinician relationship (Sherwin, 1998). Additionally, as Paul Benson argues,
restricting a person's capacity for imagining through directing the subject using specific
norms or directions can be viewed as a form of oppressive socialization (Benson, in
Mackenzie, 2000:124). In this way, within a clinician-patient relationship is the process
of therapy - often structured by authoritative forms and knowledges that the patient may
not be familiar with, or fully understand - a process in which the patient can exercise
autonomy? Many clinicians are aware of this and actively try to work against acting as an
authoritative figure, towards a more equal distribution of power.
This is also not to say that coercion is not a problem within informal relationships. For
example within ADAO programs group dynamics often involve aspects of coercion and
pressure from instructors or other members in the group towards a particular perspective,
practice or belief. In any group program, such as the fourteen-week anxiety management
program, the personalities of the members help determine the way in which the program
proceeds. However in a group structured by mutuality, in which equality of perspective
and experience is stressed the foundation for autonomy competency is more likely to
develop. Within the ADAO instructors of the fourteen-week program are made aware of
the importance of creating and maintaining an atmosphere and group dynamic in which
coercion from others, especially the instructors, is discouraged. This was extensively
discussed amongst interviewees. As one of the instructors notes:
"People may initially come to get answers, to be given answers, that is not the
process and that is made clear. And when they begin to realize that we can't give
them the answers, that we are not the experts, the dynamic changes, people change
their approaches to developing themselves, and to how they use the group and the
program. The hope that some people have with clinicians is that they will cure
them through various treatments and adherence to treatments, in the program
following instructions is dispelled, as what becomes instructive are other people's
experiences, other peoples support and other peoples encouragement and ideas"
(Amanda).
In part because the ADAO has been criticized that it cannot claim to provide therapy, or
provide an authoritative professional function, the ADAO defines itself as an educational
organization whose function is to make the public and those with anxiety conditions
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aware of a variety of opinions and approaches to those conditions. The ADAO 'informs',
it does not provide answers, and those who approach the ADAO looking for answers are
likely to be disappointed with the lack of any clear cut solution or promised cure. The
ADAO is fearful of seeming to be authoritative and is conscious of creating an
atmosphere in which coercion is actively recognized and worked against. The ADAO
presents a wide range of options for sufferers that are both clinically oriented and non-
traditional or 'alternative'. The social environment in which the ADAO is structured is
based on networks of support rather than being characterized as a place of treatment or
expertise (which is not to say that people do not use or come to the ADAO and its
programs expecting staff and instructors to be experts).
The different perceptions of coercion within clinical and ADAO settings does not mean
that all participants of the ADAO develop a range of autonomy competency skills, or that
patients of clinicians do not apply interpersonal and communication skills in other areas
of their lives and spaces as a result ofwhat they take from a clinician-patient encounter.
However, interviewee's descriptions, participant evaluations from the fourteen-week
program, and newsletter articles suggest that many members of the ADAO develop a
range of relational autonomy competency skills as a direct result ofADAO programs,
while they did not as a patient. This is contingent on the qualities of care, empathy, trust
fostered within informal social settings and the ADAO's holistic approach to a wide
range of perspectives on the etiology, treatment and management of anxiety conditions.
7.4 Exercising relational autonomy competency
7.4.1 Introduction
Relational autonomy is central to the purpose and mandate of the ADAO. Most
community-based advocacy, educational and awareness groups have qualities that
highlight the importance of relational autonomy. This is because the sharing of
experience through social interaction, increasing public awareness and informing or
demystifying beliefs are central to the process of changing social norms and changing
people's lives. Within this section I will provide direct examples of relational autonomy
and relational autonomy competency using interviewees discussions and materials from
the ADAO.
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The ADAO helps to develop relational autonomy competency skills through its
awareness and educational campaigns and programs such as the youth screen play, life
potential program for young people, and parents guide to youth and anxiety and youth
education program. The ADAO also develops these skills through its anxiety, panic and
avoidance behavior management workshops, volunteer companion program, newsletters,
publications and support groups where:
"Meeting with other people who have the same problem and sharing it with each
other helped me to see that I was not alone and it helped me to find some kind of
support and security. Thanks to this program today I feel so much better"
(Johanne, APVA, 1998b:4).
In this section I focus on three programs/services provided by the ADAO as examples of
relational autonomy: the newsletters, the volunteer companion program and the fourteen-
week program.
7.4.2 The newsletters
The newsletters published and distributed amongst members of the ADAO provide
numerous examples of the importance of relational autonomy, and the centrality of
fostering autonomy through sociability within the ADAO. The newsletters act as a space
in which members can share their stories and learn, or take inspiration, from other
people's stories and from information in the newsletters. The newsletters provide an
example of the wide range of opinions and knowledges surrounding anxiety, and while
there are distinct preferences towards approaches and beliefs about anxiety conditions,
there is also a clear message that one person's preference is one option within a diverse
range of beliefs and options. The newsletters create a space in which communication
skills that allow members to learn about other members' experiences, knowledges and
perceptions are developed. One of the aims of the newsletters is also to enhance volitional
skills and act as a place in which members can feel free to talk about a variety of options,
state their opinions, and make comments and suggestions about anxiety conditions.
Ideally the newsletters aim to enhance interpersonal skills in order to build public
awareness campaigns that promote social change and increase awareness about the daily-
lived realities of anxiety conditions.
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The importance of relational autonomy is clearly stated through a book review of Jean
Vanier's "becoming human" whose central message is that "belonging is important for
our growth to independence" (ADAO, 1999b:2). In this review we not only learn about
how autonomy is not an individualistic isolated process, but a process that is situated and
relational. The review points out the need to recognize the importance of the experiences
of ill health in developing subjectivity, or health citizenship. As the executive director
then remarks in the review:
"Jean Vanier understands that without trust and support from another person or
persons, we may not find our independence. When we know we are connected we
are then ready to become separate. This is a belief that the ADAO has carried
throughout the development of its programming and we are so happy to see it
somewhere that is so tangible and followed with so many other meaningful
insights... the moment that we are recognized, or acknowledged by another
human being, we are given an opportunity to see ourselves more clearly. Those
who can show us that we are okay just as we are, are not telling us that we have to
remain unwell, but while we feel as ifwe do, they will honor us anyway. They are
telling us that we can be as wonderful and important to our community as all
people are, even when we feel unwell. It is through our relationships with
individuals who are living through all kinds of experiences that we will really find
the essence of life and living" (ADAO, 1999b:2).
The newsletter serves an inspirational and informational function through a variety of
different article types, where one article may fit into a variety of article types.
1) First, is the use of testimonial/didactic personal stories to aid in recruitment of
membership and volunteers.
2) Second, are articles that focus on re framing the "other" that highlight progression of
stranger to friend.
3) Third, are articles that develop both a sense of community and language based on
common experiences.
4) Fourth, are articles about relationships and stories of support.
5) Fifth, are articles that could be described as progress or quest stories that often add an
evaluative dimension to the links between the personal and the social.
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6) Sixth, are "I" stories- stories about reframing the self where the construction of an
autonomous self is actualized as a result of interaction and connection with others.
7) Seventh, are articles that use narrative to highlight the diversity of experience within
the community. Often these narratives provide more detail about the experiences ofpanic
and agoraphobia emphasizing the various ways in which people may experience these
conditions.
8) Eighth, are treatment and management stories that offer suggestions on how to
approach and manage panic and agoraphobia for both the sufferer themselves, and for
others who may have to care for someone with panic and agoraphobia.
9) And, ninth are healing stories. From stories of individual healing through self-
discovery, to healing through clinical care and alternative health practices (Rimke, 2000).
In this section I provide examples of "I" stories that directly refer to processes of
relational autonomy. In one article entitled "the positive influence of others" the author
describes how through the support and encouragement of others around her she has been
able to accomplish goals and set new goals for herself thereby increasing her well being
and sense of autonomy (APVA, 1997b: 2). In another article entitled "my first trip to the
movies in fifteen years" the author, Nathalie, describes how her volunteer companion
helped her go to the movies without having a panic attack (APVA, 1998a:6). For Nathalie
going to the movies means being "one step closer to freedom" and one step closer to
feeling autonomous. But she would not feel autonomous if not for the support and
encouragement of her volunteer who was instrumental in helping her get through the
experience of the movie and therefore for helping her help herself (APVA, 1998a:6). 'I'
stories not only detail the experiences of participants, but how family and volunteers
develop a better understanding ofwho they are and their sense ofautonomy through the
programs offered by the ADAO:
"I started panicking about twelve years ago. Throughout my bouts of panic I had a
dear friend that I could always count on when things got rough for me.... I moved
to Ottawa a year ago and started received a local paper called the Penny Saver...
This is where I saw the ad for volunteers for the APVA. I immediately took
action. I called up the director and signed up. I had been taken so well care of by
the people who had supported me, that now I was feeling so well, I had to try and
help another who was now experiencing the same as 1.1 met my first client in
January... Even though I am the volunteer, she gives a lot back to me as well...
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Volunteering is one of the most rewarding choices ofmy life. It is a pleasure for
me to serve in this way and I hope that we will one day attain our visions for our
association" (APVA, 1997a: 7).
7.4.3 The volunteer companion program
As described in the quote above, the volunteer companion program is an example of how
relational autonomy competency is fostered within the ADAO. While one could never say
with certainty that all participants feel they are more 'autonomous', or understand that
autonomy is a relational process, anecdotal evidence from interviews and ADAO
documents (there is an evaluation form for every volunteer companion match, as well as a
bi-annual review of the match) suggest that various programs, including the volunteer
companion program have resulted in increased mobility, associated with increased
autonomy. This sense of autonomy was attributed to volunteer companion interaction and
support. For example, the following excerpt illustrate how notions of autonomy,
identified as independence, are predicated on relations of interdependence:
"Agoraphobia has shrunk my world to the size of a postage stamp and I have felt
extremely depressed and isolated during acute agoraphobic episodes...with the
kind and patient assistance ofmy volunteer, I was able to start going out again in a
small way. I still panicked but I grew to trust the volunteer who reassured me that
we could stop any activity if I felt uncomfortable doing it... My volunteer has
opened the door that leads me back into the world. I now know that I will never
have to be housebound again. The feeling of being trapped in one's house is a
nightmare and I am grateful to the agoraphobia and panic volunteer association for
releasing me from that prison" (SM, APVA, 1997a: 3).
In this example above mobility is directly connected to a feeling of autonomy. Autonomy
in addition to being about the ability to make a variety of choices that concerns one's life
is also about the ability to be physically mobile. Within a framework of relational
autonomy, others are seen as both hindering and enabling accessibility and mobility.
There was general consensus amongst interviewees that the fear and inability to go
various places was a barrier to autonomous action and that the agoraphobic behaviors
were not choices agoraphobics felt they had control over. In this sense overcoming
agoraphobia was a central means by which autonomy could be achieved. Developing
those skills of autonomy competency was contingent, for many interviewed, through the
support and sociability they received from programs such as the volunteer companion
program.
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Within the volunteer companion program imaginative skills that enable individuals to
envisage a range of self-concepts are central for effective goal setting while
communication skills that enable individuals to get the benefit of the volunteer's
perceptions and support are also important for an effective volunteer companion
relationship, especially when setbacks arise. Primarily, the volunteer companion program
focuses on spatial knowledge skills that are central to the development ofautonomy. The
ability to remap both public and private spaces as safe, and to understand the
interconnected relationship between one's environment, one's bodily sensations and
feelings is the ultimate goal of the volunteer companion program.
"[My client], her need for me was to have me there when she went to school. I
would stay in the cafeteria, she would go to classes, and just knowing that I was
there, she was able to function, to change the way she saw and interacted in class
and not get anxious... Towards the end she was able to go to the university by
herself, and I would arrive at a certain time later, I would be there for her at break,
then I would leave early, and earlier, and now she is able to go to the university,
and walk around and finish her classes. It is now an OK space for her and the
anxiety around pressure in class is better, changed" (Amy).
7.4.4 The fourteen-week program
As discussed within section 7.3 of this chapter relational autonomy competency skills and
autonomy competency skills are displayed within the anxiety, panic and avoidance
behavior management fourteen-week program. In this program individuals are
encouraged within a group setting to develop these skills in part through a sharing of
experiences and difficulties with others in the group. Primarily, individuals who have
experienced anxiety conditions instruct the fourteen-week program, but there are some
instructors who have not experienced an anxiety condition. These instructors, who are
mostly professional clinicians (social workers or therapists), are paired with an instructor
who has had an anxiety condition. Instructors who were interviewed talked about their
roles as facilitators and supporters. Most instructors felt that the development of
autonomy was important for participants, but that autonomy needs to be structured and
conceived of as relational, as part of learning from others:
"I feel as a facilitator it is important to foster a sense of independence, but also
foster dependence within the group, so they are using the group, and not me... so
we try to encourage if people use the group, the wisdom is within the group,
within every single individual that is there, that they've got a goldmine at their
disposal and they should be able to use that, don't just sit quietly and go home
with it, try and use the group, and maybe that does create a sense of dependence,
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but I don't think it is necessarily a wrong thing, it helps them understand and
better themselves. It's about personal growth" (Brittany).
Another interviewee in the context of interdependence described a similar discussion
about the roles of the group and facilitators:
"I think that when you are in any kind of collaboration around anything, lets talk
about a group, or the fourteen-week program, there is also interdependence.
People have different roles in terms ofwhat the group is about. A facilitator and
its members are interdependent, they are exchanging information ... I am saying
interdependence, in order not to have this distinction between dependence and
independence. I would not even talk about independence because I don't think
there is such a thing in human relationships" (Jessica).
Previous to the fourteen-week program, the ADAO ran a twelve-week program taught by
a psychologist affiliated with the ROH, Dr. Dave Erikson. But, due to group comments,
increased funding and Dr. Erikson's departure from Ottawa, a new fourteen-week
program that included more on nutrition and anger management was developed. One
interviewee who went to the twelve-week program was critical of the way in which
instructors or experts were positioned, both literally and metaphorically:
"The twelve-week course was taught by Dave Erikson, and he had two assistants...
who sat outside of the circle of the table... and we knew what their names were,
but that was it, it was sort of problematic and it made people feel really
uncomfortable, us and them. I think that was really not well done" (Brittany).
What was noted amongst those who completed the fourteen-week program is that
participants would not have embraced skills in the same way in an atmosphere structured
along expert and non-expert divisions. Many of the participants within the fourteen-week
program felt that volitional skills were much easier to embrace in a setting in which no
one is perceived to be more knowledgeable than another, including the instructors.
Thus it is important that the fourteen-week group is meant to be a "collaborative,
supportive kind of environment, it does not feel hierarchal, but I recognize it, I mean it is
still a hierarchal structure" (Amanda). The instructors are there to "act as models", to
inspire, inform and direct discussion and homework. The instructors are leaders, and as
such, have more control over the group dynamic (Susan). The lack of a perceived
hierarchal or authoritative structure within the group has to do with the way in which
instructors situate themselves within the group and the direction that instructors provide
for the group dynamic which is centered on the "supportive function" of the program:
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"We don't do therapy, it's a learning type of group, we are just giving them
information... it's a skills group.. .and when people begin to realize that they
change their approaches to developing themselves, and to how they use the group
and the program. What becomes most useful and important are other people's
experiences, the support and inspiration they get from others in the group, as well
as from us as instructors, support is the main thing they take away from the group"
(Amanda).
The course revolves around the anxiety, panic and avoidance behavior management
workbook, written and created by the ADAO. The anxiety, panic and avoidance behavior
management workbook is meant to be used as a self help guide, in a group setting to
promote greater social interaction, positive reinforcement and support, and within support
groups (ADAO, 2002a:3). It can be used as a therapeutic tool when working one on one
with a therapist, in order to develop workshops for agencies and businesses, as a support
group resource, as part of an educational group, or for individual use (ADAO, 2002a:3-4).
Comments made about the program and workbook suggest that the book was used in a
variety ofways. As part of the program evaluations, participants indicated that the first
six autonomy competency skills were developed, to different degrees, amongst
participants. Participants described how these skills were acquired in relational and non¬
relational ways. Sometimes people gained these skills through homework activities by
themselves, while at other times people gained these skills through sharing information,
homework assignments and experiences with others within the group. Ideally however the
workbook was designed for a group setting because:
"The group environment is essential in helping students to explore how they relate
to their environment; it provides opportunities to learn about their development in
a way that their processes can be modeled back to them. Groups are mini social
structures that provide the opportunity to face attitudes, morals and values
generally seen in the greater society. Finding comfort within that group through
discourse and various activities will be a great foundation through which to begin
one's work through anxiety, panic and fear" (ADAO, 2002a:2).
Thus unlike individual homework, or individual work with a clinician:
"In the group there is a sense of community, a sense of group support. Listening to
other people's feelings of isolation, and that is beneficial, it gives them skills. It
gives them hope and a lot of knowledge about themselves through the support of
others" (Brittany).
It is this combination of support and sociability within the group environment that helps
create relational autonomy competency skills:
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"When people are participating in the group there is that ability to tap into a whole
lot of other people's experiences and the wisdom that they've gotten from those
experiences. They have the ability to learn from other people in the group, and
they also have the ability to teach other people, and that can be really gratifying
and really self esteem building... people really learn a lot and it's not just the
material, it's something that they learn about themselves, that may lead to other
things like doing more for themselves, or doing the things they may have wanted
to do but did not feel supported to do it"(Brittany).
The workbook reflects a diversity of perspectives on anxiety, alongside the increasing
prevalence and importance of cognitive behavioral therapies (CBT) for the organization.
The book is based on CBT practices and techniques common to CBT but also integrates
deep breathing, nutrition, progressive muscle relaxation, and mindfulness techniques.
Independence through support and empathy is a guideline for the fourteen-week program
(ADAO, 2002a:9) As one instructor notes:
"We try to make sure that the goal is focused on being independent, through
support and through listening...Listening helps us build trust, it helps them get
better themselves, it works towards developing independence, but it also works at
the same time towards developing trust within the group" (Emily).
In this way developing independence is connected to the building of networks of support
and attachment. Relational autonomy is not only a process of constructing the self, but a
means towards developing a sense of the group or community. Individual growth is
connected to community development. Individuals can be empowered though relational
autonomy competency, and those relationships can help forge bonds of individual and
collective action. Thus, relational autonomy competency is a precursor for the effective
development of community. Recognizing how we are connected to others and to the
environments in which we are positioned helps to create change as well as social and
political forms that empower individuals and groups.
7.5 The ADAO and organizational autonomy
7.5.1 The challenges of relational autonomy and organizational development
Relational autonomy within the context of organizations draws attention to several points.
Autonomy and relational autonomy skills can be increased by the creation of a supportive
environment in which these skills are practiced. Additionally, relational autonomy skills
are also increased within an environment that is holistic, supportive of change, multiple
perspectives and practices. Substantive accounts of relational autonomy involve
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advocating for alternative visions and presenting a wider range of options for the public to
select from. In the context of organizational development, relational autonomy brings to
light the importance ofhow groups are formed and developed in different ways by people
within and outside of the group. Any organization is never completely contained but
requires other organizations and actors to develop its community and identity. For
example the way in which the ADAO is constantly compared and framed in opposition to
other clinical service providers by interviewees is an example of how organizations define
their sense of self and demarcate their boundaries in relation to others. Relational
autonomy on an organizational level implies networking, collaboration and expansion,
but those connections may also help to erode the organization and its sense of feeling
autonomous especially when situated within an oppressive hierarchy.
The availability of choice for the ADAO's membership, as well as the acceptance of
multiple viewpoints, perspectives and treatments is described by Meyers as central for the
development ofautonomy competency skills. The ADAO's receptiveness to a variety of
approaches to anxiety conditions have resulted in more collaborative partnerships within
and outside of the organization. This diversification and networking for Barclay is a
precondition of a communities ability to develop and sustain a capacity for autonomy, as
autonomy is attributable to the ADAO's remaining embedded within a network of social
relations (Barclay, 2000:57). A group's success as an autonomous agent is affected by its
ability to share its ideas, its aspirations and its beliefs in conversation with others
(Barclay, 2000:57). Many interviewees however are concerned about the extent to which
decisions the ADAO have made are a result of oppressive socialization, that is not own of
their own choosing, but choices that needed to be made in order to gain a wider network
of allies, as well as more funding and prominence. Within a procedural account of
relational autonomy the ADAO's decisions to make certain changes and directions, to
adopt the visions of others and use it to transform its own self-concept and direction could
be viewed as an account of autonomy competency. But in a substantive sense, one needs
to ask if one is moving away from the central precepts of the ADAO. These visions are
always subject to discovery and change, they transform over time. But transforming one's
beliefs is not that same process as conforming to a set of beliefs that others desire.
Both individuals and communities need to consider which attachments should be
celebrated, as well as, which shared values should be a part of the common good. This
process both creates autonomy and requires autonomy (Barclay, 2000:68). Creating
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autonomy through the fostering of ideas and spaces that belong to the individual and/or
community, and requiring autonomy in order to have the freedom to express and develop
those attachments and values. It is the freedom to express and develop particular values
and beliefs that many interviewees felt was not as possible for the ADAO within Ottawa,
and placed the ADAO at a disadvantage for being relationally autonomous. Interviewees'
discussions of this issue are framed in terms of the boundaries and limits of autonomy for
the ADAO, as well as, the meaning of autonomy, that is, the creation of a space that is
plausibly one's own (Friedman, 2000).
Amongst many groups and organizations, autonomy refers to the ability to make one's
own decisions without having to please those external to the organization. Autonomy is
thought of in the context of bureaucracy as independent from funders, without having
strings attached. Autonomy in this context is concerned with demarking the boundaries
between what is inside and outside of the organization. But to suggest that organizations
can exist outside of the networks and contexts in which they are situated, without being
accountable, responsive or having to please those external to the organization is often not
possible or realistic. Additionally failing or refusing to recognize that an organization, and
organizational decisions are affected by internal and external forces is problematic and
can result in organizations moving away from visions and desires that are central to their
sense of growth. Knowing where ideas have come from is part of the process of being
autonomously competent, of creating organizational self-realization and self-direction
that results in further organizational growth.
But, to be relationally autonomous involves the simultaneous recognition and blurring of
a constitutive outside and inside of the ADAO. Moving from Friedman's definition, an
autonomous space for the ADAO, is not simply a space in which the ADAO can exercise
its own desires and initiatives, but a space in which the subjugated knowledges and daily
lived experiences of persons with anxiety conditions are recognized and acknowledged.
Thus the ADAO's autonomous space is not conceived of as a private, contained space,
but as a publicly available arena that further opens up the possibility of other spaces
(physical, rhetorical, and agenda/ advocacy spaces), and new social imaginaries about
what it means to have an anxiety condition and what it means to be human.
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7.6 Conclusion
Coming back to the metaphor of 'heart' used in the chapter title, 'heart' is a metaphor for
interdependence as both a positive attribute that contributes to the production of caring
relationships, and as necessary for relational autonomy competency. The metaphor of
'heart' is connected to characteristics of the ADAO that interviewees discussed in the
context of what makes the ADAO distinct and different from other service providers
within Ottawa.
This chapter has focused on two interrelated issues connected to the construction of
health citizenship. The first issue is concerned with how has the ADAO created its own
sense of selfwithin a landscape of service provision. The second issue is concerned with
how relational autonomy is fostered within and by the ADAO. The chapter argues that the
ADAO has an important contribution to make in terms of its focus on relational
autonomy, within its context of care, responsiveness and diversity. These attributes make
the ADAO a distinct and unique organization within Ottawa - creating a space the ADAO
could call its own. Creating a place that is plausibly one's own is a precursor to the
development of alternatives to the normative model of the healthy citizen found in
clinical service provision - spaces in which difference is possible and exercised and where
alternative political forms can be created.
This chapter has also extended the discussion ofwhat constitutes an effective balance for
the ADAO and its potential for growth and community development. Organizational
autonomy suggests the importance of networking, as collaboration is central to the
development of both individual and group identity. However while the ADAO is effective
in developing relational autonomy competency amongst its membership its capacity for
organizational autonomy competency is not as well developed.
Chapters five, 'body', and six, 'mind', illustrated how the ADAO is connected to regimes
of governmentality that influence clinical service provision. This chapter aimed to show
how the ADAO is also engaged in a process of resistance to the model of the healthy
citizen. The chapter has reflected more critically on whether the ADAO replicates the
dominant normative discourse of the healthy citizen discussed in chapters 'body' and
'mind', or is actively engaged in the construction of a different kind of subjectivity. The
relational autonomous self poses a challenge to the model of the healthy citizen whose
171
autonomy is contingent on containing the 'unstable body' through the mastery of a
'rational mind'. The ADAO's focus on relational autonomy signals a movement away
from the healthy citizen towards a model of personhood based on connection rather than
separation, interdependence rather than independence. In so doing the lived realities of
anxiety sufferers become more apparent and more central to well-being and the
development of personhood. Ifwe are to understand citizenship as a participatory process
then the model of the citizen upon which citizenship is based must be understood
relationally, rather than as atomistic. In this way the ADAO's focus on relational
autonomy and sociability becomes the basis upon which active, deliberative, participatory
democratic forms of health citizenship can develop.
The ADAO's focus on lay knowledges, and the importance of communicating those
knowledges to a wider public is motivated by a need to address and understand the lived
conditions under which people with anxiety conditions live. The ADAO seeks to inform
others of those realities, and assist those affected by anxiety conditions, thereby reducing
potential forms of oppression and marginalization. In this way the ADAO's focus on the
first hand experiences and knowledges of those affected by anxiety conditions is
necessary to foster health citizenship. The ADAO needs to, and has something to,
contribute to the development of an effective politics of inclusion and active forms of
citizenship, rather than simply reproducing other discourses. The ADAO needs to exist as
a legitimate option for sufferers that allows for the possibility of discussion and action
informed by suffers and that privilege sufferers experiences.
These issues are advanced in the next, and final, substantive chapter. The following
chapter, chapter 'breath', like this one, is also concerned to explore relational aspects of
subjectivity and identity, but does so through issues of community and citizenship.
'Breath', brings together arguments from all the previous substantive chapters, including
this one, to further understand what is necessary for the development of health citizenship
in the hopes of creating an effective politics of inclusion and diversity.
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Chapter Eight - Breath: Spaces of citizenship - connecting the organization
"Breath is interesting in that it is what connects us, it's one thing that connects us
to the outside and inside, and so just that experience of the focus on the breath, is
automatically connecting you to your inside environment and what it feels like to
breathe, and taking in air from the outside, with every breath, and that is a way of
connecting. Boundaries, that's the way that comes up. Respecting one's
boundaries is something like communication...but those boundaries move. They
help us communicate and connect us to others. It's through that that people start to
understand that we all experience similar things. Often people with anxiety feel
very different from others. We usually have two or three people with intense
anxiety and feel really totally different, and through the group [they] really find
that anxiety is part of the continuum of what people experience. It gets extended
to, it's about being human, it is the human condition" (Kim).
8.1 Intruiluction
A point of agreement within clinical and non-clinical discourses on panic, anxiety and
agoraphobia is that breathing control is key to the management and well being of persons
with panic. The focus on breathing exercises initially came from outside the western
'clinic' and is emblematic of the influence of'alternative' or 'holistic' health practices
upon which the ADAO draws. Like 'heart', 'breath' is also a metaphor of
intersectionality and intersubjectivity. But, whereas 'heart' alludes to the relations
between of self, identity and community, the metaphor of'breath' draws attention to the
mutually constitutive and negotiable boundaries between inside and outside, public and
private, self and other, identity and community (Code, 2000).
This chapter explores how the ADAO negotiates the boundaries to which the metaphor
'breath' refers, and how, in so doing, it creates its own spaces and sense of identity and
community. I argue, that these processes are connected to a strategy of promoting health
citizenship as opposed to the model of the healthy citizen. Two interconnected aspects
characterize health citizenship. First, health citizenship entails the integration of lived
realities of ill health, disease and disorder into a model of the citizen-subject as an
important part of what constructs (rather than undermines) people's identities and
subjectivities. Second, while health citizenship involves the creation of'new' spaces and
places of citizenship, it also remains in dialogue with dominant, normative clinical
concepts and spaces of citizenship.
A central aspect of health citizenship is its connection to the politics of difference and the
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ability to create spaces in which diversity is possible and encouraged. These spaces of
difference help challenge simplistic understandings of subjectivity and community, and
challenge simplistic mappings of the public and private onto specific places, activities and
persons. If community is understood to be an expression of diversity rather than
homogeneity, then community development is a process in which difference and
multiplicity is central. If community development is understood to be a form of active
citizenship, then citizenship is not about replicating the subject but about celebrating a
diverse range of subjectivities that form a collectivity. The focus on community
development as an active form of citizenship highlights the importance of sociability and
group identity within health citizenship.
Chapters five, 'body', and six, 'mind', elaborated how the ADAO adopts, resists or
negotiates normative versions of the citizen-subject, and chapter seven 'heart' illustrated
how the ADAO moves beyond normative understandings of the citizen-subject as
individualistic and autonomous, to refigure citizenship as relationally autonomous. Taken
together, these chapters have shown how the ADAO creates a figural space for itself
within Ottawa that acts as an alternative to other service providers, and actively moves
away from the model of the healthy citizen towards health citizenship.
In this chapter I build on this analysis by exploring more closely the spaces and places of
health citizenship constructed by the ADAO. While chapter seven focused on the
relationship between health citizenship, subjectivity and identity, this chapter focuses on
social dimensions of health citizenship, implicated in the creation of community. This
chapter focuses on two differing yet connected ways in which health citizenship provides
a structure for the creation and negotiation of difference. First, in section 8.2,1 focus on
the antagonism of the radical citizen; and second, in section 8.3,1 explore how
community development, as a form of citizenship in action, is connected to the politics of
difference.
To this end I draw on complementary theorizations of citizenship. First, I use Michael
Brown's (1997) reading of Chantal Mouffe's (1992, 1993) analysis of radical democracy
to explore how the ADAO's volunteer companion program redraws traditional boundaries
between state, civil society and family, and between public and private. I then turn to
Ruth Lister's (1997) account of citizenship, Iris Marion Young's (1990; 1997)
reconceptualization of community and Staeheli (2003), Moore and Wismer's (1994)
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account of the work of community to show how the volunteer companion program
deploys diversity as an integral element of health citizenship.
8.2 The volunteer companion and new spaces of citizenship
8.2.1 Spatializing radical democracy - introduction to Mouffe and Brown
According to Mouffe (1992; 1993) the key for democracy is an antagonistic and
anagonistic moment, where anagonism means that one strives for effect and material
change in people's lives. Radical democratic politics is based on an antagonistic
pluralism- the constitution of collective identities around clearly differentiated positions
that allow us to apprehend the multiplicity of forms of subordination that exist in social
and political relations. In other words radical democracy works by utilizing antagonism as
a medium for change and creates conditions in which anagonisms can be heard and
translated into new egalitarian social relations, practices and institutions. This radical
pluralism allows for the articulation of different democratic struggles and the choosing
between "real" alternatives that create new spaces of citizenship (Mouffe, 1993).
The pluralism advocated within a radical democratic politics involves acknowledging the
contingency and ambiguity of identity, as well as the constitutive character of social
division and antagonism (Mouffe, 1992:13). Mouffe conceptualizes the social agent of
citizenship as the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions corresponding to the
multiplicity of social relations in which s/he is embedded (Mouffe, 1993:82). Those
subject positions are constructed within specific discourses and always precariously and
temporally sutured (Mouffe, 1992:10). In this way Mouffe works within a framework of
diversity and recognition of difference. For Mouffe however any final realization of
democracy and its closure is impossible. As a result Mouffe focuses on what she
describes as the political rather than politics. For her politics refers to situations where
people collectively struggle towards a common end, what makes those situations political
has to do with the way in which those struggles occur (Mouffe, 1993 in Brown,
1997:156). In this way the political and citizenship is a process of constant development
and negotiation.
Michael Brown (1997) develops Mouffe's work within his own on radical democracy.
Brown's work is inspired by Mouffe's guiding principle that we should investigate new
spaces of radical citizenship (Brown, 1997:24). However as a geographer Brown
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describes how Mouffe's discussion of the places and spaces of citizenship, where space is
metaphorical rather than constitutive of actual geographic locations or imagined
geographies, is incomplete and problematic:
"What is bothersome about Mouffe is that her writings are only meant to convince
the political theorist to rethink the subjects of radical democracy- not the locations
for them. While many of her arguments may seem to show a more geographical
sensitivity to citizenship they actually appear to be rhetorical metaphors aimed at
decentering the subject of radical democracy. I worry that Mouffe is only using
the word "space" metaphorically as a gesture to widen the array of decentered
social identities that come to mind when we conceptualize the citizen. Radical
democratic thinking never seems to consider that citizens are always engaging in
politics in actual locations"(Brown, 1997:13).
In spite of her advocacy for 'space' in political theory, the actual geographies of
Mouffe's political spaces remain uncharted (Brown, 1997:4). Thus, Brown's project is to
extend Mouffe's work by including a geographical analysis within a radical democratic
project. He does so because the ways in which radical democracy is constituted within
and by spatial relations are central to the articulation of radical democracy and notions of
citizenship. If citizenship is opened up to multiple social identities and social relations it
has not been previously associated with, then we must also open it up to a wider variety
ofmaterial spaces not previously considered political. Brown wants to enhance a radical
democratic project by demonstrating spatial aspects of its framework and how citizenship
is affected by, performed, and created within various spatial contexts. Brown is concerned
to discover where the citizen, defined as the political individual claiming rights, duties,
responsibilities, and membership in a political community is located. Mouffe argues that
we often look for new spaces of citizenship in order to reject modern, foundational, and
fixed axes ofpolitics. Yet, it is not enough to look for new spaces and leave the old ones
behind, we must look at how various geographies are being redefined.
For Mouffe and Brown the civil society holds a potential for radical democratic
citizenship as a "new space of citizenship" (Mouffe, 1993). However unlike Mouffe who
sees the state and civil society as distinct, Brown views civil society and voluntary/third
sector as a crucial element of state and public restructuring. For Brown the third sector
acts as a "shadow state" that complicates any simple geography of the public sphere
(Wolch, 1990 in Brown, 1997:19). The implications of this relationship for citizenship
lies in situating relations of the political process not merely in public places of the city but
also in the grassroots community organizations that bring strangers together through
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common, voluntary pursuits (Brown, 1997:22).
New spaces of citizenship imply new spatial interactions between state and civil society
(Brown, 1997:85). Thus, organizations such as the ADAO occupy a new space of
citizenship between the state/clinic and civil society. The ADAO, like the AIDS groups
Brown discusses, fosters radical democracy by institutionalizing citizen's obligations
towards one another and by affirming the equality of rights to which all members of a
given political community are entitled (Brown, 1997:106). Brown focuses on the role of
the 'buddy', similar to the ADAO's volunteer companion, as a new site of radical
citizenship. He demonstrates that buddying is a form of citizenship defined through
locations where elements of family, home and state/clinic relations are combined in
places across the city.
8.2.2 Introducing the volunteer companion program
Traditionally volunteerism has been connected to citizenship when volunteer activities are
placed within the public sphere. However, within the private sphere volunteers are
positioned as carers, as friends and as assistants separate from civic duty. In his book
RePlacing Citizenship (1997) Michael Brown challenges and complicated the relationship
of the public-private divide and volunteerism through concepts of radical democracy.
Brown identifies how ACT-UP, a self help organization for people living with AIDS,
creates spaces of radical democracy in two primary ways, by blurring the division
between state and civil society; and by blurring the boundaries between state and the
home. This section furthers Brown's discussion of radical democracy by demonstrating
how the boundaries between home, civil society and clinic (which is linked to the state),
are negotiated within the ADAO's volunteer companion program. In this way the
volunteer companion program is implicated in the re-mapping ofwhat is considered
public. This "fuzzy geography" reflects " the multiple social relations characteristic of
radical citizenship, empowers volunteer companions to meet their obligations as citizens,
and empowers clients who are entitled to support as citizens of a political community"
(Brown, 1997:123).
As discussed in chapter seven, 'heart', and in chapter four, the volunteer companion was
the first program set up by the ADAO, when it was still the APVA. The program was the
first of its kind in North America offering home support for agoraphobic individuals from
177
non-clinical experts. The volunteer companion provides both practical and emotional
support for agoraphobic individuals who need assistance in becoming more mobile. The
volunteer is there to assist the agoraphobic individual in setting and completing a list of
goals outlined and developed at the beginning of the volunteer companion relationship.
The volunteer is presented with a volunteer companion training manual/handbook and
must attend a series of courses provided by the ADAO on the volunteer program. The
program is goal oriented, but in practice goals may take a long time to achieve and thus
the program is much more focused on creating alternate support structures for the client
that encourage well being. According to the volunteer workbook/training manual the role
of the volunteer is to support their client physically and emotionally; help them though a
panic attack or any other physical or emotional change; and to help set goals with the
client (APVA, 1998c:8-11). The program has always had a much longer list of clients
than volunteers. Yet, in spite of high demand the ADAO matches anyone who applies to
the program with a volunteer, and actively advertises for more volunteers as demand for
the program increases yearly. Volunteer companion matches are continuously evaluated
and have a trial period of three months. If after that trial period the volunteer and client
would like to remain matched, the volunteer match continues for at least another 6-month
commitment. If the match is not successful for any reason at any time, the client or
volunteer can stop the match and ask for a new one.
Volunteers and clients are matched according to their interests, the areas they live, age
and the intuition of the volunteer coordinator to determine who will work best with one
another. Volunteers and clients are at first strangers. This means that people who would
have ordinarily never associated with one another due to race, class, ethnicity, age, and
other characteristics are made to collide because of the public dimension of the volunteer
companion relationship (Brown, 1997:149). This is an example of the agonistic nature of
the volunteer companion program, where people from different backgrounds come
together, without suppressing their differences, in a useful and helpful coalition that is
empowering for both the client and volunteers.
8.2.3 The volunteer/ client relationship
8.2.3.1 (Inter) dependency
Providing support to clients is one of the central aims and goals of the volunteer
companion program. This process of offering support can become problematic when the
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volunteer's and client's expectation ofwhat constitutes support is different from one
another. The support can be emotional, for example discussing personal issues, listening,
talking and spending time with the client. The support can be practical, for example
helping the client with errands and goal setting. However, providing practical support can
become a problem when clients expect their volunteer companions to be "cleaners,
chauffeurs, and babysitters" (Michelle).
"To be honest my first volunteer experience was a disaster, the first thing was I
think she did not have a full grasp ofwhat the program was and as a consequence
she wanted me to do things I did not necessarily want to do, such as: take her to
the doctor, be on twenty four hour call when she needed someone to pick her up
and take her places. I don't think she had a full grasp ofwhat I was required to do.
I didn't meet her needs, so we had a breakdown in communication" (Amy).
For clients practical support becomes a problem when volunteer companions expect "too
much of their clients" (Angie), expecting clients to progress within the volunteer's time
frame rather than the clients.
"I approached my client with vim and vigor, anxious to change the world and
help, and this lady was completely handicapped. I could not help her. I tried. I
would go over all the time and play scrabble or whatever, and I tried to use my
training to work on things, but she was not interested, and with her fibromyalga
she could not do the things I wanted. I wanted to practice letting her off on the
sidewalk and just going to the park but she couldn't stand well. I stressed her out
more" (Alexis).
Often problems result because the volunteer wants to achieve quick results, which in most
cases is neither practical nor possible. Relations and expectations of time and space
within the volunteer companion relationship mean that patience is a necessary skill.
Problems also occur when the volunteer oversteps her/his role and acts authoritatively as
a counselor, social worker or therapist. These are roles that many volunteers initially want
to play, but that changes as the relationship progresses.
"I am there to support her, and to be non judgmental and to help her reach her
goals that are set out monthly, not to become her friend or her therapist... there
are certain ground rules... I am there for her to accomplish her goals and help her
be healthier... not to give her therapy" (Heather).
There are points where the boundaries of the volunteer companion-client relationship
become obvious and enforced. Companions cannot always help their clients with their
problems at home or with dysfunctional personal and family relationships. The volunteer
is encouraged to remember that the homescape of the client is to some extent a private
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space they do not have access to.
8.2.3.2 (Dis) empowerment
While most volunteers and clients describe the enabling and empowering aspects of their
volunteer experiences, there is always the possibility ofdisempowerment in volunteer
companion relationships. As one interviewee notes "volunteers tend to be rescuers which
can create dependency, that is something that has to be worked on in training" (Emily).
Certain clients become dependent on their volunteer, moving their focus of dependency
from a family member or clinician to the volunteer. Conversely, clients are afraid their
dependency on their volunteer will become a burden for the volunteer:
"She [the client] does rely on our weekly get together, not just to go out and do
things but also to talk. And now she knows if she needs to come over she can,
whereas before it would have bothered her. She did not want to bother me. She
did not want to bother anyone. She did not want to feel that way, and she was
afraid she would be a user all of the time. And now I want to do things for other
people, she has that need. I think she is still afraid I will think she is a user and
that she needs me" (Hannah).
Individuals volunteer for a variety of reasons which include: feeling they are making a
difference, feeling better about their own lives, creating friendships; and making
connections within the 'community'. Clients want volunteers for similar reasons: to
enhance their well being, to feel accepted, to establish friendships and meet new people.
But often expectations of volunteerism outweigh the experience of volunteering. Thus
while a celebration of the volunteer companion program is important, an uncritical view
of volunteering can lead to problems and false hopes for both client and volunteer.
Being a volunteer may not always be a rewarding experience. Volunteers sometimes feel
they are in a position where they must monitor or "spy" on their client, which places them
in an awkward position. Some volunteers do not see their clients improve, which is both
frustrating and disempowering for the volunteer (and client) who feels that s/he has failed
as a volunteer. Because many people volunteer to feel that they are making a difference
in other people's lives, not seeing improvement can be disheartening and disempowering.
Discussing these pitfalls of volunteerism is an important aspect of volunteer companion
training that is more likely to result in a positive volunteer relationship, thereby
encouraging aspects of citizenship, rather than discouraging both volunteer and client
from future volunteerism.
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8.2.4 Volunteer companions and the development of community
One of the motivating reasons for clients and volunteers to enter into and use the
volunteer companion program is to feel a part of a community and develop networks of
affiliation in order to socialize. A sense of community is developed within the ADAO
because volunteers are celebrated and made to feel as if they are an important part of the
organization through volunteer appreciation days. These appreciation days involve social
activities, and the presentation of awards. This enhances volunteers' connections to the
ADAO and makes them feel as if they belong to the wider ADAO community. Some
interviewees, who were very appreciative of volunteer appreciation days and the sense of
community it engendered, expressed a desire for more events where volunteers and
clients could get together and socialize, thus further enhancing a sense of community and
involving clients in the activities of the ADAO. Volunteer appreciation days could be
understood as a part of the ADAO's contribution to developing community.
"Both volunteers and clients in the program want a sense, as I did, a sense of
community. I think they develop a sense of community, a sense of getting support
from the volunteer, listening to other people's feelings of isolation, and are really
beneficial. I think it gives them hope. I joined the ADAO because of the sense of
community I felt when I volunteered. Cheryl has volunteer appreciation day
parties, that have brought some of the volunteers together because otherwise we're
in our own separate, separate little worlds" (Lauren).
The development of the ADAO's community is also fostered because many clients and
volunteers want to give back to the ADAO and their other communities. Volunteers and
clients have gone on to take up positions within the ADAO or to act as volunteer
companions themselves. For volunteers the program made them feel as if they should
become more involved within their wider communities and more involved in other
programs within the ADAO.
"After being a companion I wanted to join more affiliations within and outside of
the ADAO. Like the fourteen-week program or newsletter.. .1 wish I would have
gotten more involved that way... I really wanted to be a part of the community...
That's why when Cheryl offered me the chance to work with the kids I did"
(Maria).
8.2.5 Volunteer companions and daily geographies
The volunteer companion program's purpose is to extend the spaces of the ADAO into
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the daily geographies and private sphere of agoraphobic clients, to extend the sphere of
influence of the ADAO, and to introduce clients to the multiple spaces and places of the
ADAO. Client's homes become extensions of the ADAO and the ADAO is brought into
those private spaces by virtue of the connection between organization, volunteer and
client.
The volunteer companion program helps to blur and recreate the spaces and meanings of
private and public. The process of trying to encourage clients to be more publicly mobile
was frustrating for many volunteers because the spaces they understood to be public, were
not necessarily the spaces that clients understood to be public. The division of
public/private into binaries is problematic because public/private spheres and spaces
cannot be neatly separated as oppositional or directly associated with private or public
activities (Killian, 1998; Kumar, 1996; Light and Smith, 1998; Weintraub, 1996;
Weintraub and Kumar, 1996). Private activities and relations ofprivacy often take place
in the public sphere, conversely public activities and publicity is a component of the
private sphere (Bell, 1995; Bondi, 1998, Howell, 1993; Squires, 1994; Staeheli, 1997).
For example, when a neighborhood park initially thought of as public became the site of
an intimate private conversation between client and volunteer the perception of that place
as public changed, establishing it as a private personal safe place for the client. In this
way both clients and volunteers learn to re-map their concepts ofwhat is public and
private. For some clients getting to the edge of their driveway is significant progress. For
a volunteer the edge of the driveway may at first be viewed as part of the home space as
private property, but then is transformed into a space understood as part of the public
sphere.
"You forget you don't realize how far some things are. The front step is a long
way for some people. It took her a long time to get to the corner of the street.
What you take for granted as being safe or part of your home isn't for some
people, or that spaces like a park can be the best places for an intimate
conversation. You just stop taking some things for granted. I don't see Ottawa in
the same way; I look for different things now, things that might make someone
anxious. When I go to Confederation Park, I think of the talk we had how it
helped her, I don't think of all the people. But then I remember this is a park with
lots of people in the middle of tourist land, I've seen fireworks here... it's a big
public "Canadian" touristy place... but it isn't just that anymore" (Hannah).
Volunteering takes place not only in private sphere, but also through relations of privacy
and intimacy, often located within public spaces across the city. Public spaces are
sometimes best situated for the development of intimacy and privacy between volunteer
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and client because ofproblems within the home and because within their homes clients do
not feel they can talk freely. Public places may provide private spaces to converse, while
private settings may become spaces of public spectacle and family argument.
The client's needs and goals are the defining elements of the volunteer companion
relationship. Those goals and needs dictate the form that support takes. Because those
goals and needs are located within or near the client's homes, volunteer companions act
as citizens in the private sphere. Clients themselves should be understood as radical
citizens. First the support they receive is provided to them on the grounds of need rather
than bureaucratic policy, which for many is a more satisfactory politics (Fraser, 1989;
Lister, 2001). Second, it is through the process of companionship that the client is able to
become more mobile, access more public and private spaces and recreate their sense of
what is public and private, safe and unsafe.
"They [the volunteer companion] are there to support you and help you get out
and expand your safe place so you feel safe in the world and not just your
apartment. I mean for me the grocery store was a problem. First I had to take a
bus, which 1 could not do because of all the people I thought they were looking at
me, then the store, same thing, and its hard to get out of. But we would go on the
bus, and we would chat in a seat, I would focus on her, we'd have our own private
space on the bus with all the people there. The same for the grocery store. It made
them safer; I got past the anxiety thing with her there" (Samantha).
The shifting patterns and types of support provided by volunteer companions underlie a
characteristic of radical democracy: that citizenship is located in both public and private
spheres. The interaction of the volunteer companion and client within various geographies
helps to define what is understood as public and private by both client and volunteer.
Citizenship is not limited to being in public spaces, but is understood as a process of
belonging and feeling connected to place, which involves the ability to inhabit and move
freely within public and/or private spaces. In this way the volunteer companion program
is an important form and vehicle of citizenship that helps to create a sense of place and
the creation of safe spaces.
8.2.6 Volunteer companions and the spaces of citizenship
For Brown buddying, or being a volunteer companion, fits with Mouffe's discussion of
radical citizenship in three ways. First the lack of recognition of panic and agoraphobia
by the clinic/state, state in particular, exhibited by a lack of services helps to define a
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political dimension of volunteering. Additionally many of those who are agoraphobic
often exist in antagonistic relationships with their family and the clinic.
"All her daily requirements were met by her husband, and this was the problem.
He resented her tremendously... besides the isolation that she felt, she had no
girlfriends, she had no one around her except her husband, crotchety old man... so
that was even more depressing, and made it more depressing for her. So the lack
of self esteem as well as a lot of verbal abuse in the relationship. It absolutely
contributed to it [the agoraphobia]. And although he resented it, he enabled her in
her illness, because if she wanted to do anything, he wouldn't allow it, he would
say, no, no, no, I'll drive you (laughs). He's very dramatic" (Michelle).
Volunteers are there to assist the client in ways that their families cannot and the state will
not. This defines a political dimension of the volunteer companion, as volunteer
companions exist because that antagonism exists. The existence of the volunteer
companion is predicated upon the antagonistic relationships clients have with failed
support networks. Often volunteer companions are welcomed precisely because they are
not family, and the 'impersonal intimacy' of the volunteer companion relationship makes
the client feel unencumbered, more able to detach themselves from their current stifling
surroundings (Rooney, 2002). There are some clients who are not interested in developing
a relationship of intimacy with their volunteer, and some volunteers who do not want to
be intimate with their client. These clients use the volunteer as a watchdog monitor who
ensures through their 'public' viewing and bodily presence that the client achieves their
goals. In this way the volunteer companion acts as a public figure brought into a variety
of private spaces. The volunteer companion is situated within a network of other familial
relationships that reinforce and reflect new forms of family and the definition of "home"
(Brown, 1997:136). Thus, in examining volunteer companion relationships the geography
ofwhere citizenship occurs needs to be widened to include spaces of the family and
'home'.
Second, volunteer companions strive to make a difference in their clients' lives by
offering support.
"We were going from week to week and every week we got a little bit further. We
made it around the block and we finally went into a coffee shop. And she felt
really good about herselfwhen she did that. And we continued, as a result of this
she started to feel a change within herself and she started wanting to be more
independent, and she told me that sometimes she would like to do this by herself.
She'd like to go outside to the coffee shop and go and do whatever, maybe. And
she got stronger that way. And I had to sit back. And then every time I went and
saw her, she seemed a bit better and you know I was very happy in the beginning,
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but then it's like she flew on her own and she just went off and it was great. She
started becoming a lot more independent" (Maria).
Third, volunteer companions and their clients embody a "de-centered subjectivity"
another way in which they become radical citizens (Brown, 1997:129). Agoraphobic
clients generally do not fit within classical definitions of the citizen. Clients of the ADAO
are often women who have multiple illnesses and disabilities, and generally avoid public
places and the public sphere. Additionally as many volunteer companions have been
agoraphobic themselves, or have suffered other ailments and illnesses, these companions
like their clients do not comfortably fit into classical definitions of citizenship. The
volunteer companion defies fixed definition and subjectivity, because many of the
volunteers have been former clients of the program themselves and because being a
volunteer involves a wide variety of social relations and positions.
8.2.7 Section summary
Section 8.2 has illustrated the ways in which the volunteer companion program could be
understood as a form of radical citizenship. This is important because health citizenship is
often positioned in antagonistic relations to the state and clinic. Health citizenship should
be thought of in terms of an alternative or antagonism to the dominant model of the
healthy citizen upon which much clinical and public health services are based. In order
for radical democracy to be an example of health citizenship, as it is with the volunteer
companion program, it must offer an alternative that more clearly addresses the lived
realities and needs of those with anxiety conditions. Because the volunteer companion
program is client directed and sufferer led it is more conducive to addressing the needs
and desires of those who are agoraphobic, not offered by other service providers, thus
offers a better model of health citizenship.
Unlike the buddies Brown describes, volunteer companions do not have to deal with the
impending death of their clients. Unlike AIDS buddies, most volunteer companions see
their clients getting progressively better, thus there are significant rewards for both client
and volunteer from the volunteer companion process. Many volunteer companions have
remained with a client for many years, and after the client no longer needs the volunteer a
friendship still remains. The volunteer companion program highlights how private
relations of support are political acts that contribute to the construction of citizenship. Not
having this support exacerbates the clients struggle with their anxiety condition and
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places them on an unequal footing with other members of the community. Ultimately, the
volunteer companion program strives to make changes in both clients and volunteers'
lives:
"People volunteer to feel needed, valued or have social contact as well, so the
volunteer program is a benefit, it's a very healthy benefit. It made me feel
connected, especially because I am new to Ottawa, I felt connected to the city"
(Maria).
The diversity of locations in which the volunteer companion program is exercised enable
relations of citizenship to emerge in the volunteer companion relationship. For volunteer
companions like buddies "just being there" does not mean just being anywhere (Brown,
1997:154).
8.3 Community development as health citizenship.
8.3.1 Introduction
This section expands on the discussion of health citizenship and radical democracy in the
previous section by exploring how the volunteer companion program is an example of
community development, what Ruth Lister (1998) describes as citizenship in action. The
volunteer companion program is one example of how the ADAO is involved in a process
of developing and negotiating community. The theorists I draw upon within this section
understand community as an expression of diversity rather than homogeneity.
Community development is a process in which difference and collaboration are central.
Thus if community development is thought of as a form of active citizenship, citizenship
itself is also a process of creating and celebrating a diverse range of subjectivities within a
collectivity, rather than a process of replicating the subject.
8.3.2 Community and the politics of difference
In her book Justice and the Politics ofDifference Young (1990) critiques a vision of
democracy modeled on face-to-face relationships that are assumed to be transparent and
translate into an immediate mutuality. She expands on this critique throughout her
writings on the politics of community (Young, 1997; 2000). For many her discussion of
community offers a better model of community and inclusivity. It is an approach to
community that honors the desire for mutual belonging and recognition without reifying
community as an ideal (Hirschmann and Di Stefano, 1997:9).
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According to Young the model of face-to-face relationships is predicated on the 'ideal of
community', an ideal that denies both differences and the basic asymmetry between
subjects (Young, 1990:231). Community becomes problematic when its model is based
on the "co-presence of subjects" that mandates self transparency and transparency to
others (Young, 1990:235). Thus Young argues that the idealization of community
privileges unity over difference thereby facilitating social exclusion and divisions
(Young, 1990).
As an ideal, community is internally defined by its members on the basis of shared
experience and common interpretation (Stanley, 1978 in Phelan, 1989). In this way
community becomes a form of commonality, a group whose common characteristics and
common identity preexists its members as essential attributes. A definition of community
as "the common" is one in which identity is consolidated and internal to the group rather
than "in common", a definition of community that advocates a framework for both the
deconstruction of identities and the representation of the group. This latter framework is
identified within feminist theory as a diversity perspective, which is the framework
Young works within (Young, 1991). Diversity perspectives go 'beyond' equality
perspectives that argue for integration into existing structures, and beyond difference
perspectives that seek to privilege the subordinated and marginal. Diversity perspectives
deconstruct the division ofequality/difference itself (Bock and James, 1992). As Grosz
argues the "issue for diversity theorists is not to privilege one term at the expense of the
other, but to explore the cost of their maintenance" (Grosz, 1994:32).
For Young what makes a group or community is not internal to the attributes and self-
understanding of its members but relation in which it stands to others (Young, 1997:389).
Community, or social groups are not limited to the commonality of persons who seek a
particular goal, or desire the same policy, or share similar political beliefs - shared interest
alone is not sufficient to constitute a social group (Young, 1990:186).Young is not
suggesting that community is not connected to internally defined meaning, but rather that
people within the community are more than just the group and that the identity politics of
community often rigidly defines and limits individual and group identity (Squires, 2001).
Group representation, or 'community', does not have to be centered on an interest or
identity based conception of community that focuses on the politics of
inclusion/exclusion and equality/difference. Communities can organize around 'identity
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politics' but shared experience is not an automatic guarantee of community, as there is
always diversity and disagreement within any community or group (Phillips, 1995).
Young's critique of the ideal of community is a commentary on the nature ofjustice
within contemporary democratic models. Young's thesis is a critique of the ideal of
impartiality and a unified polity that she rejects on the grounds that it promotes the
particular standpoint of the privileged as if it were a universalist standpoint, thereby
legitimating the privileged and invalidating as partial the viewpoints of the oppressed.
Instead she argues that a conception ofjustice, which challenges institutional domination
and oppression, should offer a vision of a heterogeneous public that acknowledges and
affirms group differences (Young, 1990:10). To achieve this a democratic public should,
she contends, provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of the
distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or
disadvantaged (Lister, 1997:78).
Politics, like community, needs to be conceived of as a relationship across time and space
of strangers who do not understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense
(Young, 1990: 233-4). This is important because when 'community' and politics appeals
not just to what is "in common" but to "the common", or sameness the "closure of the
political" is imminent (Nancy, 1991). Young's work stresses the importance of attending
to the social relations that differently position people and condition their experiences,
opportunities and knowledge of society rather than simply formally including all affected
individuals in the same way (Young, 2000:83). Communities are not heterogeneous
entities or distinguishable 'things' but a diverse political process of interrelationships and
networks of individuals and groups. Therefore for Young, drawing on a deliberative
democratic tradition, collaboration, participation and partnership are more integral to an
understanding of community (Squires, 2001). Community needs to be directed towards
deliberation with other social groups in the hopes of creating a metaphoric and actual
space of reciprocity between various interests.
8.3.3 Community development as active citizenship
Ruth Lister's theorizing of citizenship is based on Young's discussion of community as a
destabilizing force that brings us face to face with multiplicity and difference, rather than
community as a homogenous entity that serves to delimit the way in which we understand
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ourselves and interact with others. Lister's work on citizenship, similar to Young's work
on community, challenges the way in which community is idealized as a natural
phenomenon of similar people who are coming together. Thus, Lister's vision of
community as a form of active citizenship is a vision of bringing together people with
different identity politics through community development (Lister, 2001;Young, 1997).
Community is about the negotiation and creation of difference and celebration of
diversity.
The gathering together of people who may come from very different places and positions
and who share a set of goals and aims was a common way that interviewees described
why the volunteer companion program helps to develop the ADAO's community. The
volunteer companion program necessarily highlights the way in which people with
different experiences, viewpoints and to some extent different goals can come together to
form bonds of community.
"On the whole my volunteer experiences have been with clients that I was very
different from, but that did not matter... But with many of the clients, through the
program, we developed a friendship that we have continued even after the match
was over, and she did not need my help. We still go to the movies, and sometimes
I have lunch at her place... what is amazing is that she wants to be a volunteer
now, she feels well enough to help someone like I helped her. The experience
really connected me, and I think she felt connected, to the ADAO, it's become
part of her, of both of our communities...we both tell everyone about our
experience with the program and recommend it to anyone we know...that
connection and appreciation she has for the ADAO is why I think she wants to be
a volunteer" (Anne M.).
Lister (1997) focuses on how community is both internally and externally differentiated,
defined by both what is inside and outside of it. Thus, any community is comprised of a
wide range of voices and perspectives that help shape its content and form. In this way
Lister argues first; like Mouffe that all communities have an anagonistic function, that the
political process is an always ongoing process of negotiating difference; and second, like
Young that community has an integrative function that allows us to network with others
at the same time as it forces individuals and groups to think about issues of positionality.
In combining both Young and Mouffe's work, Lister (1998; 2001) highlights how
citizenship can act a force of inclusion as well as exclusion. Through community
development a group or individual may come to realize their lack of place within the
wider political and public sphere. An experience felt by volunteers and clients at times
while trying to access resources and work through various client goals.
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"The volunteer program is there to help them overcome whatever they are dealing
with...I think that is very important and that is what makes it a community. But I
have been disappointed because I try to help her, things she wants help with and
they (outside resources) are not there for us, we have to make our own places, we
have to be even more resourceful to achieve her goals" (Lauren).
What is most central for Lister is that community development needs to be understood as
a form of citizenship in action, a central political act that connects both individuals and
groups together and to the state (Lister, 1998). Thus, rather than viewing community as a
background for politics, community becomes the basis for politics (Phelan, 1989).
According to Lister citizenship and community are linked because both are seen to be
process involving political participation and a status involving rights. She identifies two
main citizenship traditions - civic republicanism where citizenship is understood as a
status involving rights, and classical liberalism where citizenship is understood as a
practice involving political participation. For Lister these traditions combine to provide a
framework in which women's actions and activities within spaces and spheres not
traditionally thought of as political, such as community, can be seen as a form of active
citizenship (Lister, 1997; 2001). By extending the realm of the political to include
community development, Lister is suggesting, like Brown, the importance of looking for
new spaces and subjects of citizenship, spaces that have historically been de-politicized
and thus marginalized or privatized.
The ADAO, through programs such as the volunteer companion program help create
these new spaces of citizenship - it is an important actor involved within a wider network
of political action. Lister's linking of community and citizenship suggests that programs
such as the volunteer companion program are political processes that connect individuals
within the ADAO to one other, and that also entitle those individuals to engage within the
public and private realms of the clinic/state. Because the volunteer companion program is
directly involved in the re-creation of agoraphobic spaces, geographies that have
historically been isolated and excluded from the public sphere of political participation,
active citizenship is extended to people and places it had not been before. Additionally,
development of the ADAO's community, though the volunteer companion program
allows for the articulation of experiences that have previously been marginalized and
silenced. The ADAO's community development process not only brings to light the lack
of voices and experiences of anxiety sufferers, but the lack of places for persons with
anxiety. The volunteer companion program seeks to repair that lack by extending
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potential spaces of community for agoraphobic individuals who have avoided the public
and private spaces in which community is negotiated. A central purpose of the ADAO, as
suggested by their mandate, is to connect sufferers to each other and to a wider public in
different ways. As one interviewee discusses: "it is very important to connect people,
especially people who are restricted in society and who have limited freedom, connecting
them more to the community in everyday ways" (Olivia). In this way the ADAO acts to
support a wide range of individuals and their families. This encourages people to be
involved in a range ofother relevant communities and those wider communities help to
shape the identity and boundaries of the ADAO.
Community development as a form of active citizenship should also be seen as
"community work" (Milroy and Wismer, 1994). The term community work acts as a new
conceptual framework that highlights the limitations and inherent contradictions of
conventional private/public formulations and women's places within those formulations
(Milroy and Wismer, 1994). Community work is a term for "the work that women (and
men) do outside of their homes and paid working hours, and within their localities"
(Milroy and Wismer, 1994:72). This definition is limiting and problematic when thinking
about the ADAO for two central reasons. First, many members, including the executive
director herself, are agoraphobic and housebound and cannot work outside of their homes.
Second, the volunteer, client and the ADAO are all involved in the community work that
helps to expand and develop the ADAO's community. What is useful about Milroy and
Wismer's notion of community work is their description of it as maintenance work- part
of the social glue that holds people together. Community work is essential for the
building of networks and connections between individuals and groups that help to
dissolve the bipolar way in which the terms 'public' and 'private' are used (Milroy and
Wismer, 1994).
Understanding community development or community work as a form of citizenship is
important as community is a part of the debate within western countries about the social
rights of citizenship (Staeheli, 2003:816). In one sense this has to do with a context of
shifting national and economic conditions in which service provision is being transferred
from public health agencies and the state to 'communities' themselves (although the
extent to which those communities are still directed by public health institutions is a
important issue) (Staeheli, 2003:816). In another sense this has to do with the use and
idea of community as a means of establishing social change, and as a basis for building an
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inclusive society in which social justice can be achieved (Staeheli, 2003:816).
Community, thus, becomes a space for political and social change. Often community
development is viewed as a political process, through a focus on empowerment as well as
educational and consciousness raising work that may lead to empowerment (Staeheli,
2003:825). Empowerment, through increased mobility is a key goal of the volunteer
companion program, as well as a common response (or expectation) by both clients and
volunteers who have gone through the program.
"Our goals [for the volunteer companion program] are to help our participants:
understand what panic and agoraphobia are; develop coping skills; build self
confidence; develop self esteem; foster independence; see themselves as right just
as they are; find the appropriate help when asked; set and achieve goals; and
participate in life more freely without fear" (APVA, 1998:40).
Community development is often viewed as a process of harnessing and creating social
change, as a way of connecting individuals and groups, as a space of mutuality in which
the development of social trust is possible. Community development, as a process of
social change, is both an attempt to engender and enrich a sense of place as well as an
attempt to locate and identify that community within the geographies in which it is
situated (Staeheli, 2003:827). The extent to which community development does create
social and political change, change that would lead to valuing inclusivity, is a central
issue. However this is an issue which is difficult to answer or measure within the
timeframe of the research context, and without extensive follow-up of volunteers and
clients.
8.3.4 Shifting spheres - community and the public/private divide
The creation of new spaces and subjects of citizenship are connected to a repolitization
and rethinking of the relation between community, citizenship and the public- private
divide (Pateman, 1988; 1989). Young's work on community is based on an analysis of
modern citizenship as constructed as a separation between the public and private that
presents the public as the realm of homogeneity and universality and relegates difference
to the private sphere. Thus, for Young (1990; 2001) and Lister (1997) one crucial
problem is that the public realm of citizenship has been presented as expressing a general
will, a point of view that citizens have transcended their differences to form a common
unified identity. Young argues in favor of a repolitization of public life that would not
require the creation of a public realm in which citizens leave behind their particular group
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affiliation and needs in order to discuss the common good (Young, 1990). In its place she
proposes the creation of a heterogeneous public that provides mechanisms for effective
recognition and representation of distinct voices and perspectives of groups that are
disadvantaged or oppressed. In her more recent work, Young focuses on the relationship
between community and positionality, which better enables thinking about groups, or
community as constituted through relations among persons within various geographies
(Bondi, 1993 in Young, 2000:100). For Young this means that the situated knowledge of
people located in different group positions acts as a resource for increasing the
understanding of a wider public that helps to promote public discussion and decision
making, moving those people beyond their own parochial interests (Young, 2000:109).
Young's analysis of the public and private sphere in relation to community is extended
and more thoroughly developed and discussed within feminist geography. Feminist
researchers, and feminist geographical researchers in particular, argue that the
public/private, community/individual coexist in complex combinations in everyday life
that continually shift (Bondi, 1998; Bondi and Domosh, 1998; Duncan, 1996; Staeheli,
1997; Squires, 1994). Community is shifted between, to and from the private to public
sphere depending on how that community is characterized and privileged (Shanley and
Narayan, 1997). For example, when a community is not seen as 'public' it may not
receive government funding, support or publicity that may be disabling and
counterproductive. But, when community is seen as private it is subject to a different
(often lesser) amount of scrutiny, regulation and observation that may be enabling.
'Community' is conceptualized in public and private ways that reinforce and subvert that
dualism and its associated dualisms (Shanley and Pateman, 1994). As a public,
community functions are action and awareness oriented; they are directed towards the
creation ofjustice and care as community politics. The community is there to serve the
needs of its groups and a wider group of individuals. Community in a public sense is
about service provision; communities are accountable to the state and its citizenry.
Community as an extension of the private is about relations of intimacy and friendship
that develop bonds ofmutuality. Community is related to the interpersonal bonds of
family focused on the development of kinship and identity politics. But community work
is also thought of as a process of networking and socialization that is neither simply
public nor private.
The space of community development remaps the boundaries between what is public and
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private through practices of care and a focus on interdependence, sociability and the
relational nature of individual and group. Spaces created through community
development act as a 'space of betweeness' (Staeheli, 2003) that link the public and
private in a variety ofways, what Moore and Milroy describe as a "third sphere" in which
new political practices an ideas more conducive to the experience of care marginalized
within the private sphere as women's work (Moore and Milroy, 1994). Staeheli in her
own study of the work of community identifies three ways in which community work
reflects norms, practices and metaphorical locations associated with the public and
private, with publicity and privacy (Staeheli, 1997; 2003). These three observations are
also applicable to thinking about the ways in which the volunteer companion program as
community work reflects the dynamism of the public and private, an issue discussed
earlier in this chapter (see also Brown, 1997; 1999; 2003). The first has to do with the
motivation for doing community work which is shaped by experiences within the
personal space of the home or private as well as by experiences and structures of
opportunity outside the home (Staeheli, 2003:829). This is further complicated within the
volunteer companion program, as part of the motivation for the program is to reshape the
private and public worlds ofwhat is and what is not home, thus to remap private and
public spaces as safe personal spaces. Second, the place in which community work is
done is often in spaces that are themselves ambiguous with respect to the private and
public (Staeheli, 2003:829). Third, and related to the second, "the spaces of betweeness"
in which community is developed allows for a negotiation of various pressures and
influences that may allow for changes within the wider society and amongst individuals
themselves, connecting the public and private through the opening up of public programs
and structures into the household (Staeheli, 2003:829).
Community politics can act as an alternative to state-based politics and as such are
instrumental in the redevelopment of spaces in which alternatives can be heard. The
association of community with meanings of the public and private sphere is about
processes of inclusion, exclusion and legitimation that are racialized, gendered,
medicalized and sexualized (Dwyer, 1999; Brown, 1999). What is ultimately at stake in
community development is not its definition but a political struggle over power and
resources (Hirschmann and Di Stefano, 1996:8). Thus the community work of the




This section has illustrated that the volunteer companion program is an example of how
the ADAO is actively engaged in a process of community development/work that should
be understood as citizenship in action. As community is about bringing diverse
knowledges and people together, citizenship is also a process of recognizing and working
with difference rather than subsuming difference into a model of the same. For the
ADAO community development is a process that is connected to the politics of difference
and creation of places in which difference is possible. These spaces of difference
challenge dualistic mappings of the public and private onto specific places, activities and
persons. In this way the section highlights two central aspects of health citizenship. First,
the importance of diversity and difference within a model of health citizenship, and
second, the potential to create networks of attachments in the form of community, thus
increase the well being of individuals through those supportive networks.
The analysis of the volunteer companion program as an example of community work or
community development is a project ofenvisioning community as a negotiation and
political/social process located through geography, subjectivity and identity. Programs
such as the volunteer companion program are not only examples of community
development but also help the ADAO establish a sense of community, as well as, a place
for itself within the wider network of service providers. The volunteer companion
program highlights how 'community' is constructed within and by geographic relations of
place and space connected to issues of identity and group politics. The meaning of
'community' is both temporally and spatially negotiated creating both real and imagined
spaces, as well as real and imagined communities that destabilize the bipolar use of the
terms private and public. 'Community' and community development forms a discursive
structure ofmeaning within and outside of the ADAO. Therefore, community
development is an ongoing process of negotiating difference and recognizing the
importance of positionality. The spaces of community created by the volunteer
companion program offer sufferers and volunteers viable alternative spaces of citizenship
in which people can create or at least strive to effect change in the lives of those with
anxiety conditions and thus work towards a model of health citizenship.
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8.4 Conclusion
The discussion of health citizenship in this chapter has drawn upon various feminist,
geographical and political theorists. While these theorists' commitment to a feminist
politics, and the improvement ofwomen's (and men's) lives, unifies them, there are many
differences between the political traditions and contexts these authors are embedded
within and the type of democracy they aspire to. Within this chapter aspects of all their
work are seen as complementary in thinking through issues of health citizenship and
community development/ organization.
This chapter poses the question ofwhether the ADAO is engaged in developing forms of
citizenship that are enabling and productive for its members and for the organization as a
whole. There is no consensus on a singular meaning of community, but there is general
agreement amongst interviewees that the ADAO is involved in a process of community
development for the purpose of creating different options and alternative spaces for those
with anxiety conditions. Thus the ADAO is involved in a process of health citizenship
because it highlights the needs and lived experiences of individuals with anxiety
conditions and incorporates those experiences into a model of citizenship and subjectivity
rather than using those experiences as something to strive against, thereby ignoring many
of the realities and problems faced by those with anxiety conditions. Rather than negating
one's own experience of ill health in the pursuit of an ideal of an 'able' sickness free body
and subjectivity, the experience of ill health becomes a constituent part of citizenship as
opposed to its antithesis.
To the extent that community, and community development is an expression of, or
movement towards, social and political action, then community development is connected
to health citizenship. Health citizenship is not just about recognizing and incorporating
the differing lived realities of health into a model of personhood, it is about creating
places in which difference is enacted upon. The ADAO strives to effect change in
people's lives in ways that suggest the importance of those lives, and the need for those
experiences to be counted and explored in a wider political or public forum, and it is
strengthened to do so through its bonds of community.
This chapter has illustrated that the ADAO does act as a space of active and radical
democracy, therefore the potential to create new spaces of citizenship exists. Yet, the
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substantive section of the thesis ends on an uncertain note as to whether the ADAO will
continue to create new democratic forms as it continues to expand and further negotiate
the balance between maintaining its own direction and networking with anxiety service
providers that are becoming more clinically oriented. This cannot be answered directly
within the context of the thesis, as the question is outside the scope of the thesis affected
by processes and people that are constantly changing. However, the thesis points the
ADAO in a direction that may help the organization in the creation of its own space , as
well as highlighting contributions the ADAO has made that can be used in order to
network with other anxiety service providers on a more equitable footing. The thesis has
shown the importance of health citizenship for the ADAO. But, in order for the ADAO to
be an effective example of health citizenship, it must continue to create spaces in which
the experiences of those with anxiety conditions are incorporated into a model of
subjectivity so that they can be transformed into public awareness, education, service
provision and political action. In order for the ADAO to promote health citizenship it
must recognize the various qualities and alternatives it has to offer individuals affected by
anxiety, other anxiety service providers and the public at large. Hence, we come back to
one of the primary aims of the thesis, enhancing the ADAO's own recognition and
acknowledgement ofwhat it has to offer not just in terms of programs and educational
services, but in terms of knowledge production, community and subjectivity.
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Chapter Nine - Conclusions
9.1 Chapter outline - why geography?
Invariably the first question I was asked by interviewees asked was: why is a geographer
interested in the ADAO, or in anxiety conditions for that matter? The answer as
illustrated throughout the thesis is that the experiences of the ADAO and of individuals
who are affected by anxiety conditions are intimately spatial on a variety of intersecting
scales. One of the aims of the thesis was to provide geographical insights of relevance to
the experience of individuals with anxiety conditions and groups that deal with anxiety
conditions. The thesis aimed to illustrate the connections between geography and
embodied experiences of anxiety, mental health service provision and the negotiation of
identity, community and citizenship. Having shown and analyzed why a geographer
would be interested by the ADAO, and the relevance geography has for an understanding
of the ADAO and ofanxiety conditions more broadly, in this conclusion I turn to another
aim of the thesis: to contribute to the production of geographical, political, and feminist
knowledge and theory. In this conclusion I focus briefly on some of the contributions the
thesis has made to the subject of geography. But, before outlining the form and content of
the thesis's contributions, I will present an overview of the research project, its
development towards this final form and an outline/review of the thesis chapter structure.
9.2 Thesis project overview
From the outset the research has been an interdisciplinary project. Bringing together a
wider range of literatures, notably geographical, feminist, sociological, and feminist
political literatures reflected an interest in the multifaceted ways of understanding anxiety
conditions such as panic and agoraphobia and the organizations that deal with those
conditions (the ADAO). It also reflected a desire to challenge the perceived,
predominance of bio-medical and psychological - clinical - interpretations, explanations
and approaches to anxiety 'disorders' by practitioners and organizations. The use of
geographical literature emphasized the centrality of boundaries, spaces and places (both
internal and external to the body) within an understanding of anxiety conditions,
specifically panic and agoraphobia, and within the context of organizational development.
The use of political theory helped to unpack the issue of an embodied subjectivity, which
centered on the terms 'healthy citizen' and 'health citizenship'. This presented a
significant departure from existing literatures on anxiety conditions, suggestive of the
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different ways in which experiences of anxiety conditions and the ADAO can be
approached.
Specifically feminist geographical and feminist political theory and methodology was
employed because this thesis is concerned to emphasize and uncover voices and
experiences that have been marginalized in practice and in the academy. As demonstrated
in the literature review, chapter two, drawing from these literatures much emphasis was
placed on gaps within the existing literature on anxiety conditions with an emphasis on
the first hand, lived experiences and narratives of people with anxiety conditions and
members of the ADAO themselves. Because the voices of organizations,
voluntary/grassroots/suffer-led/'community based' groups in particular, are absent from
clinical and non clinical literatures, this research project was concerned to discover their
stories and further explore what these insights have to offer both the organization and
academic knowledge production. The stories of those I interviewed simultaneously had an
individual and collective dimension that highlighted the centrality of both
group/organizational experience and individual experience in the production of selves,
subjects and spaces. In making these narratives and issues central to the thesis, my
strategy was to prioritize the concerns of sufferers and the ADAO and to allow the
research to develop in a responsive manner to their issues and concerns. Hence emerged
the question of how to balance the tension between the ADAO maintaining its own
direction, creating its own space and networking with other organizations and wider
communities in order to receive further public recognition, to expand one's membership,
share knowledges, and to gain further perceived 'legitimacy' as an organization. Further,
by presenting and situating in-depth inquiries into individual and collective experiences
of anxiety conditions, notably panic and agoraphobia, using a wider variety of literatures
the thesis emphasized the relevance of those experiences as socially, politically,
somatically and spatially mediated. In these ways, it was hoped that a new, more
sympathetic and inclusive accounts of anxiety conditions and the ADAO would be
allowed to emerge.
These wider literatures were reviewed in chapter two. The literature review provides
information about anxiety conditions and agoraphobia and thus lends insight to issues that
the ADAO must practically address. However the literature review goes well beyond
discussions of anxiety and agoraphobia within the organization to show how anxiety
conditions and agoraphobia are of relevance to a wide range of issues pertaining to
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geography and subjectivity. The literature review chapter expands on material that helps
the reader understand more about issues pertinent to anxiety service provision with
specific reference to the importance of geographical work on mental health and 'health
care', thus, chapter two focuses on the spatial aspects of service provision and mental
health, largely absent within the wider literature on anxiety conditions. The literature
review expands on that geographical literature by exploring the connections between
anxiety service provision and concepts of subjectivity. In this way the section addresses
questions about political and collective responses to anxiety conditions in the form of
anxiety service provision. By unpacking and analyzing the issues of care and autonomy
the chapter focuses the readers direction towards central themes within the thesis that are
instrumental to an understanding of citizenship, mental health, and feminist and
geographical scholarship more broadly.
As shown in chapter three, methodologically organizing the thesis was a complex and
ongoing process. In the chapter I address some of the complexity of the research process
by outlining how I intended to address the project's concerns, explaining the connection
between issues central to feminist and feminist geographical methodologies and methods
and my approach to the research project. The issue ofmethodological irony discussed in
chapter three, has come not only to be important in thinking about methodological issues,
but in thinking about the thesis analysis, and the way in which the thesis has addressed
the ADAO's question ofwhere to go next? Methodological irony means that the
researcher is positioned in a situation that resists resolution in order to act politically
without pretending that resolution has come, to both stay honest and keep moving
(Ferguson, 1991:338). The question of what constitutes an effective balance has not been
fully resolved in the thesis, and to pretend that such a complex question could be resolved
is problematic and not practically possible within the space of the research project.
However this does not mean that I do not offer a way of thinking about this tension within
the thesis, nor does it mean that the thesis does not provide some insight of relevance to
that issue. The focus on health citizenship is both a theoretically informed and strategic
one, which offers a different way into the question of organizational 'growth'. An
analysis of the way that health citizenship is fostered within the ADAO provides a
different way of looking at what the ADAO has to offer its membership and other service
providers. The thesis highlights the ways in which the ADAO has created a space of its
own that addresses needs not provided for by other organizations and institutions and
therefore can potentially inform the direction of anxiety service provision as a whole. It is
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important that the ADAO recognize the contributions they make in creating antagonistic
and deliberative spaces of difference, because the direction the ADAO has been heading
towards moves away from creating spaces in which different experiences of sufferers are
addressed. The thesis has shown, as an example ofmy own 'anxiety' about the direction
the ADAO is heading in, that the ADAO is adopting clinical structures and knowledges
that serve to homogenize anxiety service provision rather than diversify it. Additionally
and more problematically these forms of clinical service provision often fail to
acknowledge the daily-lived realities of anxiety conditions, thus further silence many
individual and group experiences.
Because of subject of the thesis is the ADAO, it is important to provide detailed
information about the group that helps the reader understand more about the organization
and its history, as well as help the reader have a clearer understanding of some ofmy
motivations for researching the group, as the ADAO offers a fascinating case study for
analysis. This is done throughout the thesis, but is focused on in chapter four where
detailed information about important aspects of the organizations history, structure,
mandate, services, programs and background information on the relationship between the
ADAO and other service providers within the city and country. In so doing chapter four
involves a critique and analysis of the power relations involved within the ADAO, and
between the ADAO and other anxiety service providers that helps the reader understand
why the tension between adopting other voices and celebrating one's own voice is such a
crucial and central issue. This chapter provides information that helps to construct new
and critical questions about knowledge practices and power relations that are constitutive
of the identities and communities that have shaped the ADAO in more precise and
informed ways.
The next four chapters provide the substantive material of the thesis and use interview
material as well as collected data from the ADAO and other service providers to expand
on a variety of themes, theoretical propositions and highlight the importance of health
citizenship in the context of creating spaces in which difference are possible. Spaces that
directly contribute back to the productive development of sufferer's identities,
subjectivities and communities. Each chapter is its own story, connected together through
themes such as health citizenship. Within chapters five through eight the thesis argues for
the development of'health citizenship' as opposed to a model of the normative 'healthy
citizen' upon which the clinic and health care practice is based. The substantive chapters
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move back and forth between models of health citizenship and the healthy citizen arguing
that the ADAO relies on both forms of subjectivity. The thesis has examined the tensions
involved in negotiating the place of healthy citizens and health citizenship within the
ADAO. Both the healthy citizen and health citizenship are important for the ADAO, as
the ADAO must address that there are sufferers who want, and need, to be a part of an
established and hegemonic clinical care culture, as well as, those who do not accept or fit
within those structures and need alternative places from which to get assistance and
inspiration. The healthy citizen-subject is an abstract ideal created and maintained by
processes of governmentality, expert knowledges and a self-care ethic. The healthy
citizen is able through detached objectivity, self-discipline and a bounded, 'independent',
sense of self to become an effective, productive member of society. Health citizenship
highlights the needs and lived experiences of individuals with anxiety conditions and
incorporates those experiences into a model of citizenship and subjectivity rather than
using those experiences as something to strive against, thereby ignoring many of the
realities and problems faced by those with anxiety conditions. Rather than negating one's
own experience of ill health in the pursuit of an ideal of an 'able' sickness free body and
subjectivity, the experience of ill health becomes a constituent part of citizenship as
opposed to its antithesis. Thus, the thesis argues that through the development of health
citizenship the ADAO potentially offers a better model of subjectivity and community
that help to create alternative forms and geographies of active citizenship and radical
democracy.
In chapters five, 'body', and six, 'mind' I elaborate on aspects of the healthy citizen, and
how the healthy citizen is linked to the production of specific beliefs about the body and
the self. In these two chapters I show how the healthy citizen is predicated on the
construction of a docile body that is inscribed by normative and hegemonic forms of
clinical care. In these two chapters the issue of lack of self-trust about the body and the
self are instrumental in understanding how the healthy citizen is formed. Additionally,
chapter five posed a question about whether an examination of the body can help to
achieve more emancipatory social and political relations in addressing issues of
marginalization and social justice (Longhurst, 2000:5). The thesis has shown throughout
that health citizenship is concerned with body politics. In a model of health citizenship
embodied subject positions, the spaces of the body, and the relationship of the body to
wider geographies are central to exposing forms of marginalization and creating more
deliberative, anagonistic and antagonistic forms of social justice. Chapter five, 'body',
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focuses on how surveillance and visibility of the body helps to create a docile body,
which must be seen in specific ways through specific lenses in order to be understood.
The body is made comprehendible through the knowledge of clinical practices, which are
then internalized and adopted by sufferers as their own. I explore how the need for the
body to be seen creates problems for individuals and organizations that deal with anxiety
conditions.
Chapter six, 'mind', focuses on how forms of knowledge production help to create a
docile body. The privileging of expert or professional forms of knowledge helps to
establish who can make claims about the self. 1 explore how the ADAO has adopted the
importance of expertise in order to be more accepted within the mental health service
sector and to be seen to be a more legitimate 'clinically based' organization. These two
chapters however, also point to the ways that the healthy citizen is adopted and resisted
by the ADAO in subtle, yet important ways. In this way the thesis suggests that there is
always the possibility of resistance to the healthy citizen even within those discourses
themselves.
The next two chapters explore how the ADAO works towards a version of health
citizenship that focuses on spaces where the possibilities of difference and diversity are
actualized. The chapters highlight that the ADAO serves an important function within the
mental health community by providing alternative approaches and structures to sufferers,
which may in fact be more democratic and equitable. In this way the thesis posits that the
ADAO offers a better model of subjectivity, identity and community than do many other
service providers. Thus the ADAO is an important organization whose usefulness needs
to be acknowledged by the mental health community more broadly and the organization
itself. Both, but especially the ADAO, need to recognize and celebrate what the ADAO
has to offer a wider public that is different from what already exists within the mental
health service sector. Chapter seven, 'heart', focuses on what makes the ADAO different
from other service providers, stemming largely from the fact that it is a consumer led
initiative based in first hand knowledge of anxiety conditions and lay expertise. In this
chapter I explore an aspect of its uniqueness - its focus on relational autonomy. In other
words the importance the ADAO places on relations of interdependence and
interconnectedness within relationships that are often mutual and non-rigid help establish
the ADAO as a different kind of service provider, with different things to offer sufferers
and the wider public. In this way health citizenship is linked to reclaiming self-trust and
challenging the idealization of independence upon which the healthy citizen is predicated.
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Chapter eight, 'breath', focuses on how issues developed in the heart chapter are
translated into alternative material spaces of difference. The breath chapter is specifically
about elaborating aspects of health citizenship through the example of the volunteer
companion program, and linking health citizenship to ideas about democracy and
community development. These two chapters specifically used concepts and themes that
are not conventionally thought of in the context of anxiety service provision in order to
challenge the criteria by which health service providers are judged. The concepts of
relational autonomy and health citizenship were chosen because they exist as discourses
that remain disconnected from work within, and by, the ADAO and yet are intimately
connected to the work of the ADAO and to understanding or improving the quality of
people's lives more generally.
In summation, the ADAO is an organization that has the potential to affect individuals'
lives, the life of the community and the world of politics. The ADAO is engaged in a
form of politics that is different and antagonistic in many ways from its context of service
provision. This needs to be acknowledged, celebrated, or at least worked with in
productive ways. In other words the thesis argues that the ADAO is an important
organization that serves as a model of democratic possibility and of change. This thesis
aimed to show that anxiety conditions, and the organizations that address issues of
anxiety, provide important, instructive lessons and knowledges about the content and
contexts ofwestern societies. Experiences of anxiety do matter and need to be counted,
not just individual experiences but collective and organizational experiences as well.
9.3 Thinking about citizenship through the ADAO case study
Within the thesis I focused upon two interconnected yet fundamentally different models
of citizenship - "the healthy citizen" and "health citizenship". The healthy citizen
involves the pursuit of an ideal 'able', sickness free body and subjectivity. This is central
to both the clinical care system that often bifurcates the experience of ill health in favor of
outcomes. The healthy citizen refers to a model of citizenship in which individuals strive
towards goals and versions of personhood that are given to them, which are then
reworked in directed, specific but multiple ways. The healthy citizen is based on ideals
and ideas that have helped structure various dualisms, such as mind/body, able/disabled,
man/woman. It is a model of citizenship that is not concerned with a complex variety of
embodied experiences, but rather that seeks to bring people together towards a particular
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version of embodiment associated with productivity and health that we must comply with
in order to be recognized as citizens. Alternatively, within a model of health citizenship
the experience of ill health becomes a constituent part of citizenship as opposed to its
antithesis. Health citizenship actively fosters the needs and lived experiences of
individuals with anxiety conditions and incorporates those experiences into a model of
citizenship and subjectivity rather than using those experiences as something to strive
against.
I have demonstrated how both these models are demonstrated in practice by the ADAO.
On the one hand the move towards clinical approaches and models that have largely been
developed by experts and professionalsfor sufferers is an example of the model of the
healthy citizen, while as the incorporation of aspects of anxiety health based on the lived
experiences of sufferer's themselves by sufferers. For example, a focus on alternative
nutritional practices and the need for volunteer companion-helpers is an example of
health citizenship in action, while the continued reliance and discussion of bio-medical
protocols and the need to include more expert professionals is an example of the ADAO's
need to incorporate a model of the healthy citizen. I have also demonstrated that these
differing models ofpersonhood are expressed through different geographical patterns and
environments. The healthy citizen, within the context of anxiety service provision, tends
to be located as forms of governance within institutions, institutional practices connected
to wider health and public health policies and organizational networks that have been well
established. However, as noted within the thesis by authors such as Lupton and Petersen,
the concept of the healthy citizen is one that has been readily adopted as a form of the
new public health or within contemporary public health practices. As such the healthy
citizen is located in a wide array of places and persons extending from and beyond
clinical institutions. The healthy citizen is far more likely to look for assistance in
dominant clinical landscapes and institutional geographies, while as a model ofhealth
citizenship tends to be diffusely located outside of or in opposition to the spaces of
clinical expertise and power. This has an affect on the creation of power relations and
feelings of empowerment. Health citizenship and practices of health citizenship can be
found within various institutional or clinical settings, its geography tends to be far more
varied, located in different complex socio-spatial settings often outside of an institutional
framework. The geographies of the body are also affected by differing versions of
citizenship. How we come to understand our bodies is contingent on what embodied
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experiences matter and are counted. In this sense differing visions of citizenship have a
significant impact of issues of self-empowerment and power relations with others.
Both models can be empowering and disempowering. Both actively foster different types
of community and spaces of community. However as I have argued throughout the thesis
for those individuals with anxiety who never quite research the 'ideal' of a sickness free
body, the healthy citizen can be a disempowering and disheartening ideal, while health
citizenship (which can be equally depressing) can be directed to enhancing those
individual's sense of personhood and subjectivity through aspects of sociability and
community development. Within the thesis I have explored how health citizenship can
involve looking for alternative radical democratic spaces of citizenship connected to
processes of community development and organization. The example of the volunteer
companion program that take into account the lived daily needs and realities of
agoraphobic sufferers is an example of how health citizenship is connected to processes
of empowerment, mobility and feelings of belonging which further fosters processes of
community and subjectivity. Through this discussion of health citizenship and the
volunteer companion program I have also explored how models of health citizenship
means looking for different expressions of citizenship beyond the public-private divide.
Health citizenship is a process where people are positioned in complex ways that may
help to resist or subvert existing meanings and spaces of the political, extending meanings
of the political beyond that of the institutions of the 'clinic' or 'state'.
The thesis demonstrates that the tension the ADAO has between balancing its desire to
create a space for itself alongside its desire to network with other service providers is a
reflection of the tension between health citizenship and the healthy citizen. Additionally
the ADAO's move back and forth between these models is a reflection of the diversity of
viewpoints in the wider community of sufferers to anxiety service provision. Having the
ideal vision of the healthy citizen can be very useful for some,'and very destructive for
others. Though I have presented these models of subjectivity in opposition to one another
intentionally, practically these models are situated in a continuum alongside each other at
different times and in different contexts. This does not mean however that these models
work with similar understandings of embodiment and subjectivity, rather that they are not
mutually exclusive. In further research and study drawing out that continuum and the
slippage between these models would be useful in the context of further thinking about
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the issues and tensions raised within the thesis. This lack has been a primary limitation of
the study.
The analysis of citizenship is limited within the context of the thesis largely due to my
desire to present the viewpoints and opinions of an organization that is struggling within a
landscape ofanxiety service provision. In this way, and for this reason I have unfairly
polarized health citizenship and the healthy citizen. This may not be so much the product
of studying an individual organization or case study, but recognition of how my
embeddedness within the ADAO and empathy for its needs desires and causes affected
the analysis of the thesis. Ultimately the research has been directed by my empathy for
the problems I observed during the research process, motivated by my fear of the
direction that the ADAO seems to be heading. The focus on health citizenship is directly
connected to my anxiety that the ADAO is moving more towards models of the healthy
citizen, away from constructing spaces of difference, thus reducing the potential number
of alternatives for sufferers within the mental service sector.
The trend towards the healthy citizen is found not only within the mental health sector but
also, within the third or voluntary 'health' sector more widely. From mental health groups
to women's shelters more organizations are being coerced and forced to adopt practices
of the clinic that highlight the importance of professional clinical expertise and
technologies of visualizing and surveying the body over other knowledge practices and
forms of lay and non clinical expertise. The move towards adopting the healthy citizen
and practices of the clinic, illustrated within the 'body' and 'mind' chapters, is such a
pervasive process that it has almost become commonsensical, the direction that
organizations must take to stay alive. This, for me, is problematic and needs to be actively
questioned for its potential to affect people's lives. The thesis illustrates, using the case
study of the ADAO, that the path towards the healthy citizen is fraught with
complications for individuals and groups.
Part of the problem in adopting the healthy citizen is that organizations such as the
ADAO are not positioned to recognize the important contributions they make to the wider
societies they are a part of. This means that those groups may not value what they have to
offer, and thus are more likely to adopt other methods, ideas or directions that make the
group more profitable or recognizable by more dominant service providers. In response to
this, the thesis suggests that the ADAO has a considerable amount to offer. The thesis
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specifically used concepts and themes that are not conventionally thought of in the
context of anxiety service provision in order to challenge the criteria by which health
service providers are judged. The concepts of relational autonomy and health citizenship
were chosen because they exist as discourses that remain disconnected from work within,
and by, the ADAO and yet are intimately connected to the work of the ADAO and to
understanding or improving the quality of people's lives more generally. The ADAO is an
organization that has the potential to affect individuals' lives, the life of the community
and the world ofpolitics. Ultimately while the research has been limited by a more
polarized analysis ofmodels of citizenship and presents a partial viewpoint of the context
of anxiety service provision, the thesis provides a point of departure from which to
develop future questions, more comparative analytic frameworks and explore different
forms of discourse.
9.4 Thesis contributions, and future questions.
In this section I touch on some of the contributions the thesis makes to academic research
in the discipline of human geography. This is reflected in the implications of the thesis
findings for wider academic audiences. I focus on what health, and mental health
geographers can take from the thesis and how those findings help reshape current agendas
within health geography? I conclude the thesis with a discussion ofwhat future questions
arise from the research project.
In the introduction of the thesis I offered three general aims that the thesis has worked
towards. First, to highlight the importance and relevance that anxiety organizations, and
the experiences of its membership, have for further study. Second, to provide
geographical insights of relevance to the experience of individuals with anxiety
conditions and groups that deal with anxiety conditions. And third, to contribute to, and
expand on, geographical, feminist and political theory by illustrating the connections
between geography, embodied experiences of anxiety, mental health service provision
and the negotiation of identity, community and citizenship. These aims have been met in
different ways within the thesis project.
The thesis has introduced the reader to importance of the experiences of sufferer-led
anxiety organizations for geographical study, while expanding on a growing literature
within geography on the anxiety condition agoraphobia. In so doing the thesis has
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explored also the intersection between community, institution and identity in ways that
highlight the important of organizations in mediating individual and collective identity, a
sense of self, and a sense of place. It is important to further study voluntary groups and
community based organizations that address mental health issues, as they enhance an
understanding of the geographies and processes of health for individuals and groups.
The thesis has bridged themes and issues in diverse areas of interdisciplinary scholarship,
as well as bringing together issues within human geography, i.e. feminist geography,
mental health geography, in innovative ways that suggest possibilities for further
research. This is not new to human geographers who draw increasingly on different areas
of geography and "other disciplinary fields to elucidate the complex connections between
the human individual, the social collective and various 'spatialities of the self" (Parr,
1999b: 673).
The thesis also discusses issues central to feminist political theory using geographical
insights, which contribute to the production of both geographical, feminist and political
knowledges and theory. The research has expanded on some subjects discussed within
human geography such as care, community and citizenship. The thesis has shown that
some concepts in feminist political theory, such as autonomy and relational autonomy,
have not been directly or well explored within human geography. These concepts are both
useful in thinking about concepts and questions within mental health geography in
particular, thus further exploration of autonomy is needed within the discipline.
Additionally, there are other more specific contributions that the thesis has made to
geographical knowledge production, methodology and theory.
First, the thesis has introduced a number of specific concepts that are relevant and
potentially useful for other forms of geographical inquiry. First, methodological irony is
methodologically useful in thinking about different aspects of the production of
geographical research and that is of relevance to further feminist geographical research
and thinking about issues of the 'field'. Second, spatial recognition skills highlight the
importance of understanding space and place as constitutive of self and subject. This has
implications for the development of feminist political theory around the issue of
autonomy, and the insights geographical theory provides for a feminist politics. Third and
most notably, the issue of the healthy citizen and health citizenship. The concept of health
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citizenship has the potential to contribute to insights within geographical literatures in
ways that connect issues of political relevance to geographical analysis. Health
citizenship is based on a pivotal issue found throughout human geography related to how
the conceptualization and material construction of bodies make a difference to our
experience of place. The thesis has explored the variety ofways that bodies are
materialized, inscribed and (re) located in place and as space (Duncan, 1996b; Pile and
Thrift, 1995). A discussion of health citizenship highlights how our bodies help us to
'map' people's geographies, communities and identities throughout the life course. These
issues are all central to human geography. Health citizenship brings to the fore the issue
ofwho counts (whose body counts) as the bearer of knowledge and whose experiences
and geographies are privileged or marginalized (Chouinard and Grant, 1995; Dyck, 1998;
Moss and Dyck, 1996; 1999b). Health citizenship is concerned to explore the various
interstices through which diversity and difference can be explored. Thus health
citizenship is ofparticular interest for feminist geographers who are concerned to explore
the stories of those who remain unheard. The concept of health citizenship needs to be
expanded on further using information and theory from other areas of geography, such as
political geography and cultural geography in addition to feminist and health geography
to further expand on the varied meanings of health citizenship.
Second, the thesis makes connections between geographies of the body, geographies of
mental health and geographies of fear in innovative ways. These connections highlight
the centrality of embodiment within the research process, hence the focus on health
citizenship as an embodied politics. The substantive chapters of the thesis begin by
drawing on and contributing to geographical theory on the body. Focusing on the body as
a lived geography, a medium through which to understand spatial relationships and the
nature of place. Bodies become sites of political contestation that act as a critique of the
ideal of universality, detached objectivity and rationality central to a model of the healthy
citizen.
The thesis has not only investigated the body's internal spaces, but the way in which
those internal geographies are connected to imagined and material environments. In this
way the thesis has contributed to an area of mental health geography that requires further
discussion. The thesis focuses not only on the shifting boundaries between interior and
exterior explored in relation to the creation of environments within and outside of the
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body itself, but the relationship between, fantasy, delusion, imagination and memory
which brings a new dimension to thinking about the body, identity and subjectivity.
This can translate into concrete and imaginative geographies that feed directly into a
landscape of social exclusion, marginalized by others or selfmarginalized, as is the case
with many agoraphobic individuals.
Criticisms have been made of the way in which corporeality has been approached in
mental health geographies. One the one hand, the body in medical geographies "simply
becomes the site invaded by disease with a specific etiology" (Hall, 2000: 21). And on the
other medical/health geographies have focused so extensively on representations of the
body the spatialities and implications of the physical presence of the body are neglected
(Parr, 1998a:28). This thesis has confronted this concern directly intertwining clinical and
non-clinical representations of anxiety conditions to the lived and somatic experiences of
those with anxiety conditions such as panic and agoraphobia, and how that is further
negotiated by groups that deal with anxiety conditions. In so doing the thesis has paid
critical attention to the spaces of clinical practice in relationship to the body, clinic, and
community in ways that decenter (Dyck, 1998) but do not disregard the clinical, which is
considered central for the study of health geography (Hall, 2000; Parr, 1999a; 2000;
Philo, 2000). Additionally the thesis has posited that bodies are dynamic and complex
spaces of individual and collective resistance whereby biomedical inscription interweaves
with bodily and social experiences in complex ways (Dyck, 1998, Chouinard, 1999).
Thus, as shown through the healthy citizen and health citizenship that the discursive
formation of the healthy and unhealthy body is a complex signification process whereby
the body becomes socially, economically, and politically legitimized in culturally
intelligible ways (Moss and Dyck, 1999a).
The analysis of the body in chapter five taken together with chapter six of the thesis
expands the geographical literature on the body by connecting geographies of
embodiment, to work on the geographies of fear and the geographies ofmental health.
Chapter five highlights how the stigma of the mental affects processes of identity and
subjectivity focusing on the body and self as an imagined geography. The stigma of the
mental also affects geographies outside of the body, both imagined and concrete. The
stigmatization ofmental illness comes to affect how people understand themselves, their
bodies, others around them, and the worlds in which they live. This chapter focuses on
how the stigma of the mental is associated with the places of institutionalization- "a
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process of tertiary spatialization" (Foucault, 1976), rather than on the specific imagined
geographies of panic sufferers themselves. The thesis has explored how landscapes of
fear are interconnected to landscapes of care based in forms of governmentality.
"Landscapes of care" involve an examination of how anxiety service provision is
spatialized and how meanings of care are defined, created and located within and by those
geographies (Gleeson and Kearns, 2001). In this way geographies of knowledge
production are connected to patterns of anxiety service provision and community
organization.
And third, a central concern for geographers involves the issue of boundaries that is
addressed within the thesis. The thesis as a whole is concerned with the issue of
boundaries, whether those boundaries are material and embodied or metaphoric and
discursive. Boundaries between what is internal and external to the body, between self
and other, between self and subject, between individuals and groups, between researcher
and researched, boundaries between groups, boundaries between theory and practice, and
boundaries within disciplinary knowledge production. These boundaries can be divisive;
they can be enabling; they can form a 'crisis'; they can be blurred, interdependent and
transformative of the other; and boundaries can point to the limits and possibilities of
knowledge production and political action. Thinking about boundaries is central to a
geographical project concerned with spaces in which difference is possible and actively
worked with.
While the titles for chapters five and six, 'body' and 'mind', refer to a legacy of Cartesian
dualisms which have separated body and mind in deeply problematic ways that need to be
challenged, the chapter titles for chapters seven and eight 'heart and 'breath' are
metaphoric for intersectional and interpersonal boundaries between self and other, and the
interconnectedness of boundaries between self, subject and environment respectively.
In chapter five 'body', the connection between self and space is explored with a particular
focus on embodiment, bodily boundaries and geographies of the body. In chapter six
'mind' the connection between self and subject is explored through an analysis of
competing boundaries of anxiety knowledge production within landscapes of care. Taken
together these two chapters illustrate how the negotiation of embodied boundaries, of
what is inside and outside of the body, the somatic and the spatial, profoundly affect the
boundaries of self and other and self and subject.
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Chapter seven, 'heart', explores how boundaries between self and other are relational,
thereby implying that the boundaries of networking with others is central to the process of
creating a space of one's own. The chapter focuses primarily on how the ADAO's
understanding of relational boundaries contributes to the effectiveness and usefulness of
its programs, and what the organization has to offer that is unique within the context of
anxiety service provision. The chapter celebrated the ADAO's capacity for creating
interpersonal relational spaces in which interchange contributes to self-trust and well-
being. Chapter eight, 'breath', extends the discussion of relational boundaries to include a
discussion around community and the public/private divide, challenging the traditional
boundaries between public and private spaces and the public and private sphere. The
ADAO, through its volunteer companion program extends and complicates the
boundaries between public and private thereby offering new ways ofexploring the
boundaries of community and the construction of citizenship.
The issue of boundaries could also be framed in terms of attachment and detachment.
Chapters five, 'body', and six, 'mind', focus on processes of detachment. For example,
the "boundary crisis" of a panic attack and resulting agoraphobic avoidance behaviors
that further separate the individual from the spaces in which they live and other people, or
the process of othering the self involved in the stigmatization ofmental illness that further
detach those individuals from a positive subjectivity and from engaging with others to
form a sense of community. In contrast chapters seven, 'heart', and eight, 'breath', focus
on processes of attachment and reattachment. These processes of attachment relate the
self to other in positive, enabling ways through a recognition of the interconnectedness of
space, self, identity and community.
The thesis may have productively contributed to areas of knowledge production but the
thesis leaves open many areas that are in need of further discussion and investigation.
There has been an increase within the geographical literature on anxiety conditions such
as agoraphobia; however, there is still a long way to go, and many more issues to address.
This thesis has not covered all anxiety conditions, such as post traumatic stress disorder
or obsessive compulsive disorder, which offer new directions for study and literature.
Issues such as race, immigration status, ethnicity and socio-economic factors such as
poverty, education and class could enrich an analysis of anxiety conditions and the
organizations that address these issues. Additionally, while this thesis reflected
interviewee's discussions and perceptions of the context of anxiety service provision,
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more work is needed that presents a more nuanced and complicated analysis of the
relationship between non clinical, clinical, self help and alternative practices around
anxiety conditions.
Finally, it is hoped that the thesis will contribute to increased interest within health
geography about a body politics. The thesis research points to an opportunity to expand
on the politics ofmental health geography within the discipline. The issue ofhealth
citizenship needs to be more fully explored within different contexts and using different
theoretical frames of references such as risk theory, disability studies and public health
management; using different political theorists, for example Habermas, Lefebrve and
Arendt, whose work is directly connected to geographical issues; and using the work of
different geographers situated in different sub-disciplines. Additionally while the thesis
did not work with much political or cultural geographical work, drawing together political
and cultural geography with work within health geography and feminist geography would
be useful.
214
Appendix I - Letter of Introduction
Date:
Ruth Bankey
Ph.D. Student, University of Edinburgh
Email: rba@geo.ed.ac.uk
Web site: www.geo.ed.ac.uk/~rba/
Tel: (613) 236 3990
Dear Participant,
My name is Ruth Bankey, 1 am a researcher and Ph.D. student at the University of
Edinburgh in the department of geography. I have been researching issues pertaining to
agoraphobia and panic disorder for the past three years. I first became aware of the
Anxiety Disorders Association of Ontario in 1997, which at that time was known as the
Agoraphobia Peer Support Network, when I began my Master's research on agoraphobia
at Carleton University, Ottawa. Since that time 1 have seen the ADAO expand its program
base, contacts and membership. I am very interested in the growth of the ADAO as an
organization because, in spite of its success, many other panic, anxiety and agoraphobia
community groups and organizations across Canada have not had similar successes.
I am interested in talking to persons who have been consulted or worked with the ADAO
since its inception in order to better understand why the ADAO has developed into the
organization it is today. I think that this research will not only be beneficial to the ADAO
itself and its membership, in that it will provide a thorough record and analysis of its
history, but I believe that this research will help other community groups and associations
in better understanding what makes for an effective organization.
I hope that you will agree to participate in this study, because it is important and ground
breaking research. I am asking you to participate in an interview, the time and date to be
set up at your convenience, and perhaps a follow up interview at a later date. If you agree
to participate in this research, 1 ask you to sign an informed consent form which outlines
your rights, provides more details of this study and lets you know that the information
you provide will be treated confidentially and respectfully.
If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact me at the addresses or
numbers above. If you would like more information on my research I have a research web





Appendix II - Informed Consent Form
I have spoken with Ruth Bankey concerning her research on panic and agoraphobia
communities and have read the letter of introduction informing me of the research and its
purposes. I, consent to participate in
this doctoral research project conducted by Ruth Bankey in order to express my views on
the subject.
I understand that my participation in the project will include the following activities and
terms (This is a flexible document and can be added to or modified at
my request):
1) I understand that I have a right to withdraw from the research process at any time
regardless of the reason without recrimination. I have a right to refuse to answer any
question and have a right to request the erasure ofany record with which I am
uncomfortable for any reason.
2) I understand that the research process may involve a number of interviews and that the
time and place of the interview will be mutually agreed upon. The interviews will be
taped and transcribed and all transcripts and audio recordings will remain confidential and
placed in a secure locked location.
3) I understand that (please choose one of the options)
(A) Personal names or any other information which would serve to identify myself as an
informant will not be included in this thesis.
(B) Personal names or other information which would serve to identify myself as an
informant can be included in this thesis.
4) I understand that I can receive and review a written transcript of the interviews and that
I can suggest modifications for accuracy or to add new information.
5) I understand that the information from the interviews will be used in the construction
of a thesis document, which may be used in further research and/or published. I also
understand that I will be informed about the research process as well as the findings
progress of the research thesis process. I understand that a summary of the research





Appendix III - Interview Schedule - (examples of questions)
1) Background -professional/occupational information and positions
• What paid or unpaid work do you do?
• What is your role? As a practitioner why do people come to you?
• How long have you been/worked in the Ottawa area?
• Have you worked with other anxiety/panic/agoraphobia organizations, individuals
elsewhere?
2) What is panic and agoraphobia, viewpoints of panic and agoraphobia and how it
should be addressed
• How do you define Panic and agoraphobia
• Do you make a distinction between Panic and agoraphobia
• What is your sense ofwhat happens to people with panic, during a panic attack,
during a period of agoraphobia avoidance?
• Do they seek help? From whom?
• How do you think panic and agoraphobia is understood or seen by others, by the
'public'?
• How do other people react to (your) panic and agoraphobia?
• Can you think of any media representations ofpanic and agoraphobia?
• Do you think panic and agoraphobia is taken seriously compared to other health
conditions?
3) Personal background information on why they work with persons with anxiety
conditions or joined/volunteered for the ADAO
• Why did you become interested in/involved in working with persons with anxiety
conditions?
• Why did you become interested in/involved in working with the ADAO?
• How has your.own anxiety condition affected the ADAO?
4) What is there personal history in relation to the ADAO, what are their roles within the
ADAO? What have they done for and with the ADAO? Who have they worked with?
Interaction with other members
• Could you describe your personal experiences and history, starting from when you
first joined the ADAO till today?
• What was your first impression of the ADAO, its members, has that changed?
Why? In what way?
• How would you describe what panic and agoraphobia are based on your
experience with the ADAO?
• What have yo.u enjoyed most or least about working with the ADAO? Any
examples to help elaborate?
5) Questions about ADAO's organization, history, viewpoints, challenges, future
directions
• Could you describe to me, based on your time at the ADAO the structure of the
ADAO, then and now?
• Could you provide me with a time line and history of the ADAO itself?
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• What are some characteristics that describe the ADAO when you first joined,
characteristics that stand out in your mind, both positive and negative?
• What were the implications of those characteristics for the organization?
• Future directions, suggestions for the ADAO?
6) Anxiety, panip, agoraphobia and service provision
• What barriers, problems, advantages exist for providing services for those with
anxiety condtions, panic , agoraphobia?
• What services exist in Ottawa?
• What services does the ADAO provide?
• Flow do you think services should be, could best be, provided for persons with
anxiety qonditions? Internet? Outreach programs? Educational Programs?
• Are there differing ppinions within the city about service provision?
• To what extent is service provision dependent on funding?
• What is the ADAO's history of funding, what is funding like within Ottawa for
anxiety conditions?
7) Anxiety conditions, community and the Ottawa area
• What other anxiety/panic/agoraphobia communities exist in the Ottawa area that
you know of?
• How are these linked, related, connected to the ADAO? The health care system?
8)Anxiety conditions and the Internet
• Have you ever used the Internet for PDA research, in your practice or
information?
• How has the ADAO used the Internet? Positive negative experiences and aspects?
• How has the Internet affected the organization and effectiveness of the ADAO?
9) Anxiety, Panic and agoraphobia and gender issues
• I've noticed that most of the staff, volunteers and consultants are women, do you
think this has affected the way the ADAO is run, the dynamics of the organization
and its effectiveness? Why?
• I've also noticed that most of the people who join and use the ADAO are women,
how has this affected the way in which the ADAO has developed and been
organized?
• Generally speaking, do you think gender is a factor in the success or running of
the ADAO? Has it been discussed?
• Have you thought about why the ADAO is mostly women? Has it affected its
programs?
• Often panic and agoraphobia are described as a female disorder, given your
experience with the ADAO what do you think about this statement?
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Appendix IV - Revised and Additional Interview Schedule of Questions
Questions:
1) How did you come to be involved with the ADAO? What were your first impressions
of the ADAO and/or members of the ADAO? Have those first impressions changed?
How and why?
2) What has been your involvement (different roles) with the ADAO and what have those
various roles or positions involved?
3) What did you enjoy most and least about working with the ADAO?
4) What are some of the ADAO's positive and negative characteristics, its strengths and
weaknesses?
5) Given your previous work in Ottawa what did you/ do you see as the role of the ADAO
within the city relative to other health service providers (ROH, CMHA, private clinics,
universities) and the general public?
6) What future directions, or roles would you like the ADAO take? Or perhaps are afraid
may happen?
7) The ADAO uses the term panic condition as opposed to the DSM's panic disorder.
Language is an important issue within mental health that is central to the construction of
identity, the professionalization of knowledge, etc.. How would you discuss issues of
language in your experience ofworking in the area of anxiety, panic and agoraphobia.
8) In my interviews so far the word 'heart' has come up time and again both as an
important characteristic of panic (heart palpitations, heart attack) and as a way of
distinguishing between different kinds of services within the city (they have a lot of heart,
she really puts her heart into it). In critically thinking about clinical and non-clinical
services for persons with anxiety, panic and agoraphobia how would you use the term
'heart', in the context ofOttawa? Same question for body, mind and breath
9) How are various services within Ottawa perceived? Are there 'tensions', differences
and politics between different types of services- or perhaps you have a very different
image of anxiety, panic and agoraphobia services in Ottawa).
10) Often ailments such as panic are perceived of as a 'private' individual problem by a
wider public - its 'your' problem. What do you think about this statement? Is it a private
concern, a public concern? How do various services in Ottawa (ADAO, ROH, etc...) take
this kind of sentiment into account in its programs and functioning?
11) Do you think panic, anxiety and agoraphobia are taken seriously ( especially in
comparison to other conditions) by the public? Why/ why not)? Why isn't there a more
public discourse on these issues? Have you seen anyone or any organization try to address
this concern? What did they do?
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Appendix IV - Heart Codes
Each word or code is a section that contains examples and excerpts from the transcripts or
from quantitative data provided by the ADAO. They should be read as headings and
subheadings. Due to reasons of confidentiality and space within the thesis text- those
quotes are not included. Some codes are repetitive, this suggests my interest in the
material.
Step 1 - Heart - Examples in the text




❖ Heart in the right place
❖ Good hearted
❖ Heart and soul
❖ It's in her heart
❖ Heart of the whole thing
♦♦♦ How much heart is going into that area
❖ Have a heart
❖ Bleeding hearts
❖ My heart pounds
❖ Heart-stethoscope to listen to heart
♦♦♦ Heart disease
♦> Heart rate
❖ Put my heart in 100%
❖ A great deal of heart
Step 2 - General issues that arise in those examples. Themes surrounding those
































Step 3 - Highlighting Issues - go beyond individual words to develop discrete themes
1) Heart and the center of things- issues of centrality
2) Heart celebrating difference
3) Nurturing the group and the individual
4) Heart notions of self
5) Connecting community identity with self identity
6) Characterizing the organization with heart
7) Expressing processes of dehumanization
8) Misperceptions of the body
9) Specific examples
• Heartfullness
• Spirituality- mind body place interconnections
Step 4 - Selective Codes - development ofmore specific issues
1) The physical experience of panic
• Reminder of the presence of the body
• Separation of body-other-space
• Loss of control over body
• Individual/private sensations
• Legitimacy of ailment
• Labeling/rootness of biomedical














4) Heart relationships between self and other
• Care and compassion
• Trust and friendship
5) Heart Discourse and Knowledge Production
• Openness, receptiveness
• Multiplicity, diversity of ideas
6) Heart- charity, voluntary, grassroots
• Qualities of voluntary, charitable, grassroots organization
• Nature ofpaid/unpaid work
• Personal investment in-group
7) Characterizing the organization with one person
• Issues of risk
• Issues of safety
• Issues of transition
8) Organizational management- issues of trust
• Need to foster trust
• Centrality of trust in programs, services
• Motivation of staff, volunteers, board
• Trust within the system
• Clinical trust/ non-clinical trust
9) Qualities of organizational development
• Transition from one person's baby or idea to group and collective status and
recognition
• Qualities of volunteers
• Qualities of staff
• What people bring to the group?
• Leadership
10) Differentiating types of knowledge
• Around caring practices
• Institutional/voluntary
• Clinical /non clinical
• Lay/professional
• Holistic/scientific directed
• Human centered/goal centered
11) Processes of dehumanization
• Forms of negation
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• Treating person or problem
12) Creating respectful relationships




• Between health care services and individuals
• Between heart care providers themselves




• Business like /professionalism
• Issues of attachment/detachment
• How professionals should act
• Creation of appearances
14) Centrality of emotions on board
• Sympathy/empathy
• Running the board
• Forms ofauthority, power and hierarchy
15) Relationship between individual and group
• Ethical issues around exposure
• Safety
• Issues of growth
• Autopathographies
16) Creation of safe spaces
• Response to panic
• Reflections of divisions in service provision
17) Make space for the organization
• Its own space
• Having a space
Step 5 - Connecting Codes with Theory
1) Heart as an expression ofhow people are relational
• Simultaneously emotional, social, political and embodied
2) Heart as metaphoric for the relational self
• Self characterized by attachment
• Fosters personal drive and passion
• Autonomy through example
• Autonomy through instruction
3) Developing self trust
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• Self-knowledge through ethic of trust
• Ethic of care/justice






• Autonomy and other forms of subjectivity
5) Heart- passion and autonomy competency
• Identity and community
• Intersectionality
• Organizational issues
• Passion not as individualistic but as connective drives and motivates people to do
things and to move towards others
• Issues of self-trust
• Positionality
6) Heart and the authentic self
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